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ABSOLUTE ALLIANCES: EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
MIRA RAPP-HOOPER 
 
What is a nuclear umbrella alliance and how does it differ from other defensive 
alliances in international politics? Scholars and practitioners frequently refer to this type of 
pact, but no study has defined it or identified how a nuclear security  guarantee, as an 
umbrella alliance is better-termed, is unique. This dissertation presents and tests a theory 
of nuclear security guarantee formation and management. 
In Chapter 1, I establish two factors that make nuclear security guarantees novel: 
their ambiguous treaty content and unilateral provision of military aid. I present my 
Theory of Absolute Alliances, positing that these alliance attributes can be explained by the 
fact that security guarantees aim to establish deterrence by punishment in addition to 
deterrence by denial. Security guarantees’ vague content and one-sided provision of 
capabilities, however, means that they are also riddled with vexing information problems 
that patron and client must manage at all stages of their alliance relations. I derive three 
hypotheses on security guarantee formation, entrapment, and abandonment that are tested 
in this project. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I present a hypothesis on nuclear security guarantee formation, 
positing that while the presence of shared adversaries among prospective allies may 
explain the formation of many defense pacts, nuclear security guarantees have more 
exacting conditions for formation. For security guarantees to form, prospective allies 
should have exclusive adversaries—that is, one or more shared adversaries and no 
unshared adversaries—between them. I test this proposition statistically and using case 
 
 
studies of the US decision to deny Israel a formal security guarantee and the formation of 
the Franco-Russian alliance, a non-security guarantee. 
In Chapter 4 I hypothesize that security guarantees’ ambiguous and unilateral 
nature may create a heightened risk of crisis entrapment for patrons. These features serve 
the purposes of general deterrence, but once an ally is involved in a crisis, they also mean 
that the patron is inclined to intervene to clarify its commitment to a weaker ally that 
cannot credibly defend itself. I test this hypothesis using summary statistics and qualitative 
case studies of the US-Taiwan and Sino-Soviet alliances in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. I 
also examine US non-intervention in the Beagle Channel Crisis, a non-security guarantee 
case. 
In Chapter 5, I present a hypothesis on client state abandonment fears. Security 
guarantee clients are prone to particularly acute abandonment fears. I posit that because of 
the a priori information deficits in these pacts, patrons may try to address abandonment 
fears through the unilateral provision of information on patron strategies and policies. I 
examine case studies of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended Deterrence 
Dialogues in the US-Japan alliance, and consultation in the US-Thailand alliance, a non-
security guarantee.  
I find significant support for my three hypotheses and conclude this study with 
directions for future research and policy implications.
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Nuclear Umbrella: n. The protection provided by the nuclear weapons of one country to its 
allies. 
-Oxford English Dictionary 
  
 The Oxford English Dictionary provides a straightforward entry for a “nuclear 
umbrella,” and one that accords with its common usage by policymakers and national 
security analysts. But this crisp definition belies a deeper puzzle: The term “nuclear 
umbrella” has no real legal or political meaning, and most experts who use it are not 
entirely certain of what it comprises or where it originated. Moreover, while a large body of 
Cold War-era work examined some of the complexities related to the practice of extended 
deterrence, no political science study has asked or analyzed whether and how so-called 
nuclear umbrella pacts differ from other types of alliances. These are the subjects of this 
dissertation.  
The origins of so-called nuclear umbrella alliances are to be found in American 
strategy following World War II. Following the widespread devastation of many of its 
partners, US policymakers hoped to restore and reinforce the balance of power in Western 
Europe and Asia against the emergent communist threat from the Soviet Union, and 
originally sought to do so using economic and political means. 1 Early references to 
“umbrella arrangements” in US government documents refer to initiatives such as the 
Marshall Plan, which was intended to give European allies shelter under which to recover 
from the devastation of conflict with the eventual aim of permitting those states to return 
                                                           
1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of National Security Policy During the 
Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 36-37.  
2 
to complete political independence.2  By 1948, strategists in the Truman administration 
came to believe that economic aid alone would not suffice: The United States would have to 
exert “counter-pressure” and establish “strongpoint defense” against the Soviet Union to 
buttress the political and territorial status quo in Western Europe as Moscow consolidated 
its own position in the East.3  
The idea of using alliances towards this end, however, came from the Europeans 
themselves, who formed the Brussels Treaty in 1948 to aggregate their military capabilities 
against a conventionally-superior USSR.  They sought the United States’ association with 
this arrangement precisely because it had not been devastated by the war and possessed 
the world’s only atomic weapons and the means to deliver them. American participation 
could substantially strengthen Europe’s military position if Washington would only 
indicate a willingness to use these weapons from afar in its allies’ defense. With the United 
States’ pledge, the North Atlantic Alliance was born. Shortly after NATO’s 1949 founding, 
select US government documents began to refer to Washington’s “security umbrella” to the 
alliance as a military and political influence strategy that went well beyond economic aid.4  
 In the vigorous Senate debates that preceded NATO treaty ratification, congressmen 
implicitly recognized the Janus-faced nature of the US security umbrella.  Senators argued 
and the public believed that the NATO treaty “required the United States to treat an attack 
                                                           
2 The first relevant reference to an American “umbrella” that this author can locate in the Foreign Relations of 
the United States series is a 1948 discussion of US political and economic aid to Europe. In this document, 
American umbrella aid is contrasted with Western Europe’s own efforts toward military unity in the form of 
the Brussels Treaty. “Western European Unity and Defense,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 
Western Europe, p. 218 (Hereafter FRUS).  
3 Gaddis, pp. 48-57.  
4 See, e.g., “Meeting of US Ambassadors at Paris, October 21-22, 1949,” FRUS 1949, Western Europe, p. 489.  
In this document, US Ambassadors to European countries define the US “security umbrella” to NATO as its 
unilateral military commitment to the alliance. 
3 
on London like an attack on Washington DC.”5 Testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, however, underscored the fact that “the treaty is so vaguely constructed 
and so replete with double talk” that its ratification would not actually tie Washington’s 
hands.6 The alliance at once appeared to bestow upon the United States the most solemn of 
military responsibilities while not actually binding it to carry out any particular action, 
because its treaty promises were so amorphous.  
 The apparent first use of the full term “nuclear umbrella” in the Congressional 
Record occurred in 1959, when a Senator used it to explain Western Europe’s failure to 
devote sufficient resources to its own defense.7 This date accords with the terms entry into 
the public lexicon. The chart below demonstrates that the phrase appeared in almost no 
English-language books until the late 1950s, became reasonably widespread by 1965, and 
reached its peak popularity in 1985. Its usage declined steadily after the Cold War ended.  
So what was—or, more accurately, is—this elusive “nuclear umbrella” or “security 




                                                           
5 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Congressional 
Record, Part 1, pp. 276-282, Part 2 pp. 518-525, as quoted in Mariah Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of 
Constitutional Authority, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 130.  
6 North Atlantic Treaty Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 81st 
Congress, Congressional Record, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 975.  
7 Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, Disarmament and 
Foreign Policy Hearings, January 28, 30 and February 2, 1959 (Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1959), p. 261.  
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Definitions and Scope 
For the purposes of this study, a nuclear umbrella alliance is a formal, positive, 
security guarantee extended by a nuclear power to another sovereign state. This definition 
has several components. First, it is a security guarantee. Second, it is extended by a nuclear 
weapons-possessing state to another country. Third, it is a formal alliance agreement. And 
fourth, it is a positive promise extended by a state actor. I consider each of these 
components in turn.  
 To begin, an umbrella alliance involves a security guarantee that explicitly states 
that an attack on one ally will be considered an attack on both or all. This is known as a 
mutual defense or collective defense clause.8 Most scholarly studies have defined a nuclear 
umbrella alliance as any defense pact concluded with a nuclear power.9 The historical 
                                                           
8 An important exception to this is the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, whose title belies the fact that the 
agreement is largely one-sided owing to Japan’s constitutional constraints on the use of force.  
9 To wit, every political science study that employs nuclear umbrella alliances as an independent variable 
defines them as any defense pact extended by a nuclear power. This definition ignores the fact that states can 
and do extend more limited defense pacts that are not full security guarantees. Dan Reiter, “Security 
Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 10, No. 1, (2014), pp. 61-80; Matthew 
Fuhrmann, and Todd S. Sechser. "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended 
Nuclear Deterrence." American Journal of Political Science (2014); Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Todd S. Sechser, 
5 
record and basic intuition make clear, however, that states can and do conclude more 
limited defense pacts without having extended full security guarantees. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 1, some defense pacts apply only to delimited adversaries, in specific 
theaters, or in certain contingencies. Some promise only consultation in the event of an 
attack, but do not necessarily promise military aid. Security guarantees are therefore best 
thought of as a subset of defense pacts, but the two categories are not interchangeable. For 
an alliance to qualify as a nuclear umbrella pact, the alliance treaty itself must contain 
mutual or collective defense language.   
Second, to qualify as an umbrella pact, the country extending the security guarantee 
must itself possess nuclear weapons. Those states who extend security guarantees do not, 
in general, declare the means that will be used to repel an attack on their allies. Security 
guarantees are intended to cover the spectrum of escalation from a serious conventional to 
a nuclear attack. Patron possession of a nuclear capability implies that these weapons may 
be used if necessary.  These pacts are deemed “nuclear umbrella” alliances by virtue of the 
fact that they are extended by nuclear powers. They do not traditionally contain overt 
                                                           
“Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), pp. 455-480; Bleek, Philipp C., and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Why Do States 
Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” in Potter 
and Mukhatzhanova, eds. Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century Vol. 1 (2010); 178-179. 
Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), pp. 429-454; Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke. “Determinants of Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007), pp. 167-194; Matthew Kroenig, 
“Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
Vol. 53, No. 2, (2009), Sonali Singh, and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation A 
Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 48, No. 6 (2004), pp. 859-88; Michael C. Horowitz, The 
Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics. Princeton University Press, 
2010.  
6 
promises of nuclear use.  Formal security guarantees could theoretically be extended by 
non-nuclear powers, but historically they have not been.10  
Third, this study focuses only on those guarantees that are formalized by alliance 
treaties, and candidate cases are admitted based on the text of the alliance treaty itself. I 
follow a widely used international relations definition of alliances:  “written agreements 
signed by official representatives of at least two independent states that include promises 
to aid a partner in the event of military conflict.”11 Formal alliances feature “specificity, 
legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal 
alignments.”12 Following the alliance literature’s emphasis on formal, written agreements 
between sovereign states, this study does not count among its nuclear umbrella/security 
guarantee cases relationships of strong alignment if they are not formalized in a security 
treaty. This is not to say that longstanding, tightly knit security relationships short of 
formal alliances are irrelevant or are incapable of producing deterrence. Rather, the need 
to delimit the phenomenon under study has led this author to select the formal security 
guarantee as a criterion.13  
This distinction is not purely definitional—even if alliance commitments short of 
formal security guarantees do send powerful deterrent signals, the basic fact that these are 
                                                           
10 This statement is based on the author’s review of all formal alliance treaties, 1816-present, as defined by 
the Correlates of War Project. The text of all treaties is available in; Douglas Gibler, International Military 
Alliances, 1648-2008, (Washington, CQ Press: 2008).   
11 The full definition is as follows: Alliances are “written agreements signed by official representatives of at 
least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain 
neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in 
the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.” Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. 
Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-
1944,” International Interactions Vol. 28 (2002), pp. 237-260. 
12 Glenn Snyder makes this observation. Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997), p. 8.  
13 Although they do not currently qualify as cases of nuclear security guarantees, the US defense relationship 
with Israel and with Taiwan are analyzed in this study.  
7 
alignments rather than formal alliances means that these commitments are distinct. The 
United States’ commitment to Taiwan from 1979 to present, for example, is one of strong 
alignment but not formal alliance. One is hard-pressed to argue that this relationship has 
not changed from the US-ROC relationship of 1954-1979, when the two states possessed a 
mutual defense treaty. The mere fact that the treaty was abrogated suggests that something 
about the commitment is different. The United States’ contemporary commitment to 
Taiwan is contingent and circumscribed when compared to the security guarantee that was 
once in place. Indeed, one alliance scholar terms the post-1979 US-Taiwan arrangement a 
“probabilistic commitment,” distinguishing it from the kind of commitment that exists in a 
broader guarantee.14 For the purposes of generating and developing a useful theory of 
security guarantee formation and management, then, I follow the recent practice of 
restricting my domain to formal alliance commitments only.  
Fourth and finally, umbrella alliances are positive guarantees extended by sovereign 
states. They are treaty-based promises that declare that if an ally becomes the victim of 
attack, military aid will be forthcoming. This phenomenon is distinct from the security 
assurances that are generally associated with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).15  
All five nuclear weapons states (NWS) that are recognized by the NPT have extended some 
form of unilateral, negative security assurances to non-nuclear powers. These are generally 
broad promises made by nuclear weapons-possessing states not to use those weapons 
against non-nuclear powers. Positive security guarantees are also distinct from positive 
                                                           
14 Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 169-190.  
15 For more on this distinction see Jeffery W. Knopf, “Varieties of Assurance,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 
35, No. 3, June 2012, p. 388. 
8 
security assurances, or general promises by NPT nuclear states to come to the aid of non-
nuclear states if they are attacked with nuclear weapons.16 NPT-related security assurances 
have generally come in the form of UN resolutions or unilateral declarations and do not 
constitute formal military alliances among sovereigns.17    
I have defined a nuclear umbrella alliance as a formal, positive, security guarantee 
extended by a nuclear power. This definition allows me to identify 54 total umbrella cases 
from 1945 to present. Three different nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet 
Union/Russia, and the United Kingdom— have extended these guarantees to their allies. 
Table 1 gives a full list of nuclear security guarantee cases. Figures 1 and 2 use maps to 
depict the universe of security guarantee cases. Figure 1 shows the three guarantee-
extending states and their umbrella allies during the Cold War. Figure 2 depicts the same 
relationships in the post-Cold War world.  
  
                                                           
16 NPT-related positive security assurances have generally been weak and diffuse. See Knopf, “Varieties of 
Assurance,” p. 389 for more on this.  
17 The earliest negative nuclear security assurances were extended via UN Security Council Resolution 255, 
accompanying the NPT. The nuclear powers adjusted these assurances at the 1978 and 1982 UN General 
Assembly Special Sessions on Disarmament. They were reworked again at the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference. For more on the history of negative security assurances and how they differ from 
positive guarantees, see John Simpson, “The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime,” in Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed. Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), p. 57-81.  
9 
Table 1- Nuclear Security Guarantee Cases, 1945-Present 
United States  USSR  United Kingdom  
   Canada (1949-) 
   UK (1949-) 
   Netherlands(1949-) 
   Belgium (1949-)    
   Luxem.(1949-)  
   France (1949-) 
   Portugal (1949-)  
I Italy (1949-)  
  Norway (1949-)  
  Denmark(1949-)  
I Iceland (1949-) 
  Greece (1951-)  
  Turkey (1951-)  
  Philippines (51-) 
  Australia (51-) 
  New Zeal. (51-86) 
  Japan (51-)   
  ROK (53-) 
  Germany (1954-) 
  Thailand (1954-77) 
  Pakistan (1954-72) 
  Taiwan (1954-79) 
  Spain (1981-)  
  Czech Rep.  (97-)  
  Hungary (1997-)  
  Poland (1997-) 
  Bulgaria (04-)^ 
  Estonia (04-)^ 
  Latvia (04-) ^ 
  Lithuania(04-)^  
  Romania (04-) ^ 
  Slovenia (04-)^ 
  Slovakia (04-) ^ 
  Croatia (09-)^ 






Hungary (49-89)  
Poland (49-89) 
Romania (49-89)  
DPRK (1961-94) 






   
  Thailand (1954-72)     
  Pakistan (1954-72)   
  Malaysia (57-71) 
  Australia (54-72) 





 **- This alliance technically expired in 1979, but was effectively terminated by 1960.  






Figure 2- Cold War-Era Nuclear Patrons and Clients 
11 
 
Figure 3- Post-Cold War-Era Nuclear Patrons and Clients 
12 
Having established what nuclear security guarantees are, one might logically inquire 
next what they aim to accomplish. Nuclear security guarantees seek to prevent large-scale 
conventional or nuclear attacks by establishing general deterrence on behalf of allies.18 
Deterrence is an influence strategy in which one state (the deterrer) aims to prevent 
another (the target or adversary) from taking unwanted actions by altering its cost 
calculations. The objective of extended deterrence is to dissuade attacks on allies rather 
than to prevent direct attacks on one’s own territory and borders.19 Homeland deterrence 
is sometimes referred to as Type I deterrence, and extended deterrence as Type II 
deterrence.20  
Extended deterrence is related to but distinct from allied assurance. Both are 
influence strategies, and although the terms are often used interchangeably, they have 
different meanings. When patrons practice extended deterrence they to aim affect the cost 
calculation of an adversary.21 Assurance, on the other hand, is aimed at the ally, and seeks 
to convince it that the deterrence-extending state is committed to its defense. Put 
differently, assurance may be thought of as efforts by one state to convince another that its 
security commitments are credible.22 These strategies are, however, deeply intertwined, 
and this study examines them both. Chapters 2 and 3 concern the formation of security 
                                                           
18 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 11.  
19 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University, 1988).  
20 On this distinction, see: Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Balance and Nuclear Blackmail (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 1987), p. 10.  
21 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” in Security Assurances and Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 14; Linton Brooks and 
Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific in the Second Nuclear 
Age,” Strategic Asia 2013-2014, p. 268.  
22 “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop 
Proceedings and Key Takeaways,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 2009, p. 8; 
Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific 
During the Second Nuclear Age,” Strategic Asia (2013), p. 268.   
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guarantees, which require deterrence-extending states to make strategic calculations about 
their will and ability to deter adversaries and to assure allies. Chapter 4 is concerned 
primarily with extended deterrence, and how it may lead to the crisis entrapment of patron 
states. Chapter 5 is concerned with some of the mechanisms that deterrence-extending 
states use to try to assure their allies of their commitments.  
Because the security guarantee dynamic is often at least a tripartite one, I employ 
specific terms throughout the study to identify the states involved. The patron is the state 
who extends deterrence; the client is the ally who receives that security guarantee and is 
the object of assurance efforts; the adversary is the target of the patron’s extended 
deterrence efforts.  
This study will demonstrate that security guarantees are unique to the nuclear age, 
and that the patron’s possession of a nuclear capability shapes the manner in which these 
alliances are formed and managed. Because this is a study of security guarnatees as a type 
of alliance, it is largely focused on intra-alliance dynamics—that is, the relationship 
between patron and client.   
Extended deterrence seeks to dissuade adversaries from attacking a client state 
with the threat that a patron state will join a conflict on its ally’s behalf, with military aid 
that could theoretically involve the full spectrum of escalation, up to and including nuclear 
weapons. It is worth noting, however, that extended deterrence is, in general, supported by 
both conventional and nuclear military means. Nuclear weapons backstop and cast a long 
shadow over extended deterrence and assurance efforts. Why they do so and how this 




CHAPTER 1 - ABSOLUTE ALLIANCES: A THEORY OF NUCLEAR SECURITY GUARANTEES 
 
“It takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Soviets, but 
ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans” 
-Dennis Healy, Defense Minister, United Kingdom23 
 
Introduction 
 Analysts of extended deterrence are fond of referencing the above quote from 
former British Defense Minister Dennis Healy:  In a security guarantee relationship, a 
relatively small probability of patron intervention may be enough to deter an adversary 
from attacking, but a much larger prospect of aid may be necessary to assure the client 
state that it is, in fact, secure.24  This assertion may be puzzling to those who espouse 
purely “rational deterrence” perspectives: If an adversary is deterred, a client state should 
believe itself to be secure.25 Since the early Cold War, however, nuclear powers have 
extended deterrence to their allies. And for nearly as long, scholars and policymakers have 
lamented the credibility problems inherent in these guarantees, primarily because the 
costs of using nuclear weapons on behalf of an ally could vastly outweigh the value of that 
alliance. As this chapter will demonstrate, this classic credibility concern is only one of a 
host of reasons that adversaries and allies may doubt so-called nuclear umbrella alliances. 
                                                           
23 Denis Healey, Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 243, quoted in David Yost, “Assurance and 
U.S. Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs Vol. 85, no. 4 (2009), p. 768.  
24 This proposition has been discussed by Schelling and Jervis. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert L. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and 
the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).   
25 For a description and discussion of rational deterrence theories, which view deterrence as a set of expected 
utility calculations see: Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and 
Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2, (January 1989), pp. 150-153. For some prominent 
critiques, see: Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 
(January 1989), pp. 183-207; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I 
Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 208-224.  
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Security guarantees extended by nuclear powers are a unique type of alliance in 
international politics. Unlike most other defensive arrangements, these pacts promise 
existential support, but specify almost nothing about how it will be provided. 
Nuclear security guarantees are perhaps the most extreme promise one state can 
make to another. One country, the patron, extends a pledge to defend the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of another, the client, against any adversary who may attack it. These 
alliances imply, but do not explicitly state, that this defense commitment may include the 
use of nuclear weapons if necessary. They also specify almost nothing else about the 
patron’s defense commitment. Given this ambiguity, it is not at face value evident that 
recipients of these guarantees should believe them to be credible, or that they should deter 
the adversaries against whom they are aimed.  
The unique nature of nuclear security guarantees becomes clear when they are 
compared to other defense pacts.  Traditional defense pacts are far more circumscribed in 
terms of adversary, geographic scope, casus foederis, and duration than security 
guarantees. Allies do not expect these other defense pacts to provide blanket protection for 
an unlimited duration. In broad terms, most military pacts are designed to aggregate allies’ 
capabilities to meet specific threats and situations, and aimed to deter or wage specific 
wars. In the pre-nuclear age, alliances often changed as military capabilities and threats 
shifted—a fact that has led leading scholars of international relations to characterize 
defense pacts as “temporary marriages of convenience.” 26 
                                                           
26 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(1995), p. 9.  
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Nuclear security guarantees look nothing like traditional defense pacts.  They are 
rarely tied to a specific adversary, theater, or contingency. They enter into force for long 
periods of time or indefinitely. Most importantly, at the highest levels of potential 
escalation they do not aggregate military capabilities: One state, the patron, possesses the 
most crucial instruments of deterrence, while the other, the client, does not. Compared to 
most defense pacts, nuclear security guarantees are riddled with information problems 
between the allies and with respect to adversaries.   
In what ways are nuclear security guarantees so different from traditional defense 
pacts?  And how do they persist, despite the fact that there are ample reasons for 
adversaries and allies to doubt the credibility of these commitments? This dissertation 
theorizes that the unique nature of these pacts can be understood by their ambiguous 
treaty content, and the unilateral provision of capabilities within the alliance. These 
uncommon factors prevail because of the patron’s interest in signaling deterrence by 
punishment in addition to deterrence by denial, but this in turn results in vexing 
information deficits for all three parties involved. The formation and management of these 
unique alliances are informed by patrons’ needs to compensate for these using peacetime 
signaling tools.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section analyzes those 
features that make nuclear security guarantees unique alliances. I demonstrate that, 
compared to traditional defense pacts, nuclear security guarantee treaties are broader, 
vaguer, longer-lasting, and involve a vast asymmetry of capabilities. These pacts involve an 
unprecedented information disparity among alliance partners and are unusually 
ambiguous.  This is in large part due to the type of deterrence that these alliances aim to 
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produce, which is both enabled and compelled by the potential for rapid and exceedingly 
destructive wars in the nuclear era.   
I turn to an examination of security guarantee treaty text, exploring what exactly 
these alliances do and do not promise, and demonstrate that the alliances themselves 
actually guarantee very little. I examine patrons’ motivations for extending so-called 
umbrella alliances, and clients’ motivations for accepting them. I then diagram and 
explicate the tripartite dynamics that arise between patron, client, and adversary as a 
result of these vague treaties and their unilateral provision of aid. I go on to present my 
theory of nuclear security guarantees, and deduce the four hypotheses that will be tested in 
the remainder of this dissertation. These hypotheses address how the ambiguous and 
unilateral nature of security guarantees shape the way these alliances form, and how the 
classic alliance dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment manifest themselves in these 
pacts. Finally, I review the methods that I will use in the remainder of this project and 
conclude.  
 
Security Guarantees: Alliance Anomalies 
Security guarantees are a post-1945 phenomenon in international politics: Few if 
any pre-World War II pacts included defensive promises as broad as those contained in 
nuclear security guarantees.27 As will be discussed shortly, the advent of nuclear weapons 
and long-range delivery vehicles makes global power projection on behalf of allies 
possible.28 The prospect of a short, massively destructive war also encourages more 
                                                           
27 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.14. Snyder’s observation is born out if one reviews the texts of pre-1945 
defensive alliances. One might point to pre-1945 declarations such as the British and French guarantees to 
Poland as examples of earlier security guarantees, but these promised protection against a specific adversary.  
28 See Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 110. 
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expansive standing alliance commitments than existed in the pre-nuclear age. Additionally, 
security guarantee relationships are sanctioned by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which 
gives all states the legal right to engage in collective self-defense—military assistance to an 
ally who has come under attack.29 These technological and legal developments mean that 
nuclear-armed states are capable of defending far-off clients.  Beyond the means that 
support them, however, nuclear umbrella alliances are also substantively different from 
traditional defense pacts. Using data drawn from the ATOP 3.03 dataset, I turn to a brief 
descriptive comparison between security guarantee treaties and other, more traditional 
defensive alliances.30  
 
Defense Pacts: The Conventional Wisdom 
In international relations theory, defensive alliances are generally understood to be 
cooperative endeavors in which members pool their resources to prosecute conflict with a 
common enemy.31 Defense pacts are often characterized by a “get help” motive, in which 
one state promises to aid in another’s defense in exchange for a reciprocal promise of 
military aid.32 They also tend to express obligations in a detailed manner. Alliance treaties 
identify a casus foederis that explains when the treaty will be brought into force. They often 
specify the opponent that the treaty is aimed against, the theater in which it applies, and 
                                                           
29 Chapter VII, Article 51 States: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Charter of the United 
Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51, United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
30 To conduct this summary statistical analysis, I added two additional variables to ATOP 3.03: A nuclear 
security guarantee variable and; a variable for all defense pacts that are not nuclear security guarantees. The 
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project, Leeds et. al. (2002).  
31 Snyder, pp. 1, 52.  
32 Snyder, p. 10.   
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the nature of the military response that may be forthcoming if aid is needed.33 Because of 
these details, Glenn Snyder has argued that the expectations that arise from alliances are 
“narrow and specifically bounded.” He suggests “[o]nly a portion of allies’ interests, 
perhaps not even all of their common interests, are selected for joint support.”34 Likewise, 
Robert Jervis has commented that "[a]lliances are formal commitments to support the 
other under specified circumstances (and often in specified ways).”35  
  Defense pacts may be symmetric or asymmetric, both in terms of the capabilities of 
member states and in terms of treaty obligations. They may form between major and minor 
powers, or between equals, and the treaty obligations may vary between partners or may 
be identical. If defense pacts specify an alliance duration when they enter into force, the 
mean specified length is seven and one-half years. In actuality, a typical defense pact lasts 
for about 20 years.36 Most defense pacts are public, but occasionally states sign defensive 
alliances in which part or all of the treaty is kept secret.37  Moreover, many defense pacts 
are quite specific—approximately half of non-security guarantee defense pacts specify an 
adversary, theater, alliance, or particular military contingency as the target of the pact.38  
Why are traditional defense treaties so detailed? Recent international relations 
scholarship has highlighted the great signaling power of alliance treaty content.39 This 
                                                           
33 Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: 
Specific Threats, Specific Promises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 5, (2000), p. 692-693.  
34 Snyder, p. 8.   
35 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997), p. 211. 
36 This information is taken from the ATOP 3.03 dataset. Specified length is taken from the variable “speclgth.” 
Actual duration is arrived at by subtracting the start from the end date.   
37 Approximately 12% of all non-security guarantee defense pacts have secret clauses or are secret in their 
entirety.  
38 95 of 234 non-security guarantee defense pacts specify a targeted threat in some form.  
39  See, e.g., Brett Ashley Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1999), pp. 979-1002.;  Brett Ashley Leeds, 
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literature demonstrates that defensive alliances rarely provide broad commitments of 
alliance support. Instead, limiting the scope of an alliance to particular theaters or 
contingencies can send powerful messages to allies and adversaries as to when they should 
expect alliance aid to be forthcoming, and when they should not.40 Alliance partners are 
therefore committed only to those contingencies that they enumerate. Once a state has 
agreed to provide aid in specified cases, it should be likely to follow through on these 
agreements by virtue of selection.41 By specifying the conditions under which partners may 
go to war on each other’s behalf, alliance treaties produce targeted deterrence.42 
Additionally, limiting the scope of an agreement may make it even more likely to be 
fulfilled, as it is less likely to be derailed by uncertainty in the international environment.43   
These defense pact characteristics are consistent with much international relations 
scholarship on alliances. Yet most of this alliance wisdom is at odds with the fundamental 
features of nuclear security guarantees.  
 
Nuclear Security Guarantees: Unconventional Treaties  
 Nuclear security guarantees differ from typical defense pacts in a number of 
important ways. First, where defense pacts may be thought of as resource-pooling 
mechanisms, nuclear security guarantees are unilateral in their provision of crucial 
                                                           
“Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” International 
Organization Vol. 57, No. 4 (2003), pp. 801-827. 
40 Leeds et. al, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability,”; Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War.”   
41 James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization Vol. 
52, No. 2 (1998), pp. 269-305; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?," International Organization Vol. 50, No. 3 (1996), pp. 379-
406. 
42 Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability: 
Specific Threats, Specific Promises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 5, (2000) p. 688.  
43 Michaela Mattes, “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design,” International Organization Vol. 66, No. 04 
(2012), p. 686.   
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capabilities. Security guarantee allies may combine some resources in preparation for 
conventional conflict, but only the patron of the guarantee possesses nuclear weapons. The 
client state may retain the military capabilities to provide for its own defense at lower 
levels of conflict, but the patron is the exclusive guarantor of security at the highest levels 
of escalation.44 Consequently, nuclear security pacts necessarily have a “guarantee” 
motive—the patron states an intention to act on behalf of a client regardless of whether it 
can reciprocate. 45 This stands in contrast to the “get help” motive that is more likely to 
accompany a traditional capability-aggregating alliance.  
 Related to the unilateral nature of these guarantees is the fact that nuclear umbrella 
agreements provide defense promises that are much broader than the typical defense pact. 
Most security guarantees are activated if the ally is the victim of an “unprovoked attack,” 
but the details of a casus foederis are not given. Security guarantees do not specify the 
threat against which they are intended to defend. Unlike other defense pacts, they do not 
identify adversaries, specific regions, specific states acting in specific regions, ongoing 
conflicts, or other alliances as threats.46 Rather, they guarantee defense of the client’s 
territorial integrity broadly defined. Details of the patron’s military response are also not 
spelled out in advance. Short of promising that it will provide for its defense, the patron 
                                                           
44 Two important exceptions to this are the British and the French nuclear arsenals. French nuclear forces 
remain under national control, however, so the United States and the United Kingdom are the only real case 
of nuclear pooling within an alliance, and the UK arsenal is subverted to NATO (and thus, US) control. Because 
of the incentives that accompany deterrence by punishment/war avoidance (discussed herein), however, my 
argument should still apply to these cases.   
45 See Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 10 for some more discussion of the “guarantee” motive. This guarantee 
motive is certainly present in most asymmetric alliances (e.g. US-ROK, US-Japan)—the client is not expected 
to provide military assistance to the patron outside of its home territory. NATO also involves an asymmetric 
guarantee where nuclear weapons are concerned, but because it is a collective defense pact, member states 
can be called upon to assist the United States outside of Europe. Ironically, the only time NATO’s Article 5 has 
ever been invoked was on behalf of the United States following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
46 This information is obtained through summary statistics run on the SPECTHRT variable in ATOP 3.03.  
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does not delineate when or how it might use any particular military capability on a client’s 
behalf. This includes the potential use of nuclear weapons, which is implied, but in no way 
made explicit by the treaty commitment itself.47  
Security guarantees also tend to be long in duration. Security guarantees either 
specify an intended alliance length in years, or enter into force indefinitely. If a security 
guarantee specifies a duration at the time of its formation, the mean specified length is 11 
years. Thirty-three percent of security guarantees enter into force indefinitely, while only 
four percent of other defense pacts do so. In actuality, security guarantees last at least 
twice as long as other defense pacts, with an average duration of four decades as opposed 
to two. These pacts are therefore semi-permanent or permanent security apparatuses, and 
are not aimed at any discrete conflict in particular. 48 
              Figure 4- Defense Pact Duration (in decades)  
 
Non-Security Guarantees   Nuclear Security Guarantees 
  
                                                           
47 For a legal analysis of the obligations contained within the United States’ security guarantee treaties, and 
the basic conclusion that they “say nothing,” see Michael J. Glennon, “War-making Treaties,” in Constitutional 
Diplomacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 192-228, but especially pp. 205-225.  
48 I create a variable, “non-security guarantee defense pacts,” which excludes offense pacts, non-aggression 





















 Are the differences between nuclear security guarantees and other defense pacts 
attributable to broader changes in alliance design over time? Scholars have found that, in 
general, Cold War and Post-Cold War alliances are more likely to be designed as “standing” 
rather than “reactive” alliances.49  Yet even when pre-1945 alliances are excluded from the 
analysis, these features still hold. Significantly, 32% of post-1945 non-security guarantee 
defense pacts continue to specify the threat they are aimed against. These pacts still last 
about half as long as their security guarantee counterparts, and while relatively few post-
1945 alliances include secret provisions, a handful of non-security guarantee defense pacts 
still do.  While there have obviously been some changes in post-1945 defense pacts in 
general, it remains true that nuclear guarantees are therefore less specific, longer-lasting, 
and more public than other defense pacts.  
Security guarantees make broad promises of assistance with little information about 
how aid will be provided, over long or indefinite time horizons. Given Leeds’ logic of how 
treaty provisions produce informative alliance signals, one might infer that nuclear security 
guarantee treaties are very poor instruments of deterrence. Indeed, there is ample 
evidence that broad, non-specific agreements are just the sort of alliances that should be 
least likely to withstand changes in the international environment.50  Agreements that 
reduce, rather than encourage, uncertainty should be the most effective and durable.51 In 
the words of one legal scholar, “a contract does not exist unless its terms are reasonably 
                                                           
49 Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes, “Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New World 
Order, or Continuation of History?” Conflict Management and Peace Science Vol. 24, No. 3 (2007), p. 194.  
50 Leeds (2003): Mattes (2012).  
51  Page Fortna demonstrates this with respect to peacekeeping agreements. Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of 
Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 2, (2003), pp. 337-
372.  
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certain.” If there is slim basis for deciding when and how an agreement will be invoked 
“there is no contract, and no legal obligation.”52 
It is clear, however, that security guarantees aim to send a very different sort of 
signal than traditional defense pacts. Rather than delineate where they will apply, against 
whom, and the response required, security guarantees make an across-the-board 
commitment to support a client state’s territorial integrity, and introduce the possibility of 
overwhelming patron intervention into adversary calculations. Why might security 
guarantee patrons have incentive to construct agreements that are both broad in their 
scope and vague in their promises? One might assume that such ambiguity could be 
dangerous, as it “muffles signals” and encourages miscalculation.53 As Richard Betts has 
observed, “deterrence should be ambiguous only if it is a bluff.”54 Why would security 
guarantee patrons choose to make their commitments anything other than crystal clear?  
Given the broad aims of security guarantees, their unilateral nature, and their 
unusually long shelf lives, highly explicit alliance commitments may actually be less 
advisable, allowing challengers to exploit defenders’ weaknesses.55 Specifying an alliance 
commitment completely may allow adversaries to determine the issues on which the allies 
                                                           
52 Michael J. Glennon, “War-making Treaties,” in Constitutional Diplomacy, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), p. 224. 
53 Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 290. See Crawford for more on why ambiguous vs. unambiguous signals may be 
desirable in extended deterrence commitments.    
54 Richard Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs March/April 2013.  
55 For more on the utility of ambiguity in deterrent threats, see: Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: 
Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 29-30, 246-49; 
Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 75, 84-85; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) p. 529-30; Robert Jervis, The 
Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 123-30. 
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will not aid one another, undermining deterrence on those issues.56 Broad deterrent 
promises may prevent adversaries from “nibbl[ing] away at points of local weakness,” or 
engaging in “salami tactics.”57 By leaving security guarantee agreements somewhat vague, 
allied states may avoid incremental challenges.58 Furthermore, a very precise alliance 
treaty raises the costs to the patron of non-fulfillment, which may be undesirable when 
commitments are intended to cover a variety of circumstances.  Given that security 
guarantees are intended to remain in force for decades, this lack of specificity may allow 
these alliances to adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances.59 The contingencies in 
which the United States is most likely to have to aid Japan, for example, are quite different 
at present than they were in the 1960s.  For the patron, who has promised to use its 
military might to preserve the sovereignty of a far-off ally, broad, vague agreements may 
inject flexibility into a commitment of existential proportions that is intended to last for a 
very long time.  
Despite the deterrence and commitment advantages that may accrue from non-
specific security guarantee agreements, their breadth, lack of detail, and length in force 
make them an uncommon type of alliance. Moreover, the fact that these guarantees are 
backstopped by a capability that only one power possesses is unprecedented in the modern 
era. While most military alliances aim to dissuade an adversary from attacking, nuclear 
                                                           
56 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 3, No. 1 
(2000), p. 73.  
57George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968), p. 132.; 
Schelling, 1966, p. 77-78.   
58 One obvious drawback to broader, less contingent agreements is that they may encourage moral hazard. 
See Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 3-6; 71-90.  
59 “According to Glenn Snyder, “The more explicit and precise the verbal commitment, the greater the cost of 
non-fulfillment and the lower the credibility of non-fulfillment.” Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 169.  
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security guarantees are unique in that only one party holds the primary persuasive 
instrument of power.  
 The table below summarizes some of the important features that distinguish nuclear 
security guarantees from traditional defense pacts. Taken together, these alliance 
differences also point to a distinct object of each type of pact. In most defense pacts, states 
combine resources towards a fairly specific security goal, to be sought over some definite 
time and space. In nuclear security guarantees, however, parties cooperate asymmetrically 
to ensure the long-term sovereignty of the client state, while the patron state is the sole 
possessor of the means to carry out the guarantee. One party is completely reliant on 
another’s capabilities at high levels of potential escalation with scant information about its 
defense provision. Nuclear security guarantees, therefore, promise a great deal and specify 
very little.  
 
 
Table 2- Security Guarantees vs. Other Defense Pacts 
Traditional Defense Pact Nuclear Security Guarantee  
Capability aggregation  Nuclear asymmetry, aggregation at lower levels 
“Get help” motive  Guarantee motive  
Symmetric or asymmetric Always asymmetric  
Specific casus foederis  Casus foederis is “unprovoked attack” 
Specific military object Object is always sovereignty/territorial integrity 
Threat is specific and often includes adversary, 
theater, other alliances or conflicts 
Do not specify adversary, theater, other alliances, 
or conflicts 
If length is specified, avg. 7.5 years If length is specified, avg. 11 years  
4% enter into force indefinitely  33% enter into force indefinitely  




What’s in a Guarantee?: Exploring the Treaty Text 
Security guarantee treaties are less specific than other defense pacts, but what sorts 
of positive promises do they contain? The vast majority of security guarantees (35) have 
been extended by the United States, with another 14 by the Soviet Union/Russia and five by 
Great Britain. Treaty content varies somewhat depending on the patron extending the 
guarantee. Any given patron does not always use entirely consistent language across its 
treaty guarantees.  Nonetheless, nuclear security guarantee treaties share some important 
similarities.  
Despite prevailing wisdom, no security guarantee treaty commitment automatically 
commits the patron to use force on behalf of its client under any particular circumstance. 
Instead, nuclear security guarantee treaties reserve for the patron the right to use force on 
behalf of an ally, but do not compel it do so. This right, however, is not a treaty prerogative 
per se, but one enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which permits the use 
of force for individual or collective self-defense. Security guarantees adopt fairly 
standardized language that keeps the definition of the targeted threat, the actions that will 
be forthcoming, and the processes for implementing an alliance response very vague 
indeed.  
The United States has been the most profuse nuclear patron since 1945, and 
although its treaty language has evolved somewhat over time, the contents of its 
guarantees are quite similar. The North Atlantic Treaty is widely understood to have the 
firmest, most committal language of any US security guarantee. In US security guarantees, 
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Article V of the treaty contains the casus foederis and details the military response that will 
follow.  NATO’s Article V reads: 
The parties agree that an armed attack against one of more of them in Europe or 
North American shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently 
they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individuals and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. 60  
 
 The phrase “as it deems necessary” is of no small importance. The day the NATO 
treaty text was made public, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech in which 
averred that the North Atlantic Treaty “does not mean that the United States would be 
automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subjected to armed attack. 
Under our constitution, the Congress alone has the power to declare war.”61  At Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings one month later, Acheson reiterated the limited 
scope of Article V. Responding to a question on whether the NATO treaty obligated the US 
President to use nuclear weapons on behalf of European Allies, Acheson stated: “Article V… 
does not enlarge, nor does it decrease, nor does it change in any way, the relative 
constitutional position of the President in Congress.”62 In response to further questioning 
on whether anything in Article V could lead to an automatic declaration of war by the 
United States, Acheson stated: “Unequivocally, ‘no’.”63 
                                                           
60 The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, Washington DC. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 
61 Address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Delivered on March 18, 1949, as quoted in Glennon, p. 210.  
62 North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, 1st 
Session, p. 18,  
63 Ibid. p. 25.  
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NATO’s Article VI does specify that an armed attack includes an armed attack on the 
“territories of any of the Parties in Europe or North America” and “on the forces, vessels, or 
aircraft of any of the Parties when in or over these territories…”64 It does not, however, 
define how an armed attack will be identified. It reserves for the signatories whatever 
response “it deems necessary” and does not guarantee aid in any form.  The North Atlantic 
Treaty is, however, unique in the pantheon of US guarantees, because it is the only one that 
promises military aid to the patron if it is attacked on its home territory. Given the actual 
language of Article V, however, this promise cannot be understood to be all that iron-clad.  
The United States’ next two security guarantees were signed in 1951. The US-
Philippines mutual defense treaty and ANZUS contain identical treaty language. In each, the 
parties agree that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare [ ] that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” An armed attack is defined as an 
attack on the territories of any of the parties, territories under their control, or the armed 
forces, vessels, or aircraft of the signatories.65 Testifying before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed: “a whole range of 
defensive measures… might be appropriate depending on the circumstances,” and “any 
action in which the United States joined would have to be taken in accordance with our 
constitutional processes.”66  
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The “peace and safety,” “common danger,” and “constitutional processes” language 
crafted for the Philippines and ANZUS treaties was adopted for the US-Japan, US-South 
Korea, The Manila Treaty (SEATO), and the US-Taiwan treaty, which was subsequently 
abrogated in 1979.67  This language was specifically chosen to preempt congressional 
concerns that the United States was committing itself in advance to any particular 
response, but all are legally equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty in automaticity and 
specificity.68 All US security guarantees to East Asian client states are very similar in 
substance. While there is some variation in US security guarantee language, then, there is 
very little in the degree of ambiguity enshrined in these commitments. As a 1979 report to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued:  
No mutual security treaty to which the United States currently is a party authorizes 
the President to introduce the armed forces into hostilities or requires the United 
States to do so, automatically, if another party to any such treaty is attacked. Each of 
the treaties provides that it will be carried out by the United States in accordance 
with its “constitutional process” or contains other languages to make clear that the 
United States’ commitment is a qualified one—that the distribution of power within 
the United States Government is precisely what it would have been in the absence of 
the treaty, and that the United States reserves the right to determine for itself what 
military action, if any, is appropriate. 69 
 
 Soviet and Russian security guarantees are no less vague. Article IV of the Warsaw 
Pact evokes the North Atlantic Treaty and states: 
In the event of an armed attack…each State Party to the Treaty shall, in the exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter, afford the State or States immediate assistance, 
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individually and in agreement with the other State Parties to the Treaty, by all the 
means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force.  
  
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, Russia and several former Soviet 
Republics formed the Collective Security Treaty, which adopted similar language.  
 The Sino-Soviet Treaty was far more ambiguous than either of these in both its casus 
foederis and promised response because of its origins. The original Sino-Soviet Treaty was 
signed between Moscow and the Nationalist Chinese government before the conclusion of 
the Second World War. In 1950, following the communist revolution in China, the Soviets 
nullified the agreement with the Nationalists and signed a new one with Beijing. The 1950 
treaty, however, largely retained the language of the 1945 document, and targets Japan and 
its allies. If either party is attacked, the other signatory promises to “render military and 
other assistance.”70  The Sino-Soviet Treaty is therefore anomalous in its targeting of an 
adversary, but otherwise fairly routine in its amorphous commitment.  
 Great Britain’s 1957 mutual defense treaty with Malaysia contained looser language 
still. Article VI states: “In the event of a threat of armed attack against any of the territories 
or forces of the Federation of Malaya…the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of 
the United Kingdom will consult together on measures to be taken jointly or separately to 
ensure the fullest cooperation between them for the purpose of meeting the situation 
effectively.” 71 Article VII states: In the event of an armed attack… the Governments of the 
Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate with each other 
and will take such action as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting the 
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situation effectively.”72 The United Kingdom’s other security guarantee commitments 
originated through SEATO, and therefore used the American treaty language.  
 Despite the fact that US security guarantees to NATO and East Asia and the Soviet 
Union’s to the Warsaw Pact are often held up as some of history’s most closely-knit 
alliances, the treaty language in these pact is anything but committal.  A guarantee, by 
definition, assures a particular outcome for its recipient.73 These umbrella treaties, 
however, do no such thing.  
  
Why Extend or Accept an Umbrella?  
Traditional defense pacts and nuclear security guarantees both aim to deter attacks 
by adversaries, and to make military cooperation more likely if conflict should arise.74 As we 
have seen, however, the nature of their treaty content suggests that security guarantees aim 
to deter in a different manner than other defense pacts.  Why would nuclear patrons offer 
broad, ambiguous, long-lasting promises of aid to far-off clients? And why would clients 
accept these vague commitments?  
In a typical defense pact that relies on the pooling of conventional capabilities, allies 
aim to: dissuade an adversary from initiating war by signaling that their combined 
capabilities may be sufficient to defeat him; defend the status quo if it is disturbed, and; 
deny the adversary territorial gains.75 In general, traditional defense pacts endeavor to 
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74 See Morrow, “Alliances,” and Mattes, “Reputation” on this point.  
75 Snyder, Defense and Deterrence, p. 41.  
33 
frustrate an adversary’s specific military goal, thwarting attempts at a low-cost or quick 
victory. They are therefore primarily focused on deterrence by denial.   
In contrast, nuclear security guarantee allies aim to: dissuade an adversary from 
initiating war by signaling that the patron’s capabilities will be used on behalf of the client; 
defend the status quo if it is disturbed; retaliate against the adversary, potentially causing 
severe damage to cities, military targets, and industrial centers of great value. By 
introducing the possibility of serious and rapid conventional or nuclear retaliation on 
behalf of an ally, however remote, security guarantees threaten deterrence by punishment 
as well as deterrence by denial.76  Like their predecessors, nuclear umbrella allies also plan 
to frustrate opportunistic conventional attacks. But rather than solely deter by creating the 
conditions to win a specific war, nuclear security guarantees also signal that the costs of 
any potential war will be too great for an opponent to bear.77 As Bernard Brodie observed, 
this kind of deterrence requires that nuclear security guarantee allies reject “the 
Napoleonic maxim, ‘on s’engage; puit on voit.”78 In a profound departure from their 
predecessors, nuclear security guarantee alliances aim to forestall all attacks on client 
states in perpetuity.  
Alliance commitments that rely on deterrence by punishment are both enabled and 
shaped by the technological means that support them. Defense pacts that rely solely on 
deterrence by denial assume that if war occurs, allies will assist each other in frustrating an 
aggressor’s military aims, and that an offensive could be repelled over a period of days, 
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weeks, or months. Nuclear weapons and long-range strike capabilities allow patrons to 
make promises of defense to far-away allies, but they also mean that attacks on those allies 
could take place with little warning time, and that devastation could be wrought quickly.79 
This technology creates some uncertainty as to the precise location of origin of military 
threats, as well as the belief that they will emerge quickly and with great destructive force 
if they do. The protection of a client state therefore becomes a fundamentally strategic 
problem, as opposed to a tactical and operational one. To quote Brodie again, “[a]n 
intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a thermonuclear warhead is something that can 
affect us […] much more immediately and entirely. The ICBM is, in the most compelling 
meaning of the word, strategic.”80  
Why would patrons assume this strategic challenge? Because of the novel threat 
that it creates, the speed and potential devastation of war in the nuclear age also allows and 
encourages leading powers to project military power beyond the homeland. In addition to 
extending security guarantees, the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain all 
practiced defense in depth after 1945 with the belief that a robust forward military 
presence was necessary to ensure the security of the nation as well as its allies. Forward 
basing allowed major powers to maintain a continuous military presence to respond to 
persistent threats, and to address global contingencies with fewer logistical demands.  As 
advances in power projection created first-strike incentives, forward basing became a 
critical part of major powers’ deterrence strategies, as they preferred to defeat enemies 
abroad before they could threaten the homeland.81   
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A patron’s decision to extend security guarantees and to establish forward bases are 
distinct calculations and do not always coincide. Nonetheless, a formal security guarantee 
may make it especially likely that a client state will contract away some of its sovereignty to 
allow a patron base access, and a forward patron presence may assure allies and deter 
adversaries as a tangible indicator of the security guarantee. 82   Umbrella alliances are 
therefore closely coupled with leading states’ reliance on power projection. These are not 
purely altruistic guarantees, but intimately linked to major power national security 
strategies that emphasize deterrence and power projection as tools of status quo 
preservation in the nuclear age. 
The map below illustrates this point. While the Second World War was still under 
way, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted two postwar basing studies that evaluated 
requirements for overseas basing after the war concluded. These potential postures 
assumed that the forward positions recommended would be sufficient for the United States 
to enforce postwar peace among the major powers. One study identified 66 potential 
foreign base sites, and the other 84. Neither, however, anticipated a need for US bases in 
Western Europe, or assumed the deployment of ground troops abroad.83 Instead, 
Washington’s 1943 Perimeter Defense strategy would allow it to project enough power 
into Europe and Asia to prevent those regions from being dominated by other states, but 
the US did not expect comprehensive forward deployment, and certainly did not envision a 
standing military presence to support a European Alliance. This vision was defunct within 
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only a few years, as Washington contemplated the prospect of facing a nuclear-armed 
Soviet Union in Western Europe, and reoriented its strategy accordingly. The United States’ 
strategy for engaging the Soviet threat comprised both the NATO alliance and its forward 
defense of Western Europe.  
 
Figure 5- US Basing Requirements According to JCS 570/2 (1943)84 
 
 
Nuclear security guarantees’ peacetime deterrence goals change the risk calculus for 
all parties involved. No adversary can initiate conflict against a nuclear-backed client 
without contemplating the possibility, however remote, that its patron might intervene and 
that conflict might escalate to devastating levels, and this may induce caution in the 
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adversary.85 The possibility of having to make good on its threat may also change patron 
behavior, however: the decision to use nuclear weapons against any state requires a 
willingness to inflict, and possible incur in return, rapid, widespread destruction. Even if an 
ally is highly-valued, these military means are difficult to fit to most political ends.  And 
with so little of its alliance commitment specified, the patron must always consider the 
possibility that a small skirmish could escalate into a devastating conflict. Rather than aim 
at an achievable military victory, therefore, nuclear security guarantee alliances aim to 
achieve political victory through the protection of allies and the preservation of the 
political status quo. The intuition of these alliance arrangements will be familiar to most 
scholars of nuclear strategy, and accords with Bernard Brodie’s prescient 1946 assertion: 
“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now 
on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”86  
This alliance logic is not necessarily dependent on a condition of mutual 
vulnerability between patron and adversary, whereby each possess a secure second-strike 
capability. Indeed, the vast majority of nuclear security guarantees were concluded well 
before mutual vulnerability had obtained.87 This logic also does not necessarily require that 
one espouse a “minimum deterrence” perspective, which sees nuclear war as irrational, 
and therefore, highly unlikely.88  Even strategists who believe that nuclear wars may 
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rationally be fought have examined how the threat of deterrence by punishment enables 
the military goal of war avoidance.89 One need not subscribe to any particular school of 
strategic thought to acknowledge that the nuclear age has ushered in an era of extreme 
caution where warfighting is concerned, as evinced by diminished risk-taking in high-
intensity disputes, and fewer changes to the political and territorial status quo.90  
Beyond deterrence and power projection for the sake of status quo preservation, 
security guarantee patrons have at least one additional, subsidiary motivation for 
extending and maintaining these pacts. Umbrella alliances are unilateral in their provision 
of crucial power projection capabilities, meaning that client states cannot easily replace a 
security guarantee if a patron removes it. This, in turn, allows the patron to use its security 
guarantees as tools of control over less powerful states.91 Not only may patrons demand 
basing rights on client state territory, but they may become deeply involved with client 
state security policy on an ongoing basis. Shortly after the end of World War II, French 
President Charles de Gaulle reportedly called on US President Harry Truman to discuss a 
treaty to “keep Germany down,” to which Truman responded that “the atomic bomb had 
changed all that.”92 Indeed, Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, is often credited 
with a phrase that suggests that the alliance’s original purpose was deterrence, power 
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projection, and allied control: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
down.”93  
Despite the fact that it may become a vector of patron power projection and subject 
to its control, a client’s motivation for accepting a security guarantee is relatively 
straightforward.  By taking on a great power sponsor, the client is absolved of the need to 
provide for its own defense at the highest levels of escalation.94 Because an attack on it 
could conceivably catalyze a great power nuclear war, superpower extended deterrence 
may seem to be a far more potent threat than what a relatively weak client could hope to 
accomplish on its own through conventional self-defense or through the costly pursuit of 
its own nuclear arsenal. The client also gains broader political benefits that come from its 
close association with a nuclear-armed great power.  The fact that the client is interested in 
receiving a security guarantee, however, by no means suggests that it will remain confident 
in its promises as the threat environment and its patron’s commitment changes with time.  
Nuclear patrons have ultimately chosen to extend deterrence and adopt forward 
defensive strategies to preserve the political and territorial status quo.  Each has done so, 
however, in slightly different ways. The Soviet Union maintained a quasi-empire over the 
Warsaw Pact, and extended guarantees to other communist allies, such as China and North 
Korea.95 The United States’ alliance system has functioned as something on the order of an 
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“empire by invitation.”96 American guarantees were initially devised to provide allies with 
protection while they recovered economically in the wake of World War II. After North 
Korea’s Soviet-sponsored invasion of the South, security guarantees were widely 
considered to be tools for avoiding undesirable involvement in far-away wars.97 And for the 
short time they were in effect, the United Kingdom was interested in using extended 
deterrence to maintain influence over former colonies. How do these alliance motivations 
change umbrella pacts in practice? To answer this question, it is necessary to explore the 
novel dynamics that abound between a nuclear patron, client, and challenger.  
 
Diagramming Deterrence in the Nuclear Age  
 The demands of deterrence in the nuclear age change the way alliances are formed 
and managed. Deterrence by punishment requires that a patron be willing and able to 
threaten on behalf of a client to inflict catastrophic levels of destruction on an adversary, 
raising the costs of conflict to unacceptable levels.  Although punishment was possible in 
the pre-nuclear age, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have changed its potency 
by orders of magnitude. Pre-nuclear age instruments of punishment, such as naval 
blockades and coercive airpower, attempted to inflict that harm on targets on a much 
smaller scale and over a much longer time period of time.98 It was therefore uncertain 
whether the targets of that punishment would be able to bear it. Since 1945, however, a 
patron can promise punishment on behalf on of an ally with a speed and scale that will 
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necessarily be devastating if it occurs.  While nuclear security guarantee treaty 
commitments contain a great deal of uncertainty, the capabilities that backstop them 
suggest a response that may be anything but.   
 Ambiguous treaty commitments, unilateral nuclear capabilities, and the incentives 
that accompany this unique type of deterrence create uncommon alliance dynamics 
between the nuclear patron, the client under its protection, and a potential adversary. The 
diagram below highlights how each of these three players evaluates the others.  
 
Figure 6- Extended Deterrence Dynamics 
 
  
In this triangular relationship, patron, client, and adversary must form judgments about the 
patron’s security guarantee commitments to its client with imperfect information. This 
complex tripartite dynamic involves the following considerations: 
 
1) The patron gives to its client a security guarantee that suggests that an attack on the 
client will be treated as an attack on the patron. The treaty language is vague on 
casus foederis and promised aid, and alliance capabilities are provided unilaterally. 
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Because they are sovereign states with a fuzzy commitment in which one partner is 
vastly more powerful, the patron can never be inexorably committed to the client. 
 
2) At any given time both the client and the adversary (if it has any interest in attacking) 
evaluate whether the patron will intervene on the client’s behalf, despite the 
devastating and otherwise-avoidable harm that it may absorb if it does.  
 
3) The client is dependent on the patron by virtue of capability asymmetry, and 
uninformed about this intervention probability due to treaty ambiguity. It looks to 
signals from both the patron and the adversary to determine whether it is, in fact, 
secure. 
   
4) Nuclear-age technology creates the imperative for the patron to convince client and 
adversary that it is deterring the adversary from attacking at all, and barring that, 
that it will intervene using  “all available means” if its client is threatened. Because 
the expectations in the security guarantee are ambiguous, however, the patron itself 
may not know if, in fact, it will intervene in any particular contingency. 
 
5) The only confirmation that that the patron’s lofty alliance promise is, in fact, reliable, 
is an attack or major crisis in which the patron intervenes. If the patron effectively 
deters the adversary, however, we should not expect to observe either one of these 
things.99  
 
6) Because there are few or no truly confirming signs of the patron’s commitment, both 
client and adversary may continually reassess the patron’s likelihood of intervention 
in a conflict on behalf of the client.  Where it perceives any potential threat to the 
client from the adversary, the patron can be expected to take steps beyond its treaty 
guarantee to demonstrate to both audiences that it intends to uphold its ambiguous 
treaty promises.   
 
                                                           
99 James Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5-29. 
43 
In sum, the ambiguous and unilateral nature of nuclear security guarantees begets a vexing 
information deficit for all parties involved. The adversary has limited information off of 
which to base its decision to challenge the client, and despite its guarantee, the patron itself 
may not know with any certainty the situations in which it will come to its client’s aid.100 
This leaves the client to determine its level of assurance based on the degree to which it 
perceives its security to be guaranteed. These high-level dynamics permit a number of 
hypotheses on how exactly the formation and management of security guarantees 
proceeds, and these are the subject of the remainder of this project.  
 Before proceeding to these, however, it is worth noting that even these macro-level 
dynamics help us to understand one puzzle that has plagued analysts and practitioners of 
extended deterrence since the early Cold War. The so-called Healy Theorem, with which 
this chapter opened, posits that it is substantially more difficult for a nuclear patron to 
assure its clients than it is for it to deter its adversaries—a statement that would seem a 
direct challenge to so-called rational deterrence theory.101 In a world of perfect 
information, this should clearly be untrue. But this statement would also seem puzzling in 
any world in which the adversary and the client could view the same patron signals of 
commitment, as both should presumably derive from these the same probability of patron 
intervention. If the adversary is deterred, one might reasonably imagine that the client 
should be inexorably assured. Indeed, as an ally of the patron’s, one might expect the client 
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to have more information about its patron’s intentions than its adversary does, making the 
patron’s guarantee all the more credible.  
As the foregoing diagram and discussion highlight, however, the adversary’s 
evaluation of the likelihood of patron intervention in an attack, and the client’s evaluation 
of its own security, are two distinct calculations. The adversary makes its decisions based 
on its prior desire to attack (which may be low or entirely absent) and its belief that the 
patron will intervene. The client, however, is one additional level of decision-making 
removed from this calculation, and must make judgments about the degree to which its 
patron’s commitment mitigates the threat from the adversary, and therefore, how secure it 
feels. Because there are few concrete indicators of how reliable its security guarantee 
actually is, the client must evaluate and re-evaluate the patron’s credibility over the years 
or decades that the guarantee endures. Even in a perfectly rational world free of cognitive 
bias, this tripartite dynamic means that an adversary may have almost no desire to attack 
based on expected utility while the client remains completely uncertain that its guarantee 
is functioning as it hopes.  Nuclear security guarantees are, therefore, alliances that leave 
something—indeed, most everything—to chance. How exactly do states form and maintain 
these extraordinary commitments?  
 
Signaling Security Guarantees in International Politics 
International relations scholars have not previously recognized or systematically 
studied the fact that alliances may be tools that enable power projection for the purposes of 
deterrence. Indeed, many seminal theories of alliance formation and management are 
silent on why nuclear-armed superpowers would form and go to great lengths to preserve 
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their alliances with small, less-capable client states, and many classical works dismiss 
alliances since World War II as inconsequential. Because they consider alliances only 
insofar as they can shift the balance of power between system leaders, seminal theories 
miss the fact alliances in the nuclear age may be formed and sustained for reasons that are 
unique to the post-1945 period.102  Our understanding of several alliance first-principles—
namely, balancing, entrapment, and abandonment—may require revision if we are to 
understand how security guarantees operate in the nuclear age.  
 Structural realism views alliance formation as of great potential consequence in 
multipolar systems, and relatively unimportant in bipolar systems.  When multiple great 
powers are present, it is possible that allies will de-align or defect to an opposing coalition, 
greatly disadvantaging their former partners, especially if conflict occurs.103 Under 
bipolarity, however, alliances are thought to be much less important: system-leading 
powers are said to focus mostly on their relationship to one another.   
Scholars have similarly argued that the alliance dilemmas of entrapment and 
abandonment are less serious in post-1945 alliances. Entrapment occurs when a state is 
dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that it does not share, or shares only 
partially.104 Abandonment is allied defection, and can take the form of re-alignment, de-
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alignment, or failure of an ally to provide support in promised contingencies.105  Leading 
work has suggested that the dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment were strong prior 
to 1945 because allies were mutually dependent and had realignment options.106 These 
dilemmas were “sharply truncated” in the Cold War, however, because superpowers were 
firmly committed by virtue of their own interests to their allies and de-alignment was 
thought to be irrational.107 Patron entrapment is unlikely for superpowers, which have 
greater resources and cannot easily be restrained by smaller allies. 108 Furthermore, the 
virtual impossibility of an ally realigning with the opposing camp mitigates the risk of 
patron entrapment.109  
 Existing theories do not explain why nuclear-weapons possessing great powers 
would choose to ally with smaller, less-capable powers, and provide them with broad, 
vague, unilateral commitments of existential military aid for long periods of time. They also 
do not recognize that these alliances may transcend the goal of discrete military 
cooperation and be part of broader deterrence strategies to hold the political status quo. 
Approaches that assume that states pursue alliances with a narrowly-construed self-help 
motivation may therefore have a limited ability to elucidate nuclear security guarantees 
and the anomalous role they play in international politics.   
 Indeed, leading theorists Kenneth Waltz and Glenn Snyder quietly acknowledge that 
nuclear security guarantees are a fundamentally different type of alliance. To quote Waltz, 
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“[a]s de Gaulle has often said, nuclear weapons make alliances obsolete. At the strategic 
level he was right. That is another reason for calling NATO a treaty of guarantee rather than 
an old-fashioned alliance.”110 In a brief aside in his seminal 1984 article, Snyder likewise 
acknowledges that entrapment and abandonment may manifest differently in nuclear-
backed pacts.111  
These leading theories’ relative silence on the formation and maintenance of nuclear 
security guarantees, however, means that a theory of this type of alliance must revisit first 
principles. We have seen that compared to traditional defense pacts, nuclear umbrella 
alliances promise a great deal and specify very little, relying on ambiguous treaty language 
and capabilities that only one power possesses. In an international system that has no 
governing authority to manage and enforce agreements, we know that alliances are subject 
to opportunism. We also know that for commitments to be credible, they must be 
consistent with the incentives of the actors involved.112 If simply forming a vague alliance 
backed by the threat of nuclear weapons were enough to deter all potential adversaries, 
despite the panoply of informational uncertainties these entail, patrons would have great 
incentive to represent themselves as committed when they were not.113  
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How do allies and adversaries assess the credibility of a patron’s amorphous 
commitment? Generally speaking, both audiences can evaluate a threat of military denial 
by evaluating the patron’s capabilities—does it have the capabilities and the operational 
capacity to take action on behalf of the client state? But evaluating the patron’s threat of 
punishment is in large part a judgment of intent—does the guarantor have the will to 
intervene and to carry out a devastating attack on behalf of an ally? 114  Security guarantees 
therefore require that the patrons extending them and make their defense commitments 
publicly and repeatedly known.115 Because security guarantee treaties communicate so 
little information to allies and adversaries, patrons must take further action to signal 
alliance intent to both audiences.116   
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Patrons can compensate for the vague, unilateral nature of security guarantee pacts 
through the demonstration of the military capabilities that support the alliance, including 
forward-deployed troops, conventional weapons systems, military bases, and visible joint 
exercises.  They may also release information about the size and composition of the 
patron’s nuclear arsenal, as well its deployment patterns. Observable indicators of the 
patron’s military investment in its client make an adversary more likely to believe that it 
will intervene in wartime because its defense interests are already involved, and also serve 
the conventional alliance goal of deterrence by denial.117 Even a small demonstration of 
patron military commitment can send a potent message, as it increases the risk that a war 
with the client will necessarily involve its security guarantor. “What can 7,000 American 
troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops do?” Schelling asked. “Bluntly, they can die. They can die 
heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop 
there.”118 
Patrons may also rely on signals of political commitment to communicate their 
intent.119 Included within this category are nuclear declaratory policy, which states how a 
patron may use its nuclear weapons and public statements of support for client security. 
Another important signal of intent is consultation and dialogues with allies, which provides 
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them with information on how their security will be guaranteed.  The most enduring and 
informative indicator of commitment is, of course, the formal alliance treaty itself.120  
Many scholars of international signaling have tended to separate communication 
into those messages that require some material cost be paid up front, and those that come 
with a reputation cost that may be paid later.121 In reality, however, few signals serve 
purely to communicate capability—most involve some message of intent as well.122  It is of 
course, important that a client state know that its patron is materially able to defend it, but 
where superpower alliances are concerned, this part of the equation is rarely in doubt. 
Rather, many signals of military capability, such as forward-deployed troops, are signs that 
the patron is both able and willing to protect the security of the client. The presence of 
several thousand troops on an ally’s soil does not manifest a capability that would have 
otherwise been unknown: rather, it demonstrates a firm commitment to use it on behalf of 
the client. These signals of intent serve to reduce the vast information asymmetries that are 
inherent in nuclear security guarantees.  
By demonstrating their military capability on behalf of an ally, patrons reveal their 
defense commitments. By signing formal treaties, engaging in joint preparation for conflict, 
or forward-deploying troops, patrons may increase their commitment and mitigate some of 
the uncertainty that accompanies a vague unilateral guarantee.123  As Thomas Schelling has 
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observed: “To project the shadow of one’s military forces over other countries and 
territories is an act of diplomacy. To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies 
or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires 
more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions.”124  
 
Hypotheses on Nuclear Security Guarantee Formation and Management 
My theory of nuclear security guarantee formation and management posits that the 
unique nature of these pacts can be understood by their ambiguous treaty content, and the 
unilateral provision of capabilities within the alliance. These uncommon factors prevail 
because of the patron’s interest in signaling deterrence by punishment in addition to 
deterrence by denial, but this in turn results in vexing information deficits for all three 
parties involved. To compensate for these, security guarantee allies engage in peacetime 
signaling to make their commitments publicly and repeatedly known. The logic of the 
theory is represented in the arrow diagram below.  
 
Figure 7- The Theory of Absolute Alliances  
 
How, precisely, do these unique features change alliance formation, entrapment, and 
abandonment? This section addresses these questions.  
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H1: Security Guarantee Formation 
Conventional alliance wisdom holds that defense pacts are usually formed between 
states that share an adversary. 125 Allying states may have some, but not all, interests in 
common.  Indeed, where traditional defense pacts are concerned, it is theoretically possible 
for states “to make strictly defensive commitments to two adversaries…”126 This is true 
because states are often allying to deter a foreseeable war against a specific adversary. 
State A and State B may form an alliance against State C, despite the fact that State B is a 
rival of State D and State A is not.  Balancing theories of alliance formation are, however 
indeterminate on where specific alliances should form.127   
When an alliance aims to deter not just one adversary in a certain contingency but 
all potential foes from any kind of attack on a client, the requirements of alliance formation 
should be more exacting. Rather than form a security guarantee with any state with whom 
it shares an adversary, a nuclear patron must consider its audience. It can anticipate that 
upholding a vague, unilateral security guarantee for years or decades will require it to 
demonstrate often its intent to defend the client. It should, therefore, be unwilling to extend 
a security guarantee if the prospective client has an adversary that that patron does not 
share.  
If the patron extends a security guarantee and an unshared adversary is present, the 
patron cannot easily reassure that third state that the alliance is not aimed at it. The actions 
that the patron may need to undertake to attempt to demonstrate the credibility of the 
alliance, such as joint military exercises, planning, or forward deployment, may polarize 
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relations with that third state. Because security guarantees are not targeted promises of aid 
in specific contingencies, the patron cannot easily tailor these signals to reassure a third 
party that they are not aimed at it. Extending a security guarantee to a state with an 
unshared adversary may mean that the patron not only acquires a new adversary, but risks 
entrapment in a war that it might have otherwise avoided. Returning to the example above, 
State A should be wary of extending a guarantee to State B, given its antipathy for State D. 
For State A to extend a security guarantee to State B, then, B’s rivals should be exclusively 
shared with A. That is, B should not have rivals that A does not share. The same should not 
necessarily hold true of more traditional defense pacts, however, where allies can tailor 
their defense commitments to specific adversaries or contingencies. For most other 
alliances, the presence of a shared rival should be a strong predictor of defense pact 
formation.  
 
H1: For a security guarantee to form, client states should have rivals that are exclusively 
shared by the patron; for non-security guarantee defense pacts to form, shared rivals will be 
better predictors of alliance formation.  
 
DV: Nuclear security guarantee/Non-security guarantee defense pact formation 
IV: Shared/exclusive adversary status   
 
Methods:  
Large-N (Chapter 2): ReLogit models 
Qualitative (Chapter 3): Case studies of the US decision not to extend a security guarantee 
to Israel (1963) and the decision to form the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894) 
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H2: Entrapment in the Nuclear Age  
 Entrapment occurs when a state gets dragged into a conflict on behalf of an ally 
whose interests it does not share, or shares only partially.128 As one scholar has observed, 
however, it is difficult to point to cases of true entrapment, especially in recent decades.129 
During the Cold War and since, leading powers faced relatively little risk of entrapment, 
traditionally defined, because alliance ties were rigid and clear. There may, however, be an 
additional reason why it is hard to locate many post-1945 cases of patrons being dragged 
into their clients’ wars: Security guarantors have great incentive to ensure that their clients 
do not go to war at all. No patron, however, committed should want to use nuclear 
weapons, especially on behalf of national interests that are not its own, or risk escalation to 
the nuclear threshold in a serious conventional war. Entrapment, traditionally defined, 
should rarely if ever be observed among nuclear umbrella allies. It may, however, take on a 
new form.  
 As already discussed at length, nuclear security guarantees’ nonspecific treaty 
content may be beneficial to both patron and client during peacetime. By leaving its 
commitments vague, patrons introduce uncertainty into an adversary risk calculus, and the 
suggestion that they may intervene in a conflict on a client’s behalf may well be enough to 
deter a potential challenger. A patron can provide deterrence without committing itself 
firmly to precise contingencies. Clients, who hope to outsource their security at the highest 
levels for long periods of time, may likewise be happy to accept a commitment that 
suggests that the patron may intervene in any defensive contingency. The ambiguous and 
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unilateral nature of security guarantees therefore serves the interests of general deterrence 
quite well.  
 Once the client becomes involved in a dispute or crisis, however, these defining 
security guarantee qualities may quickly become liabilities.  If an adversary has made the 
decision to challenge the client, it has already accounted for the patron’s ambiguous 
alliance guarantee.  Even if the patron’s direct interests are not invoked in the standoff, it 
faces the possibility that a minor skirmish involving a relatively weak client will escalate. 
The client state may not be able to credibly defend itself, and the patron may face an 
incentive to intervene sooner in crisis rather than doing so later in an actual war. Put 
differently, the characteristics that make security guarantees dependable tools of general 
deterrence may not make them particularly useful for immediate deterrence, giving 
patrons the incentive to intervene using prompt public statements or shows of force to 
reinforce their commitments and prevent escalation.  The same tendencies should not 
prevail in other defense pacts, in which the patron is not necessarily on the hook for all 
defensive contingencies. In these other alliances, the patron has fewer incentives to 
intervene on its client’s behalf in the crisis phase.  
 
H2: Ambiguous, unilateral commitments create incentives for nuclear patrons to intervene 
forcefully in security guarantee client crises to restrain allies and deter adversaries; the same 
crisis incentives do not prevail in other defense pacts.   
 
DV: Allied crisis intervention (statements and shows of force) 
IV: Defense pact type (traditional vs. security guarantee)  
 
Methods: 
Quantitative (Chapter 4): Summary statistics using ICB data  
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Qualitative (Chapter 4): Case studies of crises in the US-Taiwan security guarantee (1958), 
Sino-Soviet security guarantee (1958), and US-Argentine and US-Chile non-security 
guarantees (1978-79)  
 
H3: Abandonment in the Nuclear Age  
The fear of abandonment, or allies’ concern that partners will fail to make good on 
their alliance promises, is the second half of the alliance security dilemma. Allies are 
generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they formally abrogate the alliance treaty, 
fail to support the ally when the agreement’s casus foederis arises, or decline to back a 
partner in a dispute with an adversary.130 A central challenge of any alliance is managing 
partners’ fears that these events will occur, and the unilateral and vague nature of security 
guarantees give client states good reason to be especially anxious. Without sufficient 
patron assurance that it does not intend to abandon its junior partners, client states may 
seek other alliances or the independent capabilities to provide for their own deterrence 
and defense, which may, in turn, impoverish patron global influence.  Patron and client also 
have significant common interests, however, and the patron therefore has ample reason to 
want to assuage its clients’ abandonment fears.  
These abandonment fears largely stem from the fact that patron and client do not 
pool resources at the highest levels of escalation, leaving the latter dependent on the 
former for the primary instrument of deterrence, and potentially warfighting.  While allies 
in traditional defense pacts have ample reasons to fear abandonment as well, both usually 
maintain their own armies, meaning that capabilities are symmetric and the commitment 
bilateral. An ally’s failure to fulfill its alliance promise could still result in a significant 
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military loss, but would not be a catastrophe of the same existential proportions. Where 
nuclear umbrella alliances are concerned, however, allies must be convinced that their 
patron’s efforts at deterrence are going far enough to affect the cost calculations of their 
adversary, so that it, in turn, will not attack at all. It must believe this despite the fact that it 
has no specific indication of when and how its patron may intervene if that should become 
necessary.  
Leading institutional theories have argued that where states share substantial 
mutual interest, as in an alliance, they can assure one another through cooperation, defined 
as mutual policy adjustment. I posit that deterrence-related consultations need not actually 
induce real cooperation among security guarantee allies to mitigate client abandonment 
fears, however. Rather, because client states have so little a priori information about how 
their patrons are providing for their security, deterrence institutions can assuage 
abandonment fears by giving patrons a vehicle through which to unilaterally communicate 
existing strategies and policies. I hypothesize that nuclear patrons through the provision of 
information and with the aim of keeping the guarantee unilateral and ambiguous.  
 
H3: Patrons form nuclear consultation mechanisms to increase unilateral information 
sharing.   
 
DV: Nuclear consultation formation   
IV: Defense pact type  
Method: 
Qualitative (Chapter 5): Comparative case studies of the formation of NATO’s Nuclear 
Planning Group, the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues, and military consultation 




This dissertation makes use of multiple strategies to test the hypotheses presented 
above. It relies upon large-n regression analysis, summary statistical analysis, and 
qualitative case studies. Several of the case studies draw upon original archival research 
and interviews. Whether tested qualitatively or quantitatively, each hypothesis compares 
nuclear security guarantees and traditional defense pacts, to substantiate the unique 
nature of the former.  
The power of statistical methods lies in the ability to compare the relationship 
between independent and dependent variables across a large number of cases. This type of 
analysis is not limited to one set of cases and thus provides external validity that in-depth 
analysis of a few cases cannot claim. In this study, for instance, statistical methods allow me 
to draw upon the universe of all politically-relevant state dyads, as opposed to just the 
cases of nuclear guarantees, or the broader population of alliances that are under study. 
Statistical methods are also not subject to the same degrees of freedom problems that may 
affect case studies. When testing hypotheses on a limited number of cases, it may be 
difficult to get sufficient variation on the relevant variables to reach strong conclusions 
about the relative strength of different arguments. This is not so when large-n methods are 
used.  
For my alliance formation hypothesis tested in Chapter 2, I construct an original 
dataset of shared and unshared rivalries and alliance formations. The dataset contains 
yearly information for all politically-relevant dyads from 1816 to 2000.  I draw upon COW 
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4.1 Alliance data, and Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s rivalry data.131 I also code several variables, 
including nuclear security guarantees, shared rivals, and exclusive rivals myself.  For data 
on patron crisis intervention used in Chapter 4, I draw upon the International Crisis 
Behavior dataset, examining crises 1945-2000 using summary statistics. I measure allied 
intervention by restricting ICB’s 3rd party intervention variables to intervention by a treaty 
ally according to COW 4.1 Alliance data.  
There are, however, many limitations to statistical approaches. First, all statistical 
models impose some assumptions on the data, and these may be unrealistic or even 
implausible. This dissertation will employ traditional statistical approaches, and by 
extension, the assumptions that come along with these. I will attempt to identify and deal 
with these explicitly. Second, international relations data itself may be problematic. There 
is ample debate in IR about how best to measure a rivalry, for example, so the data I utilize 
likely measures adversary status imperfectly.132 Moreover, while there have been many 
cases of alliance formation throughout history, there have only been 54 bilateral nuclear 
security guarantee formations. Although I select a statistical model, the Rare Events 
Logistic Regression, designed to deal with this problem, it is important to keep in mind 
nonetheless.   
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Case studies can be strong in several areas where statistical methods tend to be 
weak.133  Statistical analysis tests predictions about correlations between variables, but 
cannot explain the whys and hows of those relationships. Qualitative research can evaluate 
whether variables that the hypotheses predict are behaving for the reasons expected. Case 
studies allow researchers to generalize on well-defined types of cases with a high degree of 
explanatory richness.134  They are useful when one aims at high conceptual validity, helping 
to identify the indicators that most closely represent the theoretical concepts under study. 
Cases both help to identify relevant variables and refine concepts further. This method is 
also useful when a study examines the role of a particular causal mechanism. Cases can 
help a researcher determine what conditions activate a particular causal mechanism, and 
explore in depth the operation of that mechanism.  Qualitative analysis is also helpful 
where causal complexity is present. That is, case studies can help a researcher recognize if 
multiple causal explanations are at play in explaining a single outcome.135 In sum, 
qualitative analysis can increase a researcher’s confidence that a hypothesized prediction 
holds for the reasons the theory expects it will hold.  
The qualitative analysis in this dissertation will employ matched comparative cases 
and process tracing. The comparative method involves cross-case, controlled comparisons 
among a small number of cases. Through the comparative method we can introduce 
variation on the dependent variable, and thus draw stronger conclusions about the 
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influence of the independent variable under study, and the theory more broadly.136 
Process-tracing, on the other hand, is useful for linking possible causes to observed 
outcomes. Instead of focusing on the analysis of variables across cases, it examines the 
causal pathway in a single case. Drawing on archival documents, interviews, and secondary 
sources, process tracing allows me to determine whether the causal process hypothesized 
is in fact evident in a particular case.137 Process tracing will be combined with the 
comparative method, such that the within-case results of individual case studies are 
compared within a common theoretical framework. Each of these qualitative methods on 
their own certainly has their pitfalls.138 They are, however, stronger when combined, and 
especially useful when they are paired with other methods. 
It is worth noting at the outset that there are some methodological flaws and biases 
inherent in this study. As with many phenomena in international politics, this study of 
nuclear umbrella alliances cannot escape selection effects. I have attempted to deal with 
some of these by studying the formation as well as the function of nuclear umbrellas (they 
are both a dependent and independent variable), but some still remain. For example, for it 
to be a candidate ally, any potential client state likely lives in a dangerous neighborhood in 
the first place. This affects both its interest in security guarantees and the likelihood that it 
will fear abandonment or become involved in a conflict or crisis, meaning there is some 
endogeneity. This is of particular concern in Chapter 4, where I examine patron 
intervention in clients’ crises. There are, of course, also a limited number of potential 
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nuclear patron states in the international system. Patrons must have robust power 
projection capabilities as well as an interest in providing for another country’s security to 
form these pacts in the first place. Patrons are therefore system-leading powers, and most 
cases are the US and USSR.  Furthermore, the nature of the subject under study means that 
I have relatively few candidate cases to examine (n= 54, see Introduction, p. 13). All cases 
have occurred since 1945, and the vast majority of alliances were formed during the Cold 
War. I intend to study the full universe of umbrella cases throughout history, however, 
which adds to the explanatory power of my theory.  
This dissertation concerns itself with all nuclear security guarantees, 1945-present. 
In all quantitative analysis, whether regression or descriptive statistics, all three nuclear 
patrons’ alliances and alliance behaviors are included. Because of both data availability and 
substantive importance, however, the United States’ alliances are the primary focus of the 
qualitative case studies. Particularly because of Moscow’s hierarchical military relations 
with Warsaw Pact countries, there is relatively little data that allows me to trace how 
exactly the Soviet Union managed many of its security guarantees. The Sino-Soviet alliance 
is analyzed in Chapter 4, however.   
The focus on the United States’ alliance system is warranted for substantive reasons 
as well. Even during the Cold War, the vast majority of nuclear security guarantees were 
extended by the United States. Although Russia presently extends several nuclear security 
guarantee commitments, the United States maintains these pacts with over 30 countries. If 
new security guarantees are formed in the future, they will almost certainly be American. 
Testing a theory of security guarantee formation and management on qualitative cases that 
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are disproportionately US cases is justified because this is a predominantly American tool 
of strategy and statecraft.   
 Combining the methodological insights and the hypotheses derived above, I now 
summarize some basic aspects of my research design. The phenomenon under study is 
nuclear umbrella alliances, defined as a subclass of defense pacts.139 This phenomenon is 
not an empirical universal. That is, there are many cases where security guarantee alliances 
do not form, although they might have.  There is natural variation on the dependent 
variable. The theoretical framework used here is a theory of security guarantee formation 
and maintenance that is driven by these alliances’ unusually ambiguous and unilateral 
nature.  
The chief goal of this study is to explain how, despite a host of informational 
problems and uncertainties, nuclear security guarantees have formed and persisted for 
decades. This project does not seek to adjudicate the factors that make extended 
deterrence more or less credible, or why it succeeds and fails when it does. Rather, it aims 
to elucidate how this particular type of alliance forms and functions given the panoply of 
deterrence-related information problems that prevail in these pacts.  
Beyond the contributions this dissertation will make to the literatures on alliances, 
deterrence, and signaling, however, there are some broader implications. Policymakers 
often discuss “the nuclear umbrella” as a tool of statecraft, but without a firm grasp of what 
exactly this comprises, it is difficult for analysts to make strong assertions about the policy 
                                                           
139 George and Bennett argue that most successful studies are those that work with a well-defined, smaller-
scope subclass of a broader phenomenon. This type of research allows for narrower, but more precise 
generalizations. Studies of each subtype can be thought of a building blocks in broader, typological theories 
(in this case, theories of military alliances more broadly). George and Bennett, pp. 77-78.  
64 
possibilities and pitfalls of this type of alliance. There are at least three areas of US foreign 
policy to which the findings from this study will be directly applicable.  
The first is in the Persian Gulf. President Barack Obama and former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton have both suggested that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the United 
States may extend security guarantees to additional states in the Gulf Region.140 Without a 
systematic understanding of how nuclear umbrellas form and function, however, it is 
difficult to assess the utility of such a policy. Chapters 2 and 3 will yield conclusions that 
speak directly to the feasibility and desirability of extending US guarantees to Gulf States in 
an effort to contain Iran.  
Findings from this study are also relevant in the Pacific, where US allies are growing 
increasingly anxious as China rises and North Korea develops its nuclear arsenal. Chapter 4 
of this study will highlight some issues areas in which Washington may face crisis 
entrapment on behalf of its East Asian clients, while Chapters 5 and 6 will suggest some 
ways that these partners may be assured despite mounting security challenges in the 
region.  
Finally, until March 2014, deterrence analysts had turned their attention away from 
NATO. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has brought deterrence and assurance in Europe back 
onto the global agenda.  A firmer understanding of how the alliance has grappled with the 
requirements of extended deterrence in the past will inform debates about how it can do so 
now and in the future.   
                                                           
140 For an analysis of the viability of this option, see Colin Kahl et. al, “If All Else Fails: The Challenges of 
Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” Center for New American Security, May 13, 2013; Zachary K. Goldman and 
Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Conceptualizing Containment: The Iranian Threat and the Future of Gulf Security,” 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 128, No. 3 (2013), pp. 589-616. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE ENEMY OF MY FRIEND: ALLIANCE FORMATION AND SECURITY GUARANTEES 
 
“It would be a mistake to help the French crush Germany when the French were unwilling 
to aid Russia against Austria or Turkey.”141 
-Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Geirs 
 
Introduction 
Since the early Cold War, the United States, Russia, and Great Britain—three of the 
five declared nuclear powers under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) — have all 
extended security guarantees to close allies.  Many of these are still in force today.142  
Despite the fact that these alliances were foundational to the United States’ and Soviet 
Union’s grand strategies during the Cold War, and the fact that the United States and Russia 
both continue to maintain many of these alliances, we know little about how and why these 
pacts form. Under what conditions do nuclear-weapons possessing states extend security 
guarantees, and do these conditions differ from those under which more traditional 
defense pacts are concluded?  
In this chapter, I argue that the ambiguous and unilateral nature of nuclear security 
guarantee commitments change the way these alliances are formed. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that while a shared threat may explain the formation of traditional defense 
pacts, nuclear security guarantees should only form if the prospective client state does not 
have adversaries that the patron does not share. That is, for security guarantees to form, 
the client state should only have adversaries that are exclusively shared with the patron. 
Drawing upon a novel alliance and rivalry dataset, I find substantial support for this 
hypothesis, and little evidence for the notion that the determinants of nuclear security 
                                                           
141 As quoted in William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism: A Penetrating and Revelatory Study of 
European Diplomacy in the Crucial Period of 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), p. 32.  
142 See Introduction, Table 1, for full list of cases.  
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guarantee formation are the same as those of traditional defense pacts. Consistent with 
previous scholarship, I also find evidence that nuclear security guarantee formation is 
correlated with regime type, although traditional defense pact formation is not.  
 This chapter presents a new approach to the study of alliance formation in 
international politics. Despite the received wisdom that alliances form in response to 
external threat, there has been little effort to test empirically balancing theories of alliance 
formation. This chapter not only investigates how patterns of enmity may be related to 
alliance formation, but demonstrates that nuclear security guarantees may form for 
different reasons than other defense pacts, underscoring the fact that this is a unique type 
of alliance in international politics.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I present a hypothesis on nuclear 
security guarantee formation, positing that for these alliances to form, different external 
threat conditions should prevail than those that are associated with more traditional 
defense pacts. I describe my alliance/rivalry dataset and then present the results of my 
data analysis.  Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that shared rivalries between allies are 
good predictors of defense pact formation, but less valuable in explaining the formation of 
nuclear security guarantees. Exclusive rivalries are much stronger determinants of nuclear 
umbrella alliance formation.  
 
Hypotheses on Nuclear Security Guarantee Formation  
The vast international relations literature on alliances has proffered a number of 
different reasons for why they are concluded. Perhaps the best-known explanation for the 
emergence of defensive alliances is that they are a form of balancing—efforts by states to 
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offset the capabilities or threats posed by adversaries.143 Under a balance of power or 
balance of threat explanation for alliance formation, states form alliances when they share 
an enemy. As prominent scholars have observed, however, once states share an adversary, 
balancing theories are indeterminate on where exactly alliances should form.144 Structure 
“generates pervasive fears and indeterminate options.”145 A small number of quantitative 
studies have confirmed that a relationship exists between shared threats and alliance 
formation, but relatively little empirical work has investigated balancing hypotheses or 
how patterns of amity and enmity may shape alliance formation more broadly.146  
Not only may balancing theories be underspecified theoretically and under-
examined empirically, but it is also possible that the determinants of alliance formation 
vary with the type of defense pact in question. That is, different types of defensive alliances 
may form in response to different patterns of amity and enmity.  
In this chapter and the next, I propose a hypothesis on the determinants of nuclear 
security guarantee formation.  I posit that the ambiguous, unilateral nature of security 
guarantee commitments means that the requirements for forming them will be more 
exacting than those associated with more traditional defense pacts. A shared adversary 
may be a good predictor of defense pact formation, as balancing theories suggest, but a 
patron should require more than just a shared adversary to be willing to extend a security 
                                                           
143 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Chapter 6; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987), pp. 21-26.  
144 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” p. 462. For a discussion of how this indeterminacy 
manifested itself with respect to pre-World War I alliance arrangements, see Jervis, System Effects, p. 244-245. 
145 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 62.  
146 Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” Western Political Quarterly Vol. 37, No.4 
(1984), pp. 523-44; Zeev Maoz, Lesley G. Terris, Ranan D.Kuperman, and Ilan Talmud, “What Is the Enemy of 
My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced Relations, 1816–2001,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1 
(February, 2007), pp. 100–115. 
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guarantee to a prospective client. Specifically, for a patron to be willing to extend a 
guarantee, it should not only share a rival with the client, but the client should not have 
rivals that the patron does not share.  Because security guarantee treaties do not target 
specific adversaries, military contingencies,  theaters of operations, or specify the type of 
aid that will be forthcoming, the patrons who extend them are on the hook for defensive aid 
broadly construed over an indefinite time horizon. This puts them at a higher risk of 
entrapment in their clients’ conflicts than they would be if they extended more specific 
defensive commitments. Patrons should be able to anticipate this entrapment risk and 
make their security guarantee formation decisions accordingly.147 If a prospective client 
has enemies that the patron does not count among its own, the possibility of becoming 
involved in an unwanted war should seem too great to make security guarantee formation 
worthwhile.148 For a patron to extend a security guarantee to a client, then, we should 
expect that they have not only shared, but exclusive rivals, meaning the client does not 
have rivals that the patron does not also share. Exclusive rivals should be a superior 
predictor of security guarantee formation than the shared rival explanation posited by 
balancing theories.  
The same should not hold true where other defense pacts are concerned, however. 
Because non-security guarantee defense pacts may rely upon more contingent treaty 
commitments, the conditions for forming them need not be so exacting. If an ally can 
                                                           
147 James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 
Vol. 52, No. 2 (1998), pp. 269-305; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good 
News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?," International Organization Vol. 50, No. 3 (1996), 
pp. 379-406. 
148 For foundational work on the alliance tradeoffs between entrapment and abandonment, see: Michael 
Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151-152; Snyder, Alliance Politics, 1997, p. 43; Glenn H. Snyder, “The 
Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics Vol. 36, No.4, (1984), pp. 461-495.  
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specify conditions of its military aid, it may be willing to form a defense pact even if the 
prospective partner has rivals that it does not share. The ability to provide targeted 
deterrence and military aid under circumscribed conditions should mean that exclusive 
rivals are not necessary for most defense pacts to form. Shared rivals should better explain 
the formation of non-security guarantee defense pacts.  This yields my hypothesis:  
H1: For a security guarantee to form, client states should have rivals that are exclusively 
shared by the patron; for non-security guarantee defense pacts to form, shared rivals will be 
superior predictors of alliance formation.    
 
 This hypothesis relies upon two dependent variables and two independent 
variables.  The dependent variables are security guarantee formation and non-security 
guarantee defense pact formation. The independent variables are exclusive rivalry and 
shared rivalry. Hypothesis 1 expects that security guarantee formation will be better 
explained by the presence of exclusive rivalries between partners than it will be by shared 
rivalries. Per traditional balancing explanations, however, non-security guarantee defense 
pacts will be better explained by shared rivalries. The expected relationships are shown in 
the arrow diagram below.  





Because this hypothesis consists of two dependent and two independent variables, 
there are multiple ways it can be invalidated. That is, there is more than one null 
hypothesis. There are two null hypotheses that would suggest that the determinants of 
security guarantee formation are no different than those of traditional defense pact 
formation. First, consistent with balancing hypotheses, shared rivalries may explain both 
security guarantee and other defense pact formation better than exclusive rivalries.  
Second, exclusive rivalries may explain both security guarantee and other defense pact 
formation better than shared rivalries, which would suggest that traditional balancing 
hypotheses require refinement.  Third, security guarantees and other defense pacts may 
indeed have different conditions for formation, but they may be the inverse of what I posit: 
exclusive rivalries may better explain the formation of traditional defense pacts, while 
shared rivalries alone may better explain security guarantee formation. These three null 
hypotheses are listed below.  
 
H1A1: Shared rivalries are stronger predictors than exclusive rivalries of both security 
guarantee and traditional defense pact formation;  
 
H1A2: Exclusive rivalries are stronger predictors than shared rivalries of both security 
guarantee and traditional defense pact formation;  
 
H1A3: Shared rivalries are the stronger predictor of security guarantee formation; Exclusive 
rivalries are the stronger predictor of non-security guarantee defense pact formation.  
 
In this chapter, I test quantitatively the relationship posited by Hypothesis 1 using a novel 
dataset. In the next chapter, I will test the same hypothesis qualitatively, using two in-depth 




Rivalry and Alliance Formation Data  
To test Hypothesis 1 quantitatively, I construct an original dataset of shared and 
unshared rivalries and alliance formations. The dataset contains yearly information for all 
politically-relevant dyads from 1816 to 2000.  The unit of analysis is the dyad-year.  
Politically-relevant dyads (PRDs) are dyads in which at least one of the states is a 
major power, or the states are contiguous. Much if not most international systemic activity 
occurs within this population.  The use of PRDs is prominent in international relations 
analysis of time series cross-sectional data with a binary dependent variable.149 The 
principal advantage of drawing upon this universe of cases is feasibility: PRDs constitute 
approximately 10 percent of total dyads between 1816 and 2000.150 Using PRDs gives me 
over 94,000 observations, whereas drawing upon all dyads over the same time period 
would have resulted in close to a million observations. Given that several variables under 
study in this chapter are coded by hand, politically-relevant dyads made for a more 
tractable research task.   
The primary drawback to using PRDs is that this is a non-random sample of cases 
and may introduce some selection bias. Scholars have examined whether PRDs introduced 
measurement error and selection bias, and did not find that erroneous estimation resulted 
from the use of this data.151 For my part, I try to minimize bias to the degree that I can. I 
obtain my sample of PRDs by extraction through EUGene, and set contiguity at its 
                                                           
149 Douglas Lemke, and William Reed. "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2001), p. 129.  
150 Lemke and Reed, p. 128.  
151 Lemke and Reed, pp. 140-141.  
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maximum possible level.152 I am also conscious of the fact that this sample has already 
selected for major power status and geographic contiguity, so I do not add additional 
control variables to measure these in my statistical models.  
Given the phenomenon under study, the population of PRDs is an appropriate 
choice. Because this chapter seeks to compare the determinants of security guarantee 
formation to those of non-security guarantee defense pacts, a population that samples 
great power alliances disproportionally is theoretically sound. Potential alliances that are 
not examined as a result of this PRD choice are predominately those formed between 
minor, non-contiguous powers (e.g., alliances between Latin American and African states). 
Balancing theories of alliance formation were developed to explain great power alliance 
formation. Nuclear security guarantees have only ever been extended by great powers. By 
not including minor power, non-contiguous dyads in my sample, I am essentially 
controlling for major power status. This dataset might best be termed a Major Power 
Rivalry and Alliance Formation dataset. Despite the fact that it includes only 10 percent of 
all possible dyads since 1816, it includes 900 of 2,155 total alliance formations during that 
time period, and thus nearly half of all international alliance activity.     
As explained above, I examine two dichotomous dependent variables: security 
guarantee (NSG) formation, and non-security guarantee defense pact (Defense) formation. 
Each of these variables measures whether an alliance was formed in a given dyad-year, 
based on COW alliance data.153 Because I am interested in the formation of security 
                                                           
152 At EUGene’s Level 5 Contiguity, states need not share a land border and may be separate by up to 400 
miles of water. Scott D. Bennett, and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions, 
Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 179-204. 
153 Alliance formations are coded from COW 4.1 alliance data. Nuclear security guarantees are coded by the 
author, and non-security guarantee defense pacts are a residual defense pact category.  
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guarantees as compared to other defense pacts, I do not include ententes or non-aggression 
pacts in this analysis. Because the unit of analysis is the dyad-year, I divide multilateral 
alliances into dyadic observations.154  I also examine two dichotomous independent 
variables—shared rivalry (SharedRival), and exclusive rivalry (ExclusiveRival, meaning that 
a dyad shares a rival and neither state has a rival that the other member does not share).  
Both independent variables are coded based on Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s rivalry 
data.155  In this data, enduring rivalries are coded based on behavioral indicators—
specifically, based on past disputes. Repeated conflicts create an expectation of future 
conflict. I rely upon this coding of enduring rivalries because it is straightforward and 
objective, although it is not without its drawbacks. Behavioral coding, for example, may 
miss rivalries that do not result in violent disputes. Another option would be to rely upon a 
perceptual approach to strategic rivalry, most closely associated with William R. 
Thompson’s rivalry work. In this approach, rivalries are coded when historical documents 
indicate that key decision makers perceived another state to be an adversary. This 
approach, however, includes some assumptions about power symmetry as a condition for 
rivalry identification.156 Because I am interested in a type of alliance that is fundamentally 
asymmetric, this is not an appropriate indicator for this analysis. Additionally, the 
Thompson data contains far fewer rivalries than the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl data.   
The SharedRival variable is drawn directly from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s data. It is 
coded as one if a dyad has a common rival in a given year, and zero otherwise. The 
                                                           
154 It is important to acknowledge that this may produce some bias. See: Paul Poast, “(Mis) using Dyadic Data 
to Analyze Multilateral Events,” Political Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 4, (2010), pp. 403-425.  
155 James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns.” Journal 
of Peace Research 43, No. 3 (2006), pp. 331-348. No isolated (only enduring) rivalries are included. I am 
grateful to Raymond Kuo for his help in constructing the Sharedriv variable.  
156 William Thompson, Handbook of International Rivalries: 1494-2010 (Washington: CQ Press, 2102), p. 1.  
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ExclusiveRival variable is coded through a two-stage process. I began by consulting the 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl rivalry data for the presence of unshared adversaries in every 
dyad-year. I created a variable UnsharedRival, which is coded as one if one member of the 
dyad had an adversary that the other did not share in a given year. UnsharedRival was 
otherwise coded as zero. I then created the variable ExclusiveRival. ExclusiveRival is coded 
as one if an only if: a) the dyad has a common rival that year; b) the dyad has no unshared 
rivals that year. It is otherwise coded as zero. ExclusiveRival therefore captures the 
presence of a shared rival and the lack of an unshared rival, and may be thought of as a 
more restrictive subset of SharedRival.  
 To account for the unilateral nature of nuclear security guarantees, I make some 
specific adjustments to the coding of UnsharedRival and ExclusiveRival. If the dyad includes 
one or more nuclear patrons, then I am solely concerned whether the client state has rivals 
that the patron does not share. Because only one power possesses nuclear weapons and 
provides defensive protection in these pacts, we should expect that a patron may decline to 
extend a security guarantee to a client with unshared rivals. The client, however, may be 
much less concerned that its patron has other adversaries, because a security guarantee 
does not obligate it to provide military assistance to the patron in the case of war that does 
not involve its territory. The fact that the United States had a rivalry with North Korea 
beginning in 1950, for example, should not prevent Japan from accepting a security 
guarantee from the United States in 1951, because Japan has no treaty obligation to assist 
in a US-North Korean war.  
 Before the nuclear age, however, alliance partners did not conclude pacts that were 
so unilateral in their means of deterrence or their alliance obligations. Allies were expected 
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to assist one another in the case of conflict, and their means of doing so (conventional 
arms) were symmetric, even if they did not necessarily possess equivalent levels of 
conventional capabilities. And as discussed in Chapter 1, security guarantees are a post-
World War II phenomenon, meaning that almost no previous alliances promised assistance 
that was truly unilateral in nature. Before 1945 then, the UnsharedRival is coded as 1 if 
either member of the dyad has a rival the other does not share. This also holds true after 
1945 if neither member of the dyad is a nuclear power, capable of extending a unilateral 
guarantee. I bring this coding rule into effect for each of the five declared nuclear powers in 
the first year that it possessed nuclear weapons.157 I employ this unilateral coding rule for 
all nuclear powers, regardless of whether or not they have ever opted to extend deterrence 
to allies. For example, dyads including France (beginning in 1960) and China (beginning in 
1964) are coded according to this rule, even though neither has ever attempted to extend a 
nuclear security guarantee. These states’ mere possession of nuclear weapons means that 
they theoretically could decide to form a unilateral nuclear security guarantee. 
 I also include several control variables, beginning with regime type. Numerous 
studies have examined whether states of similar regime type are more likely to form 
alliances.158  Particularly relevant are findings that suggest that Cold War-era alliances may 
                                                           
157 This occurs in the following years: The United States (1945); The Soviet Union (1949); Great Britain 
(1952); France (1960); China (1964).  
158 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 
1962-73,” International Organization,  Vol. 45, No. 3 (1991), pp. 369-395; Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann 
Emmons, “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 285-306; Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, 
“Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1, 
(1994), pp. 145-161; Michael W. Simon and Erik Gartzke, “Political System Similarity And The Choice of Allies: 
Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40 No.4,  (1996), 
pp. 617-635; Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, “Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-
1992,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,  Vol. 44, No. 2 (2000), pp. 203-227; Douglas M. Gibler and Scott Wolford, 
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be more likely than others to be correlated with regime type, which is likely explained by 
the US and Soviet alliance systems.159 Recent findings suggest that democratic dyads are 
not, in fact, more likely to form alliances, and indeed, may be less likely to form them. 
Alliances in the Cold War period tended to occur among democratic dyads, however, with 
the alliances often preceding democratization.160 Because there is ample evidence to 
suggest correlation between regime type and alliances during the Cold War, and because 
nearly all nuclear security guarantees were extended by the United States or Soviet Union 
to ideologically similar states, I expect that shared regime type will be strongly associated 
with security guarantee formation.  I create a variable, JointDemoc, which is coded as one if 
the Polity2 scores of both members of a dyad are between 5 and 10, and zero otherwise.161 
I also create a variable JointAutoc, which is coded as one if both members of a dyad have 
Polity2 scores between -5 and -10, and zero otherwise. I then combine these variables to 
create a JointRegime variable, which is coded as one if a dyad is either jointly democratic or 
jointly autocratic, and zero otherwise.  
 Next, I control for the number of great powers in the international system. As 
discussed above with respect to regime type, alliances formed under bipolarity may be 
distinct from those that formed under multipolarity. Given that nuclear security guarantees 
have all been formed during the Cold War and after, I expect that the number of major 
                                                           
“Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship Between Regime Type and Alliance 
Formation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.  50, No. 1 (2006), pp. 129-153. 
159 Gartzke and Simon, p. 628.  
160 Lai and Reiter; Gibler and Wolford, p. 143. 
161 Polity2 (Version IVe) scores rely on the 21-point regime type scale, ranging from -10 for a full autocracy to 
10 for a full democracy. Polity2 scores are appropriate for use with time series data. See: Monty G. Marshall 
and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual,” 2005, available at: 
http://www.stevendroper.com/polity.pdf . 
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powers will be negatively correlated with NSG formation. The variable NumGreatPowers, a 
count variable of system-leading powers in a given year, allows me to minimize 
perturbations based on these systemic differences.162 I do not, however, include a control 
to measure whether a specific dyad includes one or more great powers, as such a control 
would be duplicative and inadvisable given that my dataset is based on politically-relevant 
dyads.  
 Third, I control for the ratio of material capabilities within each dyad and create a 
variable CapabilitiesRatio, based on both states’ CINC scores.163  A state’s national material 
capabilities may be a good indicator of its ability to provide military assistance and security 
to an alliance partner. Because nuclear security guarantees are unilateral in their promises 
of aid, we might expect that a higher capabilities ratios to be more closely associated with 
NSG formation. Because I am controlling for CapabilitiesRatio, however, I do not also 
include an additional variable to measure GDP, as these are highly correlated.164  
 Finally, I add controls for temporal dependence in both of my dependent variables.  
Researchers have increasingly recognized the importance of controlling for time 
dependence in time series cross sectional data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS). 
Beck, Tucker, and Katz originally proposed using cubic splines or time dummies to control 
for time dependence in logistic regression to make a logit model equivalent to an event 
history model for BTSCS data.165 Time dummies can introduce estimation problems, 
                                                           
162 This variable is extracted through EUGene. Bennett and Stam. 
163 CINC scores are extracted through EUGene. Bennett and Stam. 
164 Gibler and Wolford, p. 139.  
165 Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker, “Taking Time Seriously: Times-Series-Cross-Section 
Analysis with Binary Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Oct. 1998), pp. 
1260-1288.  
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however, and cubic splines are difficult to implement. 166  An alternative is to control for 
time since the last occurrence of the dependent variable, introducing variables t, t2, and t3 
into the regression.167 This cubic polynomial approximation is simple to implement and to 
interpret.168 I create variables tnsg, tnsg2, and tnsg3, which capture time since the last 
nuclear security guarantee formation. I also create tdef, tdef2, and tdef3, which capture time 
since the last non-security guarantee defense pact formation.  These controls for temporal 
dependence are included in the bivariate and multivariate analyses below.  
 
Data Analysis 
My central hypothesis is that exclusive rivalries between security patrons and 
clients explain the formation of nuclear security guarantees, while shared rivals are the 
stronger predictor of other defense pacts. I employ Rare Events Logistic Regression 
(ReLogit) models to test my claims about the correlates of security guarantee formation. 
ReLogit is a suite of programs for estimating rare events. 169  In this case, alliance 
formations are far rarer than non-formations.170 ReLogit is able to model dichotomous 
dependent variables and to correct for biased estimates in rare events. I adjust robust 
standard errors for clustering by dyad.171  
                                                           
166 David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data,” 
Political Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 271-292.  
167 These cubic polynomials are necessarily highly correlated, but this is not problematic in a dataset as large 
as the one used here. Carter and Signorino, pp. 282-283.  
168 For a detailed explanation of why the cubic polynomial is appropriate, see Carter and Signorino, pp. 282-
283.  
169 RELOGIT Software is obtained via: Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. 1999.  RELOGIT:  Rare 
Events Logistic Regression, Version 1.1  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, October 1, available at: 
http://gking.harvard.edu/.  
170 Traditional defense pact formations occur in 800 and security guarantees in 51 of 94,341 observations.  
171 Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," Department of Government, 
Harvard University, (1999a), available from http://GKing.Harvard.Edu. 
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Multiple forms of analysis are useful in evaluating the evidence for and against 
Hypothesis 1. To begin, I examine the simple bivariate relationships between key 
independent variables and nuclear security guarantee and non-security guarantee defense 
pact formation (Table 2).  For each bivariate relationship, I include controls for time 
dependence. The bivariate analysis is only a first step, however. To control for some of the 
potentially-confounding factors I described above, I then conduct multivariate analysis, 
including control and time dependence variables (Table 3). Finally, I examine the 
substantive effects of each independent variable on the predicted probability of the 
dependent variable (Table 4).  
 
Correlates of Alliance Formation: Bivariate Analysis 
 I begin by examining the bivariate relationships between nuclear security guarantee 
formation (NSG) and the independent variables of interest. Turning to the first set of 
bivariate relationships, we see that the correlation between exclusive rivalry 
(ExclusiveRival) and nuclear security guarantee (NSG) formation is positive and highly 
significant. There is also a strong correlation between shared rivalry (SharedRival) and 
nuclear security guarantee formation, although it is somewhat less so. As anticipated, joint 
regime type (Joint Regime) and the alliance capabilities ratio (CapabilitiesRatio) each have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on NSG formation, and the number of great 
powers in the system (NumGreatPowers) has a negative and statistically significant effect in 
these bivariate models.  Turning to the second set of bivariate relationships where the 
dependent variable is non-security guarantee defense pacts (Defense), we find slightly 
different results. ExclusiveRival has a positive and statistically significant relationship to 
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Defense, but SharedRival appears to be the stronger relationship of the two. JointRegime is 
still positively and significantly associated with defense pact formation. The number of 
great powers in the system is still negatively and significantly correlated with Defense 
formation. Finally, the capabilities ratio in the dyad is not significant where defense pact 
formation is concerned. 
Table 3- Bivariate Models 
 NSG DV  
Independent Variable  Coefficient t-statistic 
 
Exclusiverival 3.889*** (13.79) 
Sharedrival 2.586*** (8.98) 
JointRegime 2.281*** (6.24) 
NumGreatPowers -1.684*** (-3.72) 
CapabilitiesRatio  0.0000450* (2.01) 
   
 Defense DV 
ExclusiveRival 0.546** (2.81) 
SharedRival 0.731*** (7.80) 
JointRegime 0.179* (2.44) 
NumGreatPowers -0.229*** (-5.63) 
CapabilitiesRatio -0.0000105 (-0.77) 
   
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001   
 
 
Correlates of Alliance Formation: Multivariate Results 
I now turn to the results of the multivariate models. In Models 1-3, NSG is the 
dependent variable and Defense is the dependent variable in Models 4-6. I begin by 
commenting on the correlates of NSG formation. In Model 1, ExclusiveRival is positive and 
highly significant, but in Model 2, SharedRival is also positive and highly significant. When I 
introduce both of these independent variables into Model 3, I find that ExclusiveRival 
remains positive and significant at the .001 level, while SharedRival loses significance 
altogether.  This suggests that ExclusiveRival holds the explanatory power where NSG 
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formation is concerned, and is a better predictor than SharedRival for this dependent 
variable, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Control variables preform as expected in Models 1-
3: JointRegime is positive and highly significant, NumGreatPowers is negative and 
significant, and CapabilitiesRatio is positive and significant in each of these first three 
models. My controls for time dependency are not significant in Models 1-3.  
The correlates of non-security guarantee defense pacts (Defense) appear to be quite 
different (Models 4-6). In Model 4, ExclusiveRival is positive and significant, while 
SharedRival is positive and significant in Model 5. When the two independent variables of 
interest are introduced into Model 6 however, SharedRival remains positive and highly 
significant. ExclusiveRival, however, not only loses its significance but takes on a negative 
sign! These results suggest that where Defense formation is concerned, SharedRival is the 
far stronger correlate, consistent with Hypothesis 1. Exclusive rivals are not a strong 
predictor of non-security guarantee formation. Control variables also preform differently 
when Defense is the dependent variable. NumGreatPowers remains negatively correlated 
and significant. JointRegime is not, however, significant, in any of Models 4-6, consistent 
with previous findings that joint regime type is a correlate of alliance formation only where 
US and Soviet Cold War alliances are concerned. CapabilitiesRatio is not significant in any of 
Models 4-6, consistent with my conjecture that capabilities may be a more important 
determinate of alliance formation when defense pacts are unilateral guarantees.  
Controls for time dependency are significant in Models 4-6. This is not entirely 
surprising. As noted throughout this project, non-security guarantee defense pacts may be 
much more specific and bounded than security guarantees. As a result, the fact that a dyad 
has one defense pact may mean there are other adversaries or contingencies for which it 
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might like to form additional alliances, and we would expect states that were already allied 
to be more likely to conclude additional alliances. This is not so where NSGs are concerned: 
A patron need only extend this type of unilateral guarantee once, as it covers all of the 
client states’ defensive contingencies. We should not expect multiple NSGs within a dyad.172 
Because these time polynomials have been included in the models, however, there is no 
need to take additional measures to account for time dependency.173  
                                                           
172 Obvious exceptions to this expectation would include Soviet/Russian cases, where one NSG alliance was 
terminated with the fall of the Soviet Union, and begun anew with Russia as the patron in subsequent years.  
173 Beck, Tucker, and Katz, pp. 1281-1282.  
83 
Table 4-Multivariate Models 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 NSG NSG NSG Defense Defense Defense 
ExclusiveRival 3.507***  2.898*** .507*  -0.171 
 [12.35]  [4.87] [2.55]   [-.73] 
SharedRival  2.452*** 0.659  .726*** .766*** 
  [8.53] [1.10]  [5.78]  [5.34]  
JointRegime 1.793*** 1.966*** 1.787*** 0.103 0.0854 0.0899 
 [4.95] [5.40] [4.93] [1.30]  [1.08]  [1.13] 
NumGreatPowers -1.703** -1.773** -1.711** -.221*** -.225*** -.225*** 
 [-2.89] [-2.92] [-2.89] [-4.86] [-5.04] [-5.04] 
CapabilitiesRatio .00008*** 0.00008*** 0.00008*** -.000007 -.000004 -.000004 
 [5.20] [5.58] [5.29] [-.61] [-.43] [-.42] 
tnsg 0.00782 0.0127 0.00836    
 [-0.25] [.38] [-.27]    
tnsg2 0.000198 0.000281 0.000205    
 [.34] [.45] [0.35]    
tnsg3 0.000001 0.0000001 0.000001    
 [-.35] [-.44] [-.36]    
tdef    -.0899*** -.0910*** -.0909*** 
    [-10.51] [-10.67] [-10.66] 
tdef2    .00139** .00140*** .00140*** 
    [6.57] [6.66] [6.66] 
tdef3 





    [-4.76] [-4.81]  [-4.82]  
_cons -.203 0.000132 -.201 -2.544*** -2.585*** -2.587*** 
 [-.07] [.00] [.07] [-9.95] [-10.09] [-10.11] 
       
N 94,316 94,316 94,316 94,316 94,316 94,316 
       
t statistics in brackets      
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
Using a standard logit or logistic regression model in lieu of a ReLogit model does 
not meaningfully alter any of the findings reported here (see Chapter 2 Appendix, Tables 6 
and 7 for logit and logistic results). Additionally, given that we might expect joint regime 
type to be correlated with exclusive or shared rivalry, I run a robustness check with 
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JointRegime excluded from the models.  Excluding this variable appears to increase the 
explanatory power of SharedRival and ExclusiveRival (see Chapter 2 Appendix, Table 8).  
Given that nuclear security guarantees all involve at least one major power, I also run all six 
models only on those dyads that include at least one great power,  as this may make for a 
more apt comparison. I find that the results are unchanged (see Chapter 2 Appendix, Table 
9).  
Table 5 examines the substantive effects of each of the independent variables on 
NSG and Defense formation, using multivariate Models 3 and 6 (Table 4).174  Table 5 shows 
the first differences, or the change in the probability of NSG/Defense formation as a 
function of each covariate.175 I calculate the marginal effects of each independent variable, 
showing how a one-unit increase in each affects the predicted probability of NSG/Defense 
formation, holding all other variables at their means. Beginning with Table 5, Model 1, I 
discuss the effects of each independent variable on the probability of NSG formation. The 
presence of an exclusive rivalry makes the formation of a nuclear security guarantee nearly 
300 percent more likely! The presence of a shared rivalry makes the formation of a security 
guarantee 65 percent more likely, but SharedRival is not significant in this model. Shared 
regime type makes a dyad nearly twice as likely to form a security guarantee, and each 
additional great power in the international system makes an NSG 171 percent less likely to 
form.  Finally, because the capabilities ratio is a continuous variable, this marginal effect 
                                                           
174 Marginal effects are calculated on the basis of Models 3 and 6, and therefore include controls for time 
dependency, although these are not shown here.  
175 On the importance of presenting first differences when interpreting ReLogit models, see King and Zeng, p. 
141.  
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measures the instantaneous rate of change, and cannot be interpreted in the same way as 
the other independent variables, which are categorical.  
 
Table 5- Substantive Effects of Variables on the Likelihood of Alliance Formation 
 
 [1] [2] 
 NSG Defense 
ExclusiveRival 2.898*** -0.171 
 [4.87] [0.73] 
SharedRival 0.659 0.766*** 
 [1.10] [5.34] 
JointRegime 1.787*** 0.0899 
 [4.93] [1.13] 
NumGreatPowers -1.711** -0.225*** 
 [-2.89] [-5.04] 
CapabilitiesRatio 0.0000807*** -0.00000466 
 [5.29] [-0.42] 
N 94316 94316 
t statistics in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
 Turning to Table 5, Model 2, I consider the effects of the independent variables on 
non-security guarantee defense pact formation. In this model, the presence of an exclusive 
rivalry actually makes defense pact formation 17 percent less likely. The presence of a 
shared rivalry, however, makes alliance formation about 77 percent more likely. Shared 
regime type makes defense pact formation about nine percent more likely, although this 
variable is not significant in the model. An increase of one in the number of great powers in 
the system reduces the likelihood of defense pact formation by 22.5 percent. Once again, 
the marginal effects of CapabilitiesRatio represent an instantaneous rate of change, and in 
this model the variable is not significant.  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter has sought to illuminate the conditions under which states form 
nuclear security guarantees, and how those conditions differ from those of traditional 
defense pact formation.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I found that the conditions for NSG 
formation do differ from those of Defense formation: exclusive rivalries are strong 
predictors of the former, while shared rivalries are superior predictors of the latter.  I 
found no evidence to suggest that both types of defense pacts might be explained by the 
same pattern of enmity (H1A1 and H1A2), and none to support a conclusion that exclusive 
rivalries explain Defense formation, while shared rivals explain NSG formation (H1A3).  
 Additionally, these empirical results appear to go beyond a simple validation of 
Hypothesis 1. In multivariate analysis when both independent variables of interest are 
included, not only is an exclusive rivalry the superior predictor of NSG formation, but 
shared rivalries are actually not statistically significant correlates at all. Exclusive rivalries, 
however, make security guarantee formation nearly three times more likely than it would 
be otherwise. Even more surprisingly, in multivariate analysis of Defense formation, not 
only was SharedRival the superior predictor, but ExclusiveRival actually took on a negative 
sign! Where non-security guarantee defense pact formation is concerned, shared rivalries 
increase the chance of a pact significantly, but the presence of exclusive rivalries actually 
reduces the likelihood of an alliance. This analysis therefore provides support for the 
relationship between shared rivalries and alliance formation proffered by balancing 
theories, as long as the defense pacts in question are not security guarantees. These 
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differences underscore the importance of studying nuclear security guarantees as a unique 
type of alliance. 
 These findings may also have some tentative implications the body of work on the 
relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Recent scholarship has found 
that regime type is closely correlated with alliance formation only where the United States 
and Soviet Union’s Cold War alliances are concerned. 176 In subsequent research, scholars 
should explore whether it is all US and Soviet alliances, or just US and Soviet security 
guarantees that are driving this relationship. If it is the latter, then regime type affinity may 
be one additional characteristic that sets nuclear security guarantees apart from other 
defensive alliances. 
 This chapter has established that there exists a strong empirical relationship 
between exclusive rivalries and nuclear security guarantee formation, and support for the 
long-accepted link between shared rivals and defense pact formation. I have not yet 
established, however, that these relationships are correlated for the precise reasons I have 
proffered: namely, that the asymmetric, ambiguous nature of security guarantees raises the 
risk of entrapment if unshared adversaries are present, while the possibility of 
circumscribing other defense pacts means that shared, but not exclusive rivalries, should 
permit their formation.  
To explore the validity of this logic, I also conduct qualitative analysis of the same 
hypothesis in the next chapter. Using process tracing and the comparative method, I 
examine the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, and the United States’ 
                                                           
176 Gartzke and Simon, pp. 617-635; Lai and Reiter, pp. 203-222; Gibler and Wolford, pp. 129-153.  
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decision not to extend a security guarantee to Israel in 1963. Does Hypothesis 1 explain the 
formation of the Franco-Russian pact and the non-formation of a US-Israel security 
guarantee? And if so, is this attributable to the different signaling requirements of a 
security guarantee compared to a traditional defense pact?  
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Chapter 2 Appendix  
Table 6- Logit Models 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NSG NSG NSG Defense Defense Defense 
       
       
ExclusiveRival 3.514***  3.052*** 0.490*  -0.183 
 (12.38)  (5.13) (2.47)  (-0.78) 
       
SharedRival  2.459*** 0.515  0.723*** 0.761*** 
  (8.55) (0.86)  (5.76) (5.30) 
       
JointRegime 1.819*** 2.005*** 1.814*** 0.102 0.0843 0.0887 
 (5.02) (5.50) (5.00) (1.29) (1.06) (1.12) 
       
NumGreatPowers -1.756** -1.813** -1.764** -0.222*** -0.226*** -0.226*** 
 (-2.98) (-2.99) (-2.98) (-4.88) (-5.06) (-5.06) 
       
CapabilitiesRatio 0.0000478** 0.0000514*** 0.0000484** -0.0000106 -0.00000804 -0.00000792 
 (3.09) (3.56) (3.17) (-0.88) (-0.72) (-0.71) 
       
tnsg -0.0115 -0.0154 -0.0120    
 (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.39)    
       
tnsg2 0.000277 0.000343 0.000284    
 (0.47) (0.55) (0.48)    
       
tnsg3 -0.00000149 -0.00000177 -0.00000152    
 (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.51)    
       
Tdef    -0.0902*** -0.0914*** -0.0913*** 
    (-10.55) (-10.70) (-10.70) 
       
tdef2    0.00140*** 0.00141*** 0.00141*** 
    (6.61) (6.71) (6.71) 
       







    (-4.81) (-4.87) (-4.87) 
       
_cons 0.0238 0.142 0.0207 -2.538*** -2.579*** -2.580*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (-9.93) (-10.07) (-10.08) 
       
N 94316 94316 94316 94316 94316 94316 
       
t statistics in parentheses      




Table 7- Logistic Models 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 NSG NSG NSG Defense Defense Defense 
ExclusiveRival  33.59274 ***  21.16515 *** 1.632454 *  0.8325707 
 [12.38]  [5.13] [2.47]  [-0.78] 
       
SharedRival  11.68915 *** 1.674072  2.059722 ***  2.140961 *** 
  [8.55] [0.86]  [5.76] [5.3] 
       
JointRegime 6.163286*** 7.423843 *** 6.133044*** 1.10766 1.087929 1.092807 
 [5.02] [5.50] [5.00] [1.29] [1.06] [1.12] 
       
NumGreatPowers .17276 ** .1631232 ** .1714085 ** .8007993*** .7979296 ***  .7977864 *** 
 [-2.98] [-2.99] [-2.98] [-4.88] [-5.06] [-5.06] 
       
CapabilitiesRatio 1.000048 **  1.000051 *** 1.000048 ** 0.9999894 0.999992 0.9999921 
 [3.09] [3.56] [3.17] [-0.88] [-0.72] [-0.71] 
       
tnsg 0.9885243 0.984693 0.9880294    
 [-0.38] [-0.46] [-0.39]    
       
tnsg2 1.000277 1.000343 1.000284    
 [0.47] [0.55] [0.48]    
       
tnsg3 0.9999985 0.9999982 0.9999985    
 [-0.51] [-0.57] [-0.51]    
       
tdef    .9137196 *** .91267 *** .9127519 *** 
    [-10.55] [-10.70] [-10.70] 
       
tdef2    1.001403 *** 1.001409 ***  1.001408 *** 
    [6.61] [6.71] [6.71] 
       
tdef3    .999994 *** .999994 *** .999994 *** 
    [-4.81] [-4.87] [-4.87] 
       
_cons 1.024044 1.152829 1.020899 .0790131 *** .0758726 *** .0757475 *** 
 [0.01] [0.05] [0.01] [-9.93] [-10.07] [-10.08] 
 
t statistics in brackets 
*p<.05  **p<.01 ***p<.001     
      




Table 8- ReLogits, No Regime Control  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



























































   








   








   







       







       

































Table 9- ReLogits, At Least One Major Power 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















































































   










































CHAPTER 3 - ENEMY OF MY FRIEND: THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN AND US-ISRAEL CASES 
 
“We must stand on our feet and be able to touch the umbrella.” 
-Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol177  
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I used ReLogit models to test a hypothesis on nuclear 
security guarantee formation. I posited that while the formation of many defense pacts may 
be well-explained by a common rival among the prospective allies, nuclear security 
guarantees should have more exacting conditions for formation. I hypothesized that 
security guarantee formation should be better explained by the presence of exclusive 
rivalries between a patron and client, rather than simple shared rivalries. Because security 
guarantee treaties do not target specific adversaries, military contingencies,  theaters of 
operations, or identify the type of aid that will be forthcoming, the patrons who extend 
them are on the hook for defensive aid broadly construed over an indefinite time horizon. 
This puts them at a higher risk of entrapment in their clients’ conflicts than they would be if 
they extended more specific defensive commitments, and they should be wary to form 
security guarantees if the client has rivals that the patron does not share.  
In Chapter 2 I found substantial statistical support for the relationship between 
exclusive rivalries and security guarantee formation and shared rivalries and traditional 
defense pact formation. To determine that these relationships hold for the reason that I 
posit—namely, that security guarantees formation requires exclusive rivalries because the 
broad and unilateral nature of these pacts and their attendant signaling requirements—I 
                                                           
177 Eshkol made this statement in a meeting with American Ambassador Barbour, and White House Liaison 
Meyer Feldman. “Incoming Telegram, Department of State, From: Tel Aviv,” Barbour to Rusk, April 7, 1964, 
NSF 138, LBJL. 
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must also test this hypothesis qualitatively. I do so in this chapter by examining two case 
studies: The United States’ decision not to extend to Israel a formal security guarantee in 
1963-64, and France and Russia’s 1894 decision to ally despite their unshared adversaries.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I review my hypothesis on 
nuclear security guarantee formation, as well as the alternative hypotheses.  Because I am 
testing this hypothesis qualitatively, I also discuss the observable implications that will 
substantiate my claim and disprove the others. I explain my case selection, before moving 
on to the case studies and analysis.  
For each case study, I begin by summarizing the relevant facts surrounding the 
alliance formation decision. I look for evidence that calculations about unshared 
adversaries entered into the alliance negotiations, and examine whether and how 
prospective allies’ entrapment fears manifested. Where evidence of entrapment fears can 
be found, I go on to analyze how these were linked to the presence of unshared adversaries 
and the signaling requirements of the prospective alliance. I also consider the alternative 
hypothesis that these alliance can be explained by a more common shared rivals/balancing 
explanation.  
I find that the United States’ decision not to extend a security guarantee to Israel 
provides ample support for my first hypothesis and reveals a great deal about the 
conditions that are necessary to security guarantee formation and sufficient to prevent it. I 
also find that despite the presence of shared adversaries, France and Russia managed to 
form an alliance in 1894 because their commitment was highly contingent, consistent with 
the expectations of Hypothesis 1.  
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Hypothesis 1: A Review 
In the previous chapter I derived and found statistical support for the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: For a security guarantee to form, client states should have rivals that are exclusively 
shared by the patron; for non-security guarantee defense pacts to form, shared rivals will be 
superior predictors of alliance formation.    
 
I also derived and tested several alternative hypotheses:  
 
H1A1: Shared rivalries are stronger predictors than exclusive rivalries of both security 
guarantee and traditional defense pact formation;  
 
H2A2: Exclusive rivalries are stronger predictors than shared rivalries of both security 
guarantee and traditional defense pact formation;  
 
H2A3: Shared rivalries are the stronger predictor of security guarantee formation; Exclusive 
rivalries are the stronger predictor of non-security guarantee defense pact formation.  
 
 
 In Chapter 2, I found substantial support for H1: Exclusive rivalries have significant 
explanatory power when it comes to the formation of security guarantees, while shared 
rivalries do not predict these well. Shared rivalries, however, provide significant 
explanatory power when it comes to the formation of other defense pacts, consistent with 
the expectations of more traditional balancing theories.  
 It remains to be seen whether or not this relationship holds for the reasons that I 
posited in Chapter 2. Do nuclear security patrons chose to extend security guarantees only 
to those clients with whom there are no unshared adversaries because they understand the 
taxing requirements of upholding these ambiguous, unilateral pacts? Do patrons fear 
entrapment when unshared rival exists with a client to whom it otherwise might have 
formed a security guarantee? And do allies in more traditional defense pacts form them on 
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the basis of shared rivalries rather than exclusive rivalries because they can make more 
contingent, circumscribed commitments?  
To answer these questions, I must investigate the same hypothesis using qualitative 
case studies. The dependent variable under study remains alliance formation. The 
independent variable remains a shared/exclusive adversary. To understand the conditions 
under which states may form nuclear security guarantees, however, it is insufficient to 
examine cases in which these alliances have formed or have endured. Cases of successful 
nuclear umbrellas are likely overdetermined. There may be many reasons that allies 
choose to formalize security guarantee relationships, including compatible defense 
concerns, general policy affinity, shared values, and similar domestic systems.  There may 
be even more reasons that those relationships last once they are in place. Examining cases 
of successful umbrella pacts may provide us with many different variables that are 
associated with guarantee formation and persistence. These may, however, be factors that 
are epiphenomenal, rather than necessary or sufficient conditions of guarantee formation.  
To identify whether exclusive rivalries are a necessary condition for security guarantee 
formation, then, I focus on a case in which a security guarantee was seriously considered 
but never formed. Because of the structure of the hypothesis I test here, however, I also 
select a case in which a traditional defense pact was formed, to examine whether this 
occurred despite the presence of unshared adversaries between the prospective allies.  
There are some important observable implications that can be derived from this 
hypothesis. First, if H1 holds true, historical evidence should reveal that patron state 
leaders did not extend a security guarantee because the client had a likely adversary that 
the patron did not share. Concerns about polarizing relations with or becoming entrapped 
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in a conflict with this third party should feature prominently in decision-making.  We 
should not only expect to see concerns about the adversary, however, but worries about 
the patron state’s ability to engage in signaling on behalf of the client. Specifically, leaders 
of the patron state should be wary of making public statements, deploying troops, 
conducting joint exercises, or undertaking other observable forms of military cooperation 
because of the potential perverse effects. These effects may include, but are not limited to 
the potential to be entrapped in a war between the client and the unshared adversary, or 
simple concerns about creating an adversary where one did not exist before. 
In the case of traditional defense pact formation, however, the presence of unshared 
adversaries between prospective allies should be surmountable. If two states are 
considering defense pact formation and have a shared rival but also have unshared rivals 
between them, historical evidence should reflect that they acknowledged this state of 
affairs and constructed a more specific, contingent alliance to minimize associated risks. 
The presence of unshared adversaries in a prospective defense pact dyad should not 
impede alliance formation.  
Despite the fact that I did not find statistical support for the alternative hypotheses 
offered in Chapter 2, I will consider one of them again in this qualitative examination. It is 
possible that shared rivalries provide a good explanation for security guarantee and 
traditional defense pact formation decisions. Case studies allow me to examine this 
alternative hypothesis in a way that my statistical treatment could not. It is possible, for 
example, that a more traditional shared rivalries explanation for security guarantee 
formation may prevail in a way that statistical analysis could not capture: Patrons may base 
their security guarantee formation decisions on whether or not that new alliance would 
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serve its interest with respect to its primary adversary. If the United States declined to 
extend a security guarantee to a client because it would negatively impact its relationship 
with the Soviet Union, for example, rather than because of concerns about a client’s 
unshared rivals, then a more traditional balancing explanation would be born out. Even in 
traditional defense pacts, it is possible that a shared rivals/traditional balancing 
explanation prevails for different reasons than posited. If prospective allies conclude a 
treaty solely on the basis of a shared rival and give little thought to unshared rivals that 
may exist between them, this would also invalidate my hypothesis.   
 If H1A1 is substantiated with respect to the security guarantee case, we would 
expect leaders in the patron state to be concerned that an alliance with the prospective 
client may be unwise because of the way it could negatively impact a shared rivalry.  If 
H1A1 is born out with respect to the traditional defense pact, there should be little 
historical evidence to suggest that the prospective allies considered and found ways to 
surmount the presence of unshared adversaries between them.  
In Chapter 2 there was no statistical evidence to substantiate H1A2 or H1A3, 
however, and there is no logical reason to believe that either one of these alternatives is 
likely to be born out in the qualitative evidence. For the remainder of this chapter, I 
therefore set these aside.  
Case Selection 
Using primary sources collected from extensive archival research, I trace American 
leaders’ decisions to reject a security guarantee request from Israel. This approach 
provides me with a few advantages. First, because I examine a negative case, I am able to 
identify conditions that are sufficient to impede security guarantee formation. Second, I 
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focus on a country, Israel, with whom the United States has maintained a longstanding, 
strong political and military alignment. This is a case in which we might reasonably expect 
to see a formal security guarantee. Explaining why the United States did not extend its 
nuclear umbrella to Israel is a more helpful endeavor than explaining why it did not extend 
it to North Korea, as it allows me to focus on the causal factors that inhibited formal 
alliance formation despite strong affinities.  
Beyond these methodological explanations, there are also important substantive 
reasons to focus on the prospective US security guarantee to Israel. Only two scholars have 
ever discussed the fact that the United States seriously considered granting a security 
guarantee to Israel, and neither of these studies examines closely why the guarantee was 
rejected.178 This case study draws on declassified documents that have not previously been 
cited by scholars. Thus, from a historical perspective, this case is valuable. Finally, because 
the United States maintains close ties with Israel and is still militarily engaged in the 
region, the decision against formal alliance relations continues to have policy 
reverberations today.  
The Israel case is not an empirical anomaly, however: There are other instances of 
security guarantees that were considered but not extended. The United States considered 
extending a security guarantee to India during the Kennedy and Johnson eras, and to 
Pakistan in the Kennedy, Johnson and Carter years. There is also some anecdotal evidence 
                                                           
178 These studies are: Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); 
Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance, (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press, 2003).  
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that a security guarantee to the PRC was briefly discussed. 179 To the degree that 
Hypothesis 1 is born out then, it should provide insights on these cases as well. 
To examine the enmity patterns that affect the formation of traditional defense 
pacts, I analyze the birth of the Franco-Russian alliance, which was formalized in 1894. 
Leading scholars have noted that when it formed, the Franco-Russian pact was a highly 
unlikely one, and yet it became one of the most consequential relationships in alliance 
history.180 Was this partnership unlikely because France and Russia had unshared 
adversaries? And if so, how did they overcome this potential risk? To explore whether 
Hypothesis 1 can be verified qualitatively and for the reasons I posit, I turn to the case 
studies.  
 
The United States and Israel: “To Touch the Umbrella” 
Introduction 
 The Israeli request for a security guarantee from the United States is a fascinating 
nuclear counterfactual. Between May and October 1963, the Kennedy administration 
carefully considered and ultimately rejected a plea by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion to 
bring the country under the US nuclear umbrella. The process by which Kennedy came to 
that decision generates important insights on the conditions that are necessary to form a 
security guarantee, and those that are sufficient to impede one. I begin this inquiry with a 
summary of the Israeli case. I then move on to explore the details of this case through the 
                                                           
179 For evidence of US interest in guarantees to the Indians and the Pakistanis see: Komer to Bundy, December 
6, 1963, Robert W. Komer Papers, Box 3, LBJL; RW Komer, “Memorandum for Arthur Dean,” November 18, 
1965, NSF Box 6, LBJL; “Draft National Security Action Memorandum: Review of US Nuclear Policy Towards 
India,” December 1965, NSF Box 6, LBJL. On China, see Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 179-182.  
180 Jervis, System Effects, p. 243; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 125, 166.   
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lens of Hypothesis 1, examining the extent to which the observable implications are 
present in this instance. I evaluate whether or not the presence of an unshared adversary 
factored into the US decision to withhold a guarantee whether the US was worried about 
entrapment in a war on behalf of Israel, and how peacetime alliance signaling factored into 
this decision. I find substantial support for Hypothesis 1.    
 
Case Summary 
On April 17, 1963, Egypt, Syria and Iraq issued a declaration of unity that marked 
the expansion of the United Arab Republic. In addition to announcing their federation, the 
countries vowed to “liberate Palestine.”181 To Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, the 
UAR statement was “the first time that an official Arab constitutional document lay[ed] 
down as one of its principle objectives the obliteration of Israel.”182 On April 25, Ben Gurion 
made a request to John F. Kennedy that the United States grant his country a security 
guarantee.183 Ben Gurion’s first proposal asked for a joint declaration of guarantee from the 
United States and the Soviet Union, but he knew that the US president would reject this as 
politically infeasible, as Kennedy quickly did.184 Ben Gurion followed up on May 12 with a 
request for a bilateral security guarantee from the Americans alone.  Israel had thrice 
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before requested a security guarantee from the United States, and the United States had 
given Israel a private, informal assurance that it would come to its defense if it were 
attacked.185 But the Kennedy administration took seriously the Israeli request for a formal 
guarantee in the spring of 1963 for two reasons: First, despite the fact that the United 
States thought that Israeli concerns over UAR expansion were “overdrawn,” Ben Gurion 
was near hysteria and the Americans thought this disadvantageous for regional stability186; 
Second, the Kennedy believed that a security guarantee might provide a solution to Israel’s 
nascent nuclear program.   
The United States had first discovered Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona in late 
1960.187 Two American scientists were permitted to visit the reactor in mid-May of 
1961.188 The inspectors reported that the reactor did not appear to have military purposes 
at that time.189  At a May 1961 meeting between Kennedy and Ben Gurion, the Prime 
Minister gave the President an informal promise that Israel would not seek nuclear 
weapons. But Dimona had not been inspected since, and by early 1963 Kennedy had grown 
concerned that there were no safeguards on the Israeli program. He ordered National 
Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 231, which considered possible arms control 
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arrangements in the Middle East. Kennedy also sent a request to Ben Gurion that the 
Dimona facility be inspected semiannually, beginning in May of 1963, and again that 
October.190  The Prime Minister and his successor Levi Eshkol were deeply reluctant to 
grant the US access to Dimona, and negotiations over inspections dragged on through the 
spring and summer. The Israeli request for and US consideration of a security guarantee 
therefore occurred in the context of a broader standoff over the future of the Israeli nuclear 
program.  
To quell mounting Arab-Israeli tensions over the UAR expansion announcement, 
Kennedy issued a presidential statement on May 8. In his speech Kennedy reiterated the 
1950 Tripartite Declaration, a statement issued by the United States, United Kingdom and 
France, which expressed their “deep interest” in the “maintenance of peace and stability” 
between the Arab states and Israel in the Near East. It declared that plans by any state to 
violate borders in the region would cause the three powers to immediately “take action.”191  
The statement was intended to give some limited reassurance to Israel, while signaling to 
Arab states, and particularly Egypt, that US policy in the region had not changed.  
The Israeli Prime Minister was not impressed by the statement, and told Kennedy: 
“The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was of no value and a reaffirmation of such a 
declaration does not meet the situation.” Instead, the Prime Minister suggested a bilateral 
security treaty between the US and Israel “with which allies of the United States would be 
invited to associate themselves.”192 Three days later, Israeli Minister Mordechai Gazit 
followed up with the Nation Security Council’s Robert Komer, pushing for an “open defense 
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arrangement” and a standing diplomatic and military dialogue between to two states. In his 
record of the meeting, Komer concluded, “the Israelis were determined to get something 
out of the US in the way of greater security reassurances.”193 Kennedy ordered his chief 
national security aide, McGeorge Bundy, to begin investigating possibilities for a US 
guarantee. A handful of close advisors began a methodical investigation into whether the 
United States could and should expand its security commitment to Israel. 
Because Kennedy was deeply interested in containing nuclear and missile 
technology in the Middle East, the group devised a “highly secret probe” of Israeli and UAR 
willingness to cooperate on regional arms control. This would be linked to a possible 
security guarantee for Israel. The plan was a result of the recent NSAM 231, and according 
to it a special envoy would approach Nasser and Ben Gurion to gauge each leader’s 
willingness to forgo nuclear weapons and offensive missiles.194 Because the Israelis had a 
far more advanced nuclear program and were deeply concerned about the recent UAR 
declaration, they might be the more difficult party to persuade. A bilateral security 
guarantee would be considered as a tool for inducing Israeli cooperation on arms control, 
assuming the Israelis were willing to forswear nuclear weapons completely.195 The 
approach did not envision a formal agreement between the UAR and Israel, but rather 
bilateral arrangements between each party and the United States. Several US Middle East 
experts encouraged the probe, convinced that “Israel will go ahead with nuclear weapons 
unless we give her a security guarantee.” The arrangement aimed to assuage Israel’s 
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defense concerns and US proliferation fears at once by rewarding Israel with a security 
guarantee in exchange for abandoning its nuclear quest.196  
The initiative was codenamed operation CANE197, and John J. McCloy was selected as 
the emissary.198 The CANE staff envisioned a very specific timeline for the probe: McCloy 
was to meet with Nasser and with Ben Gurion in the month of June; US officials would 
receive the results of these meetings and assess how to proceed in mid-July. A second 
round of negotiations would then take place. If no progress had been achieved by fault of 
the UAR by February of 1964, the US would revert to negotiations with Israel alone on the 
subject of a security guarantee. By June 1964 there was to be in place either a UAR-Israel 
arms limitation agreement and security assurance to Israel, or a unilateral security 
assurance to Israel. 199 If Egypt refused to cooperate with the initiative, the Americans 
would be justified in granting Ben Gurion the 105guarantee he wanted. 200 The proposed 
arms deal itself was amorphous but the CANE endgame was clear: One way or another 
there was a good chance that the US would extend its umbrella to Israel by the spring of 
1964.  
McCloy’s mission was to obtain from the UAR and from Israel an agreement not to 
acquire nuclear weapons or surface-to-surface strategic missiles, with consent by both 
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parties to have the US monitor compliance.201 His preparatory materials did not include 
any mention of a security guarantee, as Kennedy was wary of suggesting one before he had 
received a promise of nuclear cooperation and compliance from Israel. “If we give Israel 
stronger security assurances we cannot afford to do so unless she renounces nuclear 
weapons,” Robert Komer advised in a memo.202 Israel would not renounce nuclear 
weapons unless Nasser did the same, so it was crucial to approach him first, before any sort 
of assurance was presented to Tel Aviv.203  Shortly before McCloy departed for the region, 
the administration received the news that Ben Gurion had resigned and been replaced by 
Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, which would delay McCloy’s travels to Tel Aviv.   
McCloy spent June 26-29 in Cairo, and met with Nasser on two separate occasions. 
Nasser was uninterested in a public, bilateral arms control deal with the US because it 
would “really amount to a limitation in Egyptian sovereignty through agreement with a 
foreign power,” and would be looked upon as a “protectorate” or “satellite” relationship.204  
He was not opposed to an arms control deal in principle, however, and would be willing to 
forswear strategic missiles and nuclear weapons in a “‘collective’ setting such as the UN.”205 
Nasser insisted to McCloy that he had no interest in nuclear weapons and no desire to 
attack Israel, and asked the emissary to convey that message to Kennedy. The Egyptian 
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President also stated that he might be willing to put these promises in writing and have 
them made public.206  
Much to the dismay of several CANE staffers, McCloy did not spend much time on 
the subject of the Israeli nuclear program. Specifically, he neglected to tell the Egyptian 
President that the arms deal had been initiated because of American concerns over Israeli 
nuclear progress. McCloy also failed to emphasize that Israel was far ahead of the Egyptians 
in the nuclear field, making arms control advantageous for Nasser.207 McCloy left Egypt 
after his second meeting with Nasser, having not conveyed the CANE message in full. The 
Kennedy administration decided that he should return to Washington rather than travel to 
Tel Aviv so that CANE could be recalibrated. Several US officials urged the President to 
consider Nasser’s proposals for arms control through the UN or through public letters of 
intention.208 American Ambassador to Cairo, John S. Badeau, also urged Washington to 
decouple ballistic missile control and nonproliferation efforts: The Egyptians did not seem 
to have any nuclear aspirations, so the nuclear question should be put to the Israelis 
exclusively.209 “None of us are too discouraged with these initial results,” Robert Komer 
told the President. “There is still a chance we can get Nasser signed on to some sort of 
scheme.”210 
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Shortly after McCloy left Egypt, Kennedy delivered to the new Israeli Prime Minister 
a letter that had been intended for Ben Gurion on the day of his resignation.  He 
congratulated Eshkol on his position, but immediately pushed for semi-annual US access to 
Dimona. He also repeated a thinly veiled threat that Kennedy had already made to Ben-
Gurion: “This Government’s commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously 
jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information [on 
the nuclear program].”211 The United States might not only withhold the formal guarantee 
Israel wanted, but the informal security relationship would suffer if access to Dimona was 
not granted. Eshkol replied on July 19, promising to give the matter careful study as he got 
his political bearings. Robert Komer argued in a memo to the President that Eshkol’s reply 
“confirms that Israelis regard Dimona inspection as a bargaining card on security 
guarantees.” “Israel will almost certainly insist on some form of greater security 
reassurance as its price for not going nuclear.”212   
Kennedy and the CANE staff reconvened in Washington to discuss next steps on July 
23. The President was amenable to Nasser’s suggestions for arms control, but at the end of 
the meeting Kennedy made an unexpected decision: He did not want to pursue the CANE 
overture any further, and was only willing to continue negotiating with Eshkol over access 
to Dimona.213 The “nuclear and security guarantee questions should be kept separate,” he 
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decided.214 Throughout the summer, administration officials including Robert Komer of the 
NSC, Dean Rusk, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all conducted independent analyses on the 
costs and benefits of a US guarantee to Israel. These would all be used to help support the 
President’s final decision to deny Ben Gurion’s request.  
On October 2, 1963, Kennedy wrote a formal reply to Eshkol. He alerted the Prime 
Minister that he had considered whether the advantages of more explicit ties over “existing 
informal arrangements” outweighed the disadvantages and decided they did not. 215 Well 
before Kennedy had a chance to send his final reply to Eshkol, however, the Israelis appear 
to have anticipated the rejection of their request, and they began to lobby for support from 
the Americans short of a formal treaty. CANE was revived in late February 1964, under 
President Lyndon Johnson. A new emissary visited Cairo in early March. 216 This time, 
however, the United States was solely interested in striking an arms control deal between 
Israel and Egypt. No security guarantee was on the table. Nasser was once again 
moderately receptive to some sort of deal, but Eshkol was unwilling to let the Americans 
share their Dimona inspection reports with Nasser or give him specifics about Israeli 
nuclear progress.217 Without a promise of US protection, he would not budge. Israel “seeks 
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a close military identification with us to serve as a deterrent to the Arabs,” Rusk explained 
to Johnson in early 1964. But on the question of a security guarantee, the Secretary of State 
insisted, Israel’s appetite “exceeds its needs.”218 
 Israel’s security desires, as well as the underlying motivation for Kennedy’s final 
decision will be discussed below, as I turn to the roles that an unshared adversary, the risk 
of entrapment, and peacetime alliance signaling played in this case.     
 
Know Your Audience: An Unshared Adversary  
When Kennedy restated the Tripartite Declaration on May 8, he did so partially to 
reassure Israel, and partially to communicate to Nasser that American feelings towards 
Egypt had not changed. The President, who had already devoted substantial energy to 
improving US relations with Egypt, personally suggested he send a separate letter to 
Nasser, to explain that the United States was in no way turning against the Arab world.219  
Once the administration began to evaluate seriously the possibility of extending a 
guarantee, analysts considered what the negative ramifications of a US-Israeli pact would 
be. Of primary concern was “[p]ublic hostility throughout the Arab world,” and 
antagonizing Nasser in particular.220  And while the United States was most worried about 
ruining its relationship with Egypt, it also feared backlash from other states such as Jordan, 
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Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 221 Additional concerns included “Reduced US diplomatic 
effectiveness generally,” in the region, as well as the harassment of oil companies.222  
The United States’ deference to Nasser was evident in the way it conducted the 
CANE probe. Although early CANE analysis suggested a willingness to press on with a 
security guarantee to Israel even if Nasser rejected an arms control agreement, it was 
clearly preferable to have him on board. Nasser was a leader in the Arab world, and his 
accession to an arms control agreement would likely mitigate the backlash from other 
states.  The Egyptian president’s assent to a CANE bargain would not only help to prevent 
an arms race in the Middle East, but would make US policy towards Israel acceptable.223 
Notably, concerns about alienating Egypt and the Arab world more broadly 
dominated the assessments that Kennedy received shortly before he drafted his reply to 
Eshkol. Rusk argued that a security arrangement with Israel would almost certainly harm 
US interests, unraveling “carefully built influence with the Arab states.” 224 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff asserted the same. If the United States and Israel were to deepen their relationship, 
the Chiefs recommended, new ties should take the form of political discussions so as not to 
appear as military planning efforts against Arab states. 225 
 Finally, American relations with the Arab world had a prominent place in Kennedy’s 
reply to Eshkol.  Kennedy explained to the Prime Minister that US relations with Arab 
countries had improved considerably in recent years, and both Israeli interests and US 
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were advanced by the maintenance of those relationships. A formal guarantee from the US 
would cause backlash in the region. Kennedy’s conclusions also noted his fears of 
“provoking a hostile Arab reaction…any such move would be widely viewed as an abrupt 
departure from established United States policy, arousing suspicion and concern both in 
the Near East and the world at large.”226 Finally, in early 1964, Dean Rusk explained to the 
new US President why he should not reconsider Kennedy’s decision to deny the security 
guarantee: “Such a relationship would not only destroy the influence we need to maintain 
with the Arabs but stimulate closer Arab-Soviet ties and reduce our ability to bring about 
an eventual peaceful solution to the Arab –Israeli dispute.”227 
 
Anticipating Entrapment 
There is strong evidence that Kennedy’s concerns about alienating the Arab world 
were closely linked to a fear of entrapment, as Hypothesis 1 suggests.  Specifically, Kennedy 
was concerned about a war between Egypt and Israel over the latter’s nuclear program. In 
the McCloy-Nasser meetings, Ambassador Badeau inquired how Nasser would react “if he 
learned that the Israelis were misusing their reactor for the manufacture of weapons 
material.” The Egyptian President replied quickly, “Protective war. We would have no other 
choice.”228 Kennedy learned of Nasser’s “protective war” threat for the first time in the July 
23 CANE meeting. “[W]hy had he not stated this earlier?” Kennedy demanded, suggesting 
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that this new information was of particular importance.229 Ambassador Badeau suggested 
that the previous US inspection at Dimona had done a great deal to appease Nasser. 
Without adequate inspections or information about the Israeli nuclear program since 1961, 
he was getting jittery. Paul Nitze, then an Assistant Secretary of Defense, shared a Pentagon 
assessment that the UAR was unlikely to mount a successful attack against Israel as a 
whole, but might conduct limited airstrikes against the facility. Shortly thereafter, Kennedy 
stated that he could not move beyond the assurances in the Tripartite Declaration, and 
wished to continue negotiations with the Israelis over Dimona inspections only. The 
prospect of an Egyptian attack on the Israeli nuclear program had clearly distressed 
Kennedy. What’s more, Eshkol’s letter four days prior had indicated continued Israeli 
intransigence over inspections. Kennedy staffers had recommended that the President only 
pursue a security guarantee if Tel Aviv was willing to forswear nuclear weapons 
completely. Without having concluded that such a quid-pro-quo was impossible, however, 
Kennedy decided against deepening US ties with Israel. Nasser had indicated that he was 
amenable to forswearing nuclear weapons, so the CANE probe had not been followed 
through to its conclusion. Yet the Egyptian president’s suggestion that he might strike 
Dimona appeared to end Kennedy’s serious consideration of the security guarantee.  
 Beyond Nasser’s threat of “protective war” against Dimona, the Americans had other 
reasons to believe that entrapment was a risk. On a September 11 meeting between 
Mordechai Gazit and Roger Davies of the State Department, the Israeli minister bemoaned 
the nature of the private security assurances that the United States had given to Israel. The 
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Americans had made verbal promises of aid if Israel were invaded, Gazit noted, but his 
government would find those promises much more reassuring if it did not always use the 
“qualifying adjective” “unprovoked attack.”230 The Israelis wanted a commitment of US 
military aid even in cases where they might appear to be the aggressor. Even before Gazit 
made these comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had flagged this risk in their analysis. They 
worried that Israel was in search of a security guarantee that was not limited to aggression 
against Israel. A security guarantee itself is, of course, already a rather broad defensive 
promise, but the Israeli desire for military support in an even wider range of contingencies 
made defense cooperation very risky in the eyes of the JCS. The Chiefs urged Kennedy not 
to extend a security guarantee for these reasons. 231 
 
The Costs of a Guarantee: Signaling the US-Israeli Relationship 
 
The presence of an unshared adversary in Egypt and US fears of entrapment also 
made peacetime alliance signaling a key consideration in the decision to reject the Israeli 
bid. Shortly after Ben Gurion requested a guarantee in April 1963, the Israelis began to 
elaborate on their alliance desires. In April, Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with Israeli 
Ambassador Avraham Harman and Deputy Minister Abba Eban. The Israelis were 
interested in “stronger, more watertight, more public” statement of alliance from the US, 
the ministers informed him.  They also wanted to begin regular joint military planning with 
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the Americans.232  Two weeks later, Robert Komer warned McGeorge Bundy that the 
Israelis wanted more than just a bilateral security guarantee. They were interested in “joint 
military and political planning to give them confidence we could move fast enough to help 
them in event of attack.” 233 In a May document, CANE staffers evaluated  “What Israel 
Seeks from the United States.” Israel’s top two goals were: “A special, public guarantee of 
Israel’s Security,” and “Joint military planning and regular intelligence exchange.”234  
 Initial CANE analysis focused primarily on the type of guarantee that the US might 
consider—a signal of intent— rather than alliance signals of capability in the form of joint 
military planning.  As staffers began to investigate their options, they prepared a document 
entitled “Possible United States-Israel Security Assurances.” The primary question was 
whether the assurance should come in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, and 
officials appeared to agree roundly that the latter option was preferable. The chief reasons 
to support an executive agreement were that it would drum up less publicity and would not 
require Congressional ratification. But executive agreements could still take many different 
forms. One option was a unilateral statement of policy that would have no binding legal 
force; another was a diplomatic note incorporating a unilateral statement of policy; a third 
was a bilateral executive agreement between the US and Israel, which would, effectively, be 
legally binding.235 State Department officials favored the less binding presidential letter 
over an executive agreement, but warned that Israel would push for the maximum possible 
commitment and be eager for a full-fledged treaty.236  
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There was also the question of whether an assurance should be classified or 
unclassified. Analysis wholeheartedly supported an overt assurance for its “[m]aximum 
public utility and deterrent effect.” It was highly unlikely that a US-Israel security 
agreement would stay secret forever, and Arab countries were more likely to be upset if a 
furtive pact was eventually leaked. And if the US were to extend a guarantee, it would 
prefer Arab countries to know precisely what it had promised.237 The prospective 
guarantee might not come in the form of a formal treaty, but it would be public, and in no 
way limited in its scope. 
 As the summer of 1963 dragged on and Kennedy had not yet replied to Ben Gurion’s 
request, Israeli officials began to pressure their American counterparts. On July 25, Israeli 
Minister Mordechai Gazit dropped in on Robert Komer to probe the security guarantee 
question. If the US was going to reject the security guarantee request, he suggested, why 
not begin discussions of alternatives that might “partly help meet Israel’s security 
needs?”238 At an August 9 meeting Gazit pressed Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Kitchen 
further. Gazit insisted that there was “little physical evidence” to support the US’s promise 
to aid Israel in case of attack. Reassurances “had not had a useful political effect” in Israel. 
Gazit suggested that a “private but formal assurance to Israel, which might accomplish the 
desired political effect within the Israeli leadership” would be better that none at all. He 
also pushed for meetings between Israeli and American military officers to plan for Israel’s 
defense.239 Three weeks later, Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman met with Komer to 
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suggest “more effective exchange of information” between the two countries. “What harm 
would a greater exchange of intelligence assessments do?,” he asked Komer. “What Israel 
wanted,” he continued, “was to institutionalize such discussions.”240 
 On September 9 and 11, Gazit again lobbied for a guarantee. He noted that if Israel 
got into a war with her neighbors, there would be little time to react.  As a result, the US 
and Israel needed to begin coordinating plans for defense.241 A few days later, Israeli 
Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban met with US Ambassador Barbour to discuss the deficit 
in Israel’s “political/psychological deterrent.” Once again pushing for a guarantee, he 
explained “history shows there has never been an attack on an area protected by a formal 
US security treaty, while situations in which ambiguity of US attitude existed, such as 
Korea, have been subject to such aggression.” If the US planned to reject the Israeli request, 
he continued, joint contingency planning would at least be a step in the right direction.242   
 Overt military cooperation was not an exclusively Israeli concern. Although the 
CANE staff was aware of Israel’s interest in joint planning, it did not initially conduct much 
cost/benefit analysis on the matter of defense cooperation. As the administration more 
closely scrutinized the guarantee option, however, defense cooperation and its implications 
featured prominently in high-level assessments.  Dean Rusk prepared a memo explaining 
why Kennedy should decline the request. What Israel really wanted from the US was the 
political advantage that would come from a formal guarantee and “open military 
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support.”243 Rusk recommended rejecting the Israeli request, adding the extra warning that 
“alternatives such as joint military planning […] might cause difficulties as great or greater 
than the formal security guarantee.”244  
In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted an analysis for the Secretary of Defense 
in which they considered the proposed security guarantee, as well as the general idea of 
closer military coordination with Israel. Joint planning was “not essential to assist Israel 
effectively” they argued.  If Israel was attacked, the US was most likely to give aid in the 
form of air strikes, and coordination would provide no operational advantage. Stronger US 
military ties with Israel would likely polarize the region, the Joint Chiefs argued, and that 
was antithetical to US interests. In summary, the Joint Chiefs recommended that: “a. No US 
security assurance to Israel be given beyond that enunciated by the President on 8 May, 
1963; b. Joint contingency planning with Israel not be undertaken.”245   
Kennedy’s final reply to Eshkol stated that the United States had carried out an 
assessment of its own ability to “deter or halt swiftly any aggression against Israel” and 
found that “existing informal arrangements” were sufficient. “To formalize our known 
intentions and commitments—to go further into special security arrangements with Israel 
at this point—would contribute little to deterrence,” he concluded.246 The administration 
was prepared to intervene on Israel’s behalf if it was in serious danger, but it was quite 
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unwilling to make a public commitment to do so, either in the form of an alliance treaty or 
joint military cooperation.  
Kennedy’s official rejection letter only prompted more Israeli requests for closer 
military ties. Gazit told Komer that the “existing informal arrangements” to which Kennedy 
had referred to were not arrangements at all, but “repeated indications of generalized US 
support.”247 Shaul Bar-Haim, another Israeli Embassy official, told a State Department 
colleague that it was “a political fact that Israeli leaders did not feel reassured and that they 
believed Israel remained vulnerable.” He too pushed for coordination of military plans and 
intelligence sharing.248 And in his reply to Kennedy’s rejection letter, Prime Minister Eshkol 
declared that Israel would have to seek a different sort of “balancing deterrent 
capability.”249  
At a November meeting with US officials, Deputy Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
explained to Robert Komer why Israel regarded unofficial US guarantees as qualitatively 
different than those given to other allies. “[W]e had open formal treaty commitments to our 
other allies but not to Israel. These open commitments were a stronger deterrent,” Rabin 
argued. Additionally, “we did joint planning under our other alliances, and this was 
essential to make them militarily effective.”250  President Kennedy was killed four days 
after the Rabin meeting. Under Lyndon Johnson, the US-Israeli defense relationship grew 
closer in 1964 as the Americans agreed to M-48 tank and A4F aircraft sales. The new 
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president, however, continued to resist public military cooperation.251 To the Israelis, 
private security assurances and arms sales were still not enough.  
 
Explaining US-Israel Alliance Non-Formation 
As of mid-May, 1963, it seemed that there was a good chance that an American 
security guarantee to Israel would be in place by 1964. If CANE failed, the administration 
expected to resume bilateral negotiations with Israel. Yet without ever officially 
approaching the Israelis, the overture was scuttled. What happened? The US rejection of 
the Israeli bid for a security guarantee appears to provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
The United States initially considered a security guarantee to Israel in hopes of gaining 
leverage over its nuclear program, and looked for a relatively low-cost way of providing 
one, in the form of a unilateral executive agreement.  As time passed, however, officials 
began to argue that a security guarantee would be inimical to US interests because it would 
alienate the Arab world. Moreover, as the summer drew on, Nasser’s threats of “protective 
war” gave the United States reason to fear entrapment between Egypt and a nuclear Israel 
if they went ahead with a guarantee. These risks were ultimately decisive because there 
was little the United States could do to circumscribe a defense relationship with the 
Israelis. Tel Aviv wanted the most binding alliance it could get, coupled with peacetime 
defense cooperation. The United States knew there would be no purpose to an alliance 
unless it was made public, but the prospect of provoking Arab states and risking 
entrapment made this commitment too costly. 
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As Hypothesis 1 expects, the presence of Israeli adversaries that the United States 
did not share helps to explain why the Americans could not allow greater defense 
cooperation and therefore could not extend a guarantee. Kennedy had spent a great deal of 
time cultivating positive relations with Nasser, and believed that alienating the Egyptian 
President might mean the total demise of US influence in the Arab world.  The reason that 
defense cooperation with Israel would have been so costly was because the guarantee itself 
could not be structured to make a US-Israeli alliance less threatening to Egypt. 
Furthermore, the enmity between Israel and Egypt was why Kennedy had to consider the 
risk of US entrapment in a war. Nasser’s statement that he would strike Dimona if Israel 
was developing nuclear weapons led Kennedy to halt the CANE probe. Although Nasser had 
expressed a willingness to forswear nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, potentially 
fulfilling step one of the plan, the administration knew that a security guarantee would be 
necessary to get Israel out of the nuclear business. Had the United States extended a 
guarantee, however, Nasser’s hypothetical strike would have brought the Americans into a 
war against Egypt that they might otherwise have avoided. In all likelihood, Kennedy 
stopped Operation CANE before he knew whether he might convince the Tel Aviv to give up 
its program for this very reason.  
As Robert Komer observed, Israel hoped to receive a “full-fledged alliance, with all 
the trimmings” from the Americans. 252 The Americans, however, were not eager to grant 
such a formal guarantee. Even in the May CANE analysis, which took a relatively favorable 
view on an increased US commitment to Israel, officials seemed to agree that a formal 
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security treaty was not desirable. They preferred instead to consider a public, unilateral, 
executive agreement. There was, however, no sign that the Kennedy administration 
contemplated any serious limitations on the scope of the agreement. That would, of course, 
have been inimical to the general purpose of the guarantee.  
Once the United States began to consider the possibility of joint military 
cooperation, however, the potential costs of a guarantee became excessive. Israeli requests 
for joint military planning began in the spring, but as the summer progressed and it seemed 
less likely that Kennedy would grant Ben Gurion’s request, officials increased the pressure 
for defense cooperation. Even after Kennedy wrote to Eshkol to officially decline Ben 
Gurion’s request, the Israelis continued to press this issue, explaining the lack of observable 
military cooperation with the US made American promises significantly less credible than 
those to formal allies with whom they did publicly train and plan.  
For the Americans, the prospect of enhanced defense cooperation with Israel was a 
major sticking point. Although Kennedy officials anticipated that Israel would want these 
sorts of arrangements when they began the CANE initiatives, it was not until the summer 
that key officials analyzed and emphasized the detrimental effects that observable military 
coordination could have. Tellingly, reports from the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of State 
came down strongly opposed to joint military planning or training with the Israelis. Both 
noted that this type of signaling could trigger as much or more backlash as a treaty itself, 
and ruled defense cooperation to be destructive to US interests in the region. Significantly, 
although US officials began the CANE probe to investigate the utility of a formal guarantee, 
they do not appear to have seriously considered whether a formal defense pledge without 
“the trimmings” would have been possible. Most high-level analyses appear to assume that 
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a security guarantee and defense cooperation were inextricable.  A stronger public 
commitment to deter on Israel’s behalf would have to be backed up with signs of the United 




American thinking about the costs and benefits of a security guarantee certainly 
focused on whether the United States was willing to signal a commitment to Israel, and 
how this would affect its relations with the Arab world, and Egypt in particular. But a 
corollary to these concerns was how antagonizing the Arab states might, in turn, increase 
Soviet influence in the region. In the administration’s early analyses, officials worried that 
an open, public, guarantee to Israel would polarize Egypt and its neighbors. Those states 
might then turn to the Soviets for a counter-guarantee. 253 This is somewhat consistent with 
the alternative hypothesis.  
Following McCloy’s trip to Egypt, as the Kennedy administration considered the new 
arms control options Nasser had laid out, Robert Komer reminded him that the Israelis 
would not comply unless they got something from the Americans in return. He urged the 
President to consider “the minimum we may be able to get away with, while still limiting 
risk of strong Arab reaction and Soviet response.” 254 On July 23, when Kennedy decided to 
end the CANE meeting after the discussion about Nasser’s comments on striking Dimona, 
he also made mention of the Soviets. He declared that the May 8 Tripartite statement was 
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as far as he could “go without inviting the Soviets into the Middle East.”255 Further, 
Kennedy’s reply to Eshkol mentioned his concern that an American guarantee to Israel US 
would cause backlash in the region, and possibly cause Arab states to seek similar 
assurances from the USSR. 256  
Finally, in his November meeting with US officials, Yitzhak Rabin mentioned the 
Soviets as well. Unofficial guarantees to Israel were less credible than a formal and public 
treaty, or an alliance where the partners engaged in joint military planning. But they were 
also “not against a communist enemy. The US would fight if their chief opponent attempted 
aggression, but it might be a different matter when no Communist enemy was involved.” 257 
 Another important consideration, however, was the real US concern that a 
guarantee to Israel could result in Arab polarization and a Soviet counter-guarantee, or 
increased Soviet influence in the region more broadly. There is no question that this 
possibility was important in Kennedy’s decision to deny the Israelis a guarantee, as he 
explicitly mentioned it as he ended the July 23 meeting. It would appear then, that the 
Israel case provides some limited support for H1A1, that security guarantees are formed or 
denied on the basis of the patron’s primary adversary. It is important to consider the causal 
logic underlying this fear about a possible Soviet counter-guarantee, however. The 
Kennedy administration worried that a formal guarantee and military cooperation would 
antagonize the Arab world and Egypt in particular.  The Soviets could gain influence as a 
consequence of this polarization. Increased Soviet influence was therefore a potential 
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tertiary effect of the guarantee, with signaling and the loss of the Arab world preceding any 
effects on the Soviets. While we cannot eliminate H1A1 entirely, it is also incorrect to say 
that the Soviets were a primary motivation for denying the guarantee, although they did 
factor into the administration’s cost calculations.  
 
“I Can’t Disarm Myself” 
 
The case of Israel provides important support Hypothesis 1. It is also a harrowing 
historical counterfactual. CANE did not fail because Egypt or Israel flatly refused the probe, 
but because the United States was unwilling to send public signals on Israel’s behalf lest the 
Arab world turn against it. Had the Kennedy Administration been confident that it could 
engage in a satisfactory quid-pro-quo with Eshkol, it might have attempted to trade a 
guarantee for the Israeli weapons program. And if Israel had accepted a guarantee, it would 
have also had to accept the US requirement of eschewing further territorial expansion, 
three years before the Six Day War. Furthermore, if the US had pursued Nasser’s offers of 
arms control in a “collective setting” or via unilateral renunciation, CANE would have been 
the second arms control treaty of the nuclear age, following closely on the heels of the 
Limited Test Ban.   
Instead, however, the United States decided that a public commitment to Israel 
could not be made at an acceptable cost, and that it could not go beyond private security 
assurances and, later, regular arms sales. But this did not go far enough to satisfy the 
Israelis. “We must stand on our feet and be able to touch the umbrella,” Prime Minister 
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Eshkol explained in 1964.258 One year later, as American official pleaded with him not to go 
nuclear, Eshkol went further: “If we were a member of NATO or had a security pact with 
you… but I can’t disarm myself.”259  By most accounts, Israel crossed the nuclear threshold 
in 1967, as it prepared to clash with Nasser in the Six Day War. The United States, Israel’s 
“de facto” ally, had almost no involvement.260  
 
The Franco-Russian Alliance: War on Paper 
Introduction 
 The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance between is a sharp contrast to the 
United States’ decision to reject the Israeli security guarantee bid in 1963. Between 1890 
and 1894, Paris and St. Petersburg negotiated both an entente and a formal defense pact, 
and did so despite the existence of several unshared adversaries. This alliance formation 
process demonstrates how the requirements for forming traditional defense pacts differ 
from those of security guarantee formation—namely, that the specific nature of the Franco-
Russian pact and the fact that it was kept secret allowed the two countries to ally despite 
their many differences. I begin this section with a summary of the Franco-Russian alliance 
negotiation. I then go on to explore the case through the lens of Hypothesis 1 and its 
observable implications.  I consider the role that unshared adversaries played in alliance 
formation, and how France and Russia constructed a detailed and clandestine pact that 
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could assuage entrapment and abandonment fears, despite their differing strategic 
priorities. I also demonstrate that even after the conclusion of the alliance, Paris and St. 
Petersburg continued to have distinct defensive interests, but that this did not prevent 
them from upholding their 1894 commitment when war eventually came. 
 
Case Summary 
Between 1890 and 1894, France and Russia negotiated and concluded a two-part 
defense pact. The first component, an entente, was signed in August 1891. The second part, 
an agreement for mutual military assistance in case of war was finalized in the first days of 
1894. Although it has come to be thought of as a natural counterweight to the Triple 
Alliance, and one of the rigid alliances that helped to plunge Europe into the First World 
War, the Franco-Russian Pact was not a foregone conclusion. The prospective allies were 
primarily concerned about the military threats emanating from different foes, and this 
caused disagreements in two major areas. The first was the form that military cooperation 
among them should take; the second was the degree to which that cooperation should be 
publicized. Moreover, the diplomacy surrounding the Franco-Russian negotiations 
demonstrates how very much this type of defense relationship differed in its requirements 
from a post-1945 security guarantee.  
 The French and Russians were not natural allies. Alexander III, the Russian tsar, 
very much disliked the “radical, atheistic French Republic,” and believed that form of 
government to be unreliable and unstable.261  Russia had previously had a warm 
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relationship to Germany, as Tsar Alexander II was the nephew of Kaiser Wilhelm I, and was 
known to despise the French.262 In the early 1880s, Russia was a part of the Three 
Emperor’s League and thereafter, held a neutrality agreement with Germany. The Tsar and 
his ministers only began to contemplate an alignment with France after these treaty ties 
ended with Bismarck’s 1890 departure, and even then, an alliance with Paris was 
considered a last resort to avoid complete isolation.263  
  The French, for their part, had few friends abroad after their humiliating defeat in 
the Franco-Prussian War.  France looked to Russia as an international partner who might 
help it restore its position.264 Paris’ goal, both for the alliance and in Europe more broadly, 
was revanchism against Germany and the eventual return of Alsace Lorraine.265  This 
agenda was a liability for the Tsar and his ministers, who feared that the French might use 
the alliance for offensive purposes.266 The French Armed Forces were finally returning to 
full strength by the late 1880s, however, making Paris a more attractive partner.267 From 
the French perspective, until 1890, the most obvious barrier to an alliance was Russia’s 
other political commitments.  
In 1881, Russia had joined the Three Emperors’ League with German and Austria-
Hungary, an arrangement that seemed natural based on ideological and dynastic kinship.268 
The pact stated that if any of the three became involved in a war with a power outside the 
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group, the other two would observe neutrality and would not aid the adversary.269 The 
motivation behind the pact was that an ongoing rivalry might relapse into conflict 
(Germany might renew its feud with France or that Russia might go to war with England in 
the Near East). With the treaty in place, there would be no need to worry about either of 
the other signatories launching an opportunistic attack.  The League was renewed twice, 
and its terms most certainly prevented Russia from allying with France. In 1887, however, 
the Tsar refused to renew for a third time, arguing that Austrian policy had hurt Russia’s 
position in Bulgaria.270  As a substitute, Alexander concluded a secret neutrality pact with 
Germany only, which came to be known as the Reinsurance Treaty. By this agreement, 
Russia and Germany were bound to observe neutrality in war as long as the other partner 
was not the aggressor. Although it was a narrower commitment than the Three Emperors’ 
League, the Reinsurance Treaty guaranteed Russia against having to fight a two front war 
with Germany as one foe. It would not, for example, face England in the Mediterranean and 
Germany in Poland simultaneously271.  
The Reinsurance Treaty was due for renewal in 1890, just as German Chancellor 
Otto Von Bismarck resigned. His successor, Leo Von Caprivi, recommended that the secret 
treaty be allow to lapse.272 Ostensibly, Kaiser Wilhelm II and his advisors refused to renew 
the treaty because Germany had too many others.273 Bismarck had understood the 
interlocking nature of his complex treaty system, but the new government did not 
comprehend what additional value Germany gained from the pact.274   They did not, for 
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example, perceive that the Reinsurance Treaty combined with long mobilization times 
meant that Russia could be kept out of the first few weeks of a renewed war with France. 
They also did not consider that its cancellation would cause Russia to seek some other form 
of alignment, and that the terms of the eventual Franco-Russian alliance could never have 
been negotiated with the Reinsurance Treaty in place.275   
As Glenn Snyder has observed, a purely systemic logic would expect the Franco-
Russian alliance to have formed directly following the Austro-German alliance of 1879. 
Bismarck, in effect, “beat the system” by mollifying for Russia concerns about its western 
border with the neutrality pact.276 Only when his successors cut that tie did a Franco-
Russian alliance become possible, and even then, St. Petersburg was wary. Indeed, 
following the Reinsurance Treaty cancellation Alexander reportedly told Wilhelm that he 
would never make an alliance with a republic.277 On the German side, Wilhelm II was not 
nearly as pro-Russian as his father, but he did not intend to take up a hostile policy, and 
told the Tsar as much when he informed him of his decision to let the treaty lapse.278 The 
German government insisted it would abide by all of its former positions, including support 
for Russian claims in Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits.279 The Russian Foreign Minister, 
Nikolai Geirs, continued to believe that a tenuous German connection was better than any 
French one, so he tried desperately to convince Berlin to put these promises in writing. 
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Their absolute refusal to do so was what finally made St. Petersburg look elsewhere for 
international support.280  
The initial steps towards Franco-Russian rapprochement took place in August of 
1890. High-level military officials from both states met and agreed that the other should 
have some intrinsic interest if it became embroiled in a war with Germany.281 These 
conversations revealed, however, that the Russians and the French disagreed on military 
strategy as well as on the form that an agreement might take—persistent themes 
throughout the remainder of their treaty negotiations. In terms of military strategy, 
General Nikolai Obruchev proposed a “Russian Schlieffen Plan”: if an initial German 
offensive came against Russia, Russia should launch an offensive against Austria while 
taking the defensive against Germany; if the German thrust were against France, Russia 
would again take offensive against Austria and defensive against Germany, and turn full-
force against Germany once Austria was defeated.282 The French General, Raoul le Mouton 
de Boisdeffre was less than pleased with these proposed arrangements, but was heartened 
at the prospect of Russia joining them in war at all. The second point of disagreement was 
whether the pact should be formal and public (the French preference) or informal and 
secret (the Russian hope). The Generals parted ways without resolving either conundrum. 
By winter 1891, the Tsar was still not comfortable with the idea of promising to join France 
in a war against Germany.283   
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The spring of 1891, however, brought with it the pressure that was necessary to 
elicit alliance interest from the Russians: the Triple Alliance announced its treaty renewal 
plans earlier than expected, which led to a series of rumors that Great Britain was planning 
to join it.284 Fearful that he would be shut out by a hostile Anglo-German combination, and 
that the French might pursue alternative arrangements out of necessity, the Tsar quickly 
gave his blessing and the Entente Cordiale was drafted in July.285 Negotiations took place 
when French vessels visited Russian naval maneuvers at Cronstadt. Though the document 
text was closely-held, the visit itself was seen as evidence of rapprochement.286 
  French Foreign Minister, Alexandre Ribot, came to that meeting with two sets of 
demands. First, the two governments should act in concert on all matters regarding peace 
in Europe. Second, the two governments should agree to immediate and simultaneous 
mobilization in case of a threat from the Triple Alliance.287 His Russian counterpart would 
not agree to immediate and simultaneous mobilization, and softened the French language. 
He suggested that the entente partners draft an “agreement on measures” for “immediate 
and simultaneous adoption,” in case a military threat arose. If either party was menaced by 
aggression, Paris and St. Petersburg would confer, and would take action in tandem, 
assuming previously-agreed to circumstances had come to pass.288 Ribot insisted that they 
would have to agree in advance to the circumstances and accompanying actions to which 
the Russians referred, and this was accepted. The Russians also raised the question of 
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whether attacks on interests outside the European theater should be included in the 
entente (Egypt or the Mediterranean, for example), but later dropped this request.289 The 
Entente Cordiale entered into force by an exchange of notes in late August, 1891. In 
addition to providing for consultation and concerted action in (to-be) specified 
circumstances, the final document cited the fact that the Triple Alliance had seriously 
compromised the European balance of power, and went so far as to speculate on Great 
Britain’s possible incorporation.290  
  Even before it was signed, however, the French began to push for more binding 
arrangements. As Ribot’s “immediate and simultaneous mobilization” clause had suggested, 
they were eager for an express commitment from the Russians that aid would be 
forthcoming in the case of a war against Germany. They worried that even with a 
consultative arrangement in place, the Russians might still pass the buck and focus on 
Austria first.291 They argued that the allies should define their military commitments much 
more explicitly, lest lines of communication be quickly cut if war broke out.292 The 
Russians, for their part, were happy to think of the entente as evidence of improved 
relations, but most of the Tsar’s cabinet ministers, and the foreign minister in particular, 
opposed any further action that would result in a more intimate military relationship. This 
was because, from St. Petersburg, no actual war with Germany was foreseeable at that 
time.293 As will be discussed shortly, the Russians remained preoccupied with Austria and 
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Britain in the Mediterranean, but knew full well that France had its eye on Germany.294  The 
Russians therefore declined French entreaties to conclude a more binding military pact, 
and embarked on a good will tour of Europe, to reassure other states (and Germany in 
particular) of the entente partners’ peaceful intentions.295  
By early 1892, the French were growing antsy and wished to firm up the Entente’s 
implicit but wholly unspecified obligation of mutual assistance in the case of aggression. 
Specifically, they hoped to conclude an agreement on mobilization and delineate what 
military measures would be taken by each side.296  The French General Staff authored a 
paper, which argued that the Franco-Russian alliance had a small manpower edge, but that 
the Triple Alliance could best them due to their speed of mobilization. The study, discussed 
in more detail shortly, recommended deployment patterns (numbers of troops and 
positions they would take up) to best address these shortcomings.297 In August, 1892, 
General Boisdeffre arrived in St. Petersburg with the French proposal. In case Germany 
alone, or the entire Triple Alliance mobilized, France and Russia should do the same 
without need for previous agreement or notification, and should commit to very specific 
deployment patterns.298 The Russians, who remained preoccupied with Austria, were 
hesitant to make any specific commitment that was primarily focused on Germany.299  A 
compromise military convention was drafted on August 10, 1892, with minimal Russian 
enthusiasm.300  
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 After its drafting, the alliance agreement entered limbo for a year and a half, largely 
due to Russian concerns as to whether its defense interests could be reconciled with the 
French.301 In July, 1893, however, the German Reichstag passed a new army bill, which 
increased the country’s standing peacetime military by 72,000 and implemented a new 
system of reserves. When implemented, the new system would allow Berlin to field 
520,000 trained men on short notice.302 The bill raised suspicions about German intentions 
in both Petersburg and Paris, although the Tsar was still not quite prepared to agree to 
French demands about troop commitments.303 Following a highly-publicized Russian naval 
visit to Toulon that October, however, Russian commitment to the proposal increased 
substantially.304  Other European states took notice as well. The German Chancellor was 
reported to have declared that no event “of the preceding twenty years had so seriously 
threatened the peace of Europe,” and a London newspaper argued that Russia’s visit 
marked “the most serious day England had passed through since the battle of Trafalgar.”305 
With both its existence and specific provisions held secret, the Franco-Russian alliance 
entered into force in the first days of January, 1894.306  
 
Unshared Adversaries: Surmountable Obstacles 
 
The long delay between the cancellation of the Franco-German Reinsurance Treaty 
and conclusion of the Franco-Russian defense pact can largely be explained by the fact that 
                                                           
301 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 120.  
302 Kennan, p. 216.  
303 Langer, pp. 42-43.  
304 Langer, p. 47; Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 121-122.  
305 Langer, p. 47.  
306 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 122.  
136 
the two states did not necessarily share military goals. Indeed, as of 1890, their divergences 
were more notable than their shared strategic interests, particularly when it came to 
adversaries. The overarching concern that drove Paris to seek an alliance was the 
possibility of a second Franco-Prussian War. The German presence on France’s borders 
made it deeply insecure, and it retained a long-term goal of recapturing Alsace-Lorraine. 
Beyond that particular territory, there was a strong desire in Paris to exact revenge on 
Berlin.307 A secondary concern was Italy, with whom France had a host of colonial 
conflicts.308 From 1887-1890, Franco-Italian relations were at a nadir, as the French sought 
to break the Italian connection to Triple Alliance through punitive economic measures and 
interference in a dispute between the Pope and the Italian government.309 In early 1891, 
the Italians attempted to improve relations in hopes of sapping the French interest in a 
Russian alliance, but their refusal to disclose the terms of the Triple Alliance scuttled 
rapprochement.310 Paris had no ill-will towards Vienna, however, understood that Austria’s 
membership in the Triple Alliance had little to do with France, and would have much 
preferred an Austrian alliance to a Russian one.311 France had little interest in the Balkans 
or Turkish Straits, where the Austrians clashed with St. Petersburg.312 Finally, due to 
colonial disputes, Anglo-French relations were poor.313  
As of 1890, Russia’s patterns of amity and enmity were quite different. The Three 
Emperors’ League and Reinsurance Treaty meant that Russo-German relations were 
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relatively friendly, despite the latter’s refusal to codify their sustained amity.314  The 
Russians had little stake in the Franco-German rivalry, and none whatsoever in Alsace-
Lorraine. They also had no particular quarrels with the Italians, and as they began 
rapprochement with the French, took pains to convince Rome that the partnership was 
only a reaction to the renewal of the Triple Alliance.315 There was, however, a longstanding 
distrust of Austria-Hungary through the Russian government and society more broadly, 
and bad blood over the Balkans and Turkish Straits specifically.316 In one of the few 
similarities in the two countries’ rivalry profiles, Russo-British relations were also tense, 
especially over the Russian presence in the Black Sea.317 In sum, for the French, the primary 
alliance goals was to defend against and eventually inflict damage upon Germany, whereas 
the Russians were primarily interested in settling scores with Austria and Britain without 
fear of German intervention.318 The Russians however, did not expect any near-term war 
with Germany, and were acutely concerned that an alliance with France could provoke 
Berlin to attack.319  One could hardly argue that the Paris and St. Petersburg were natural 
military allies.  
Once entente negotiations commenced, France and Russia’s differing adversaries 
were a prominent concern. In their 1891 talks, the French sought an explicit and public 
pledge of Russian support in a war against Germany, and their stated war aim was the 
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.320 In negotiations, the French hoped for a pledge of immediate 
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and simultaneous mobilization that would force the Russians to wage a two-front war from 
the start. The French worried that without a binding agreement, the Russians might 
concentrate efforts on Austria alone. The Russians, however, were primarily interested in 
deterring German intervention in an Austro-Russian war. In such a conflict they hoped to 
gain Austrian Galicia and control of the Straits at Constantinople.321 They preferred a 
vaguer, non-public alliance agreement, which would not provoke Germany or foreclose the 
possibility of re-establishing a Russo-German friendship later. A flexible and secret 
agreement also had the bonus of reducing the risk of entrapment over Alsace-Lorraine.322  
These conflicts of interest were summarized by General Obruchev, the Russian Chief of 
Staff, as entente negotiations were under way:  
 
“The French regard as their immediate enemy Germany almost exclusively; to Italy 
they attach secondary importance, while for Austria they cherish certain 
sympathies… Hence, the French would like, if possible, to conclude with us a 
convention solely for the event of war with Germany. To a certain extent this 
condition is mutually profitable. But one cannot help noticing that it is considerable 
more profitable for France than for us. Having secured a guarantee against her most 
dangerous enemy, France might, in the case of war by Russia against Austria, even 
though it broke out at Germany’s command, remain inactive and wait for 
developments, which might prove fatal to us…”323 
 
Foreign Minister Geirs echoed this sentiment in explaining why the Russians could 
not commit to a true military pact in 1891: “It would be a mistake to help the French crush 
Germany when the French were unwilling to aid Russia against Austria or Turkey.”324 Geirs 
argued that if the Russians agreed to the French request for aid against Germany, and 
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helped France to prevail in a war against Berlin, the Russians would have no guarantee 
whatsoever of French cooperation to finish off Austria.325  
Another compelling reason for the Russians to demur on a formal military 
commitment to France was the simple fact that they fundamentally did not believe that a 
near-term war between them and Germany was likely.326 To quote one prominent scholar 
of the alliance:  
 
“…there was at that time simply no political issue outstanding between Russia and 
Germany that could remotely have justified, or called for, a settlement by force of 
arms. Neither power had any territorial design on the other. Neither had any 
specific objectives with relation to the other that only a successful war could be 
expected to achieve, unless it be the Tsar’s rather wistful assumption that a defeated 
Germany would fall to pieces and cease to be a bother to him. And Bismarck, in his 
final years in office, had repeatedly warned the Germany military leaders not only 
that Germany had no designs on Russia territory, but that if they got themselves into  
a war with Russia they would have no rational objectives and would never find a 
favorable place to stop.”327 
 
At the time that they penned the Entente Cordiale, then, Russia and France had myriad 
unshared adversaries, and few that were truly mutual (the British came the closest). In 
Russian eyes, this meant that there was simply no basis for a more binding commitment.  
The French, of course, wanted more than an entente and continued to advocate for a 
Russian commitment of aid against Germany. As they considered the military convention 
that the French General Staff had drafted, the Russians insisted that they would have to 
have a guarantee of French support in case of a war by Austria alone.328 They made clear to 
the French that they would not attack Germany and Austria on the basis of Italian 
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mobilization against France.329 The French, for their part, insisted that they should retain 
the right not to intervene in a purely Austro-Russo conflict, so long as Germany did the 
same (they did not want to be forced into the position of aggressor against Germany).330  
Because of these disagreements, nearly all of the Tsar’s top ministers remained opposed to 
any further written agreement at all.331  
  While the alliance agreement stood unsigned, the Entente partners’ diverging 
military interests remained apparent. The French declined to support Russia in disputed 
with Britain over the Indian border, and Russian claims in Bulgaria were an “open sore” 
between the two states.332 The Russians, in turn, refused to support the French position in 
Egypt when it was challenged by the British.333 Perhaps most problematic was the fact that 
the entente had clearly not stemmed St. Petersburg’s interest in a rapprochement with 
Berlin. In 1892, the Russians initiated a new commercial treaty with Germany as a step to 
improve relations, which the Germans took up with interest.334 In an effort to lure the 
Russians back, Berlin returned to a “Bismarckian attitude” on Bulgaria, and ceased its 
explicit support for Austrian and British interests there.335 In early 1893, Kaiser Wilhelm II 
was overt in his efforts to win over the Tsar, telling Alexander that the French government 
was capricious and corrupt, and suggesting that a “crusade” against them might become 
necessary. Further, he insisted, the Triple Alliance was wholly defensive, based on 
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conservative principles and in was in no way an obstacle to re-establishing a Holy Alliance 
or Three Emperors League to combat corruption and revolution.336   
  In July, 1893, a newspaper article entitled “Alliance ou Flirt?” appeared in the 
French newspaper Le Figaro.337 It suggested that a Russo-German rapprochement might be 
in the offing, and argued that the French were being slighted. In Russia, there was ample 
suspicion that the French government was behind the article, but it nonetheless sent the 
message that the French might lose interest in closer ties. That same summer, the Russo-
German trade treaty collapsed and Berlin introduced to Parliament their new military bill 
that would expand its armed forces by 8,000.338 Several months later, on December 16, the 
Tsar finally informed the French ambassador that he was ready to agree to the military 
pact set out at the Toulon visit in 1892. After stressing the need for peace in Europe, 
Alexander informed the ambassador that “French idea of revenge must be kept in the realm 
of sentiment and must not be translated into action.”339 On December 27, 1893, the Russian 
government issued its formal adherence to the military convention that had been drafted 
15 months earlier, and on January 4, 1894, the French cabled back with the same language. 
The litany of defensive disagreements did not stop Paris and St. Petersburg from 
successfully negotiating a defense pact.  
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Avoiding Entrapment and Abandonment: Specificity and Secrecy in the Pact 
 Despite the fact that France and Russia each had multiple adversaries that the other 
did not share, they managed to go well beyond their initial entente relationship and 
conclude a binding alliance. The presence of unshared adversaries raised for each state the 
possibility of entrapment in an unwanted war or abandonment in crisis, but this risk was 
managed through two important mechanisms. The first was a series of very specific 
defensive commitments, which allowed each party to believe that it would receive military 
support against its most-likely adversary, without committing completely to contingencies 
in which it had less of a stake. The second was treaty secrecy: the Russians eventually 
agreed to make a specific series of commitments to France against Germany because the 
existence of the treaty, as well as its content, was to be held in absolute confidence. This 
minimized the risk that the Franco-Russian alliance would have the near-term effect of 
inciting Berlin. I begin by examining the specific treaty content that allowed the French and 
Russians to surmount the obstacle of unshared adversaries; I then go on to consider the 
role that secrecy played in this alliance.  
The Franco-Russian military convention managed to assuage the entrapment and 
abandonment fears of both parties because it was a compromise document with 
circumscribed aims. The first article of the pact read as follows:  
 
“If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will 
employ all her available forces for an attack on Germany. If Russia is attacked by 
Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France will employ all her available 
forces for an attack on Germany.”  
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This clause was important for several reasons. First, it acknowledged that France was 
primarily concerned with a German or Italian attack, while Russia was preoccupied with a 
German or Austrian one. France and Russia were therefore not required to “take on” each 
other’s adversaries to make a defense commitment. Second, France was committed to 
aiding Russia against attack from Austria and Russia committed to aiding France against 
Italy if and only if the adversary was supported by the Germans.  This was a nod to the 
Russian concern that St. Petersburg not be obligated to go to war over some “isolated 
fracas” between France and Italy.340 Likewise, it insulated the French against association 
with a war between Austria and Russia over discrete territorial interests. Finally, by having 
war making obligations hinge upon German involvement, Article 1 gave deference to 
French concerns that this was the potential future conflict in which both French and 
Russian interests would be engaged. This concession was eventually made because the 
Russians came to believe that any major attack by Germany would eventually include the 
Austrians as well.  
 The second article of the pact laid out the allies’ mobilization obligations and was 
not entirely consistent with the first. It stated:  
 
“In case the forces of the Triple Alliance or of one of the partners of that Alliance 
should mobilize, France and Russia, at the first announcement of that event and 
without necessity for prior agreement, will immediately and simultaneously 
mobilize  the totality of their forces and will move them as close as possible to their 
frontiers.” 
 
Because of their shared belief that the Triple Alliance could mobilize its forces faster than 
they could, France and Russia each agreed to begin mobilization promptly when any 
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member of the Triple Alliance did, so that if war came, neither would be delayed in 
assisting the other. The French had originally proposed that the alliance mobilize in 
response to German mobilization only, but this stoked Russian fears that they could be 
pulled into a war with Germany on France’s behalf without a reciprocal guarantee of 
French aid in a war with Austria.341 The commitment to mobilize was therefore far less 
discriminating than the actual commitment to make war, and provided for contingencies in 
which France or Russia might mobilize without actually going to war (e.g. an exclusively-
Austrian attack on Russia in the former case, or an exclusively-Italian attack on France in 
the latter).342  This agreement was intended as a compromise, as it protected France 
against entrapment in an Austro-Russian war, but guaranteed Russia that it would at least 
have French support in an Austro-Russian crisis.343  
 Article 2, however, then went on to specify the actual troop deployments that would 
be made by each side if and when the contingencies enumerated in Article 1 came to pass. 
Specifically, the French committed to employ 1,300,000 men against Germany, and the 
Russians 700,000-800,000 against Germany (out of a total 1,600,000).344 These forces were 
to be concentrated as quickly as possible on the German frontier “in order to deprive [the 
Germans] from the outset of all possibility of shuttling their forces between East and 
West.”345 In any war involving Germany, then, the Russians committed to placing fully half 
of their armed forces on the German border as quickly as possible, reserving only what was 
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necessary to hold Austria in check.346 The aim of this commitment was to force Germany to 
fight on two fronts, and to eliminate any need for the allies to confer further in case war 
should break out.347 This commitment demonstrated that even though the Russians’ 
primary political occupation remained the Austrians, the allies were able to come to an 
agreement on how their mutual interests might be served operationally.  
 Several scholars have observed the curious format of the first two articles of the 
Franco-Russian treaty. Logically, one would expect the compact to address: 1) 
mobilization; 2) common action in case of war; 3) troop commitments. This agreement led 
with the commitment to common action and then included mobilization guidelines that 
were not terribly consistent with those goals. The explanation for this inconsistency 
appears to be that it was necessary to cobble together a compromise: Article 1 allowed the 
French to claim that they were only obligated to provide aid in the case of a German-backed 
war, while Article 2 allowed the Russians to insist that they would have French support 
against Austria (in the form of mobilization), regardless of whether Vienna was backed by 
Berlin.348 The common action clause was placed front and center because the French 
drafted the agreement, and this was the portion of the commitment they preferred to 
highlight.  
The remaining clauses of the treaty stated that the general staffs of the two armies 
should concert in advance to facilitate the measures laid out, and communicate to each 
other any knowledge relating to the armaments of the Triple Alliance. France and Russia 
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agreed not to conclude peace separately with members of the Triple Alliance, and agreed 
that the pact would remain in force for as long as the Triple Alliance did. The final article 
declared: “All the clauses numbered above here shall be held rigorously secret.”349  
 The clandestine nature of the Franco-Russian alliance was the second reason that 
the two states managed to forge a defense pact despite their disparate strategic concerns. 
The reciprocal naval visits to Cronstadt and Toulon made it clear that the two countries had 
achieved rapprochement, but the details of both the entente and defense pact negotiations 
were closely held. The document that was eventually approved in early 1894 was dubbed a 
“military convention” rather than a defense treaty so that the French would not be 
obligated to submit it to Parliament for approval, and during its negotiation, no more than a 
handful of advisors on each side were aware of its existence. Moreover, a chief reason that 
a year and a half passed between the drafting and entrance into force of the defense pact 
was Russian concerns about secrecy.350  
 As already discussed, in the years between 1890 and 1893, the Tsar was not at all 
convinced that the Russo-German relationship was beyond repair, and hesitated to 
formalize any kind of relationship with France, lest it provoke Berlin. A significant reason 
for St. Petersburg’s delay in approving the military convention was the strongly-held belief 
among top ministers that the country needed several years of peace to focus on domestic 
and other less prominent international issues.351 This group feared that if the Russians 
were to conclude a military convention, and news of its existence (never mind its content) 
were to become public, relations with Germany would be soured needlessly. The French 
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had quite a different agenda. Upon conclusion of the entente, they began to push for a 
treaty commitment that laid out more specific defense obligations and was public, for the 
purposes of sending the strongest possible message to Germany. The Tsar and his 
ministers flatly refused to consent to this, however, and insisted that the draft convention 
include a clause that stated that the treaty could not be made public without the consent of 
both parties.352  When the French tried to amend this clause, the Russian Foreign Minister 
threatened to back out of the alliance altogether.353 The Russian insistence on secrecy in 
turn placed the French in a somewhat precarious position until the pact was signed: The 
October 1893 Toulon visit, for example, caused outrage in many European capitals, but the 
French had no actual defense commitment from Russia at the point they hosted the fleet.354 
They therefore assumed the liability of antagonizing adversaries, without gaining the 
benefit of deterrence.  
 When the Franco-Russian treaty was adopted on January 4, 1894, both parties 
understood that its existence, if not the actual content, would eventually become known—
the question was when this would occur. The French negotiators hoped it would become 
public sooner, so that they might receive the political credit for brokering the alliance; the 
tsar, however, wanted to delay any leakage by several more years, lest Germany be 
provoked unnecessarily.355  Following the ratification of the compact, the German 
ambassadors in Paris and St. Petersburg were instructed to rely to Berlin that neither 
country had any offensive intent.356 At that time, no more than a handful of Russians had 
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knowledge that any document had been signed at all. More French officials were aware of 
its existence, but that number was still a circumscribed one.357 Moreover, one scholar has 
observed that correspondence relating to the treaty suggests that multiple conventions 
may have been signed in 1894, meaning that there may well have been additional secret 
military provisions, unknown to either foreign office and yet to be unearthed by history.358  
 Despite the fact that France and Russia had different adversaries and might have 
seemed strange strategic bedfellows in the early 1890s, the two countries managed to 
overcome these obstacles and sign a defense pact. This was possible because the treaty 
itself was so specific as to lay out each sides’ operational commitments in a manner that 
was made mutually acceptable. It was also helped along by the fact that the treaty and its 
contents were negotiated and held in secret by both governments, so as not to create 
prematurely for Russia a sworn adversary in Germany when that might be delayed or 
avoided. The specific contents, then, of the Franco-Russian alliance, are they key to 
understanding why, despite many hurdles, the relationship was possible at all.  
 
After the Pact: 1894-1914 
 One might reasonably assume that France and Russia’s divergent strategic interests 
were ameliorated by their alliance—that the two states took on each other’s defense 
priorities, moving towards alliance “consistency.”359 The historical record demonstrates, 
however, that the allies continued to have different adversaries, but that this did not 
ultimately undermine their defense commitment to one another.  
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 After signing the 1894 compact, Russia’s relations with Germany continued to ebb 
and flow. In late 1894, the Kaiser decided to try to “sap the vitality” of the Franco-Russian 
relationship, by cultivating a friendship with the Tsar and denying any interest in near 
eastern affairs.360 Germany announced to Austria the Russian occupation of Constantinople 
would no longer be considered a casus belli that would invoke the alliance.361 Russian 
relations also warmed with Austria during the same period.362  
France and Russia parted ways over the latter’s policy in the Far East. Although 
France supported a Russian bid to force Japan to give up territories gained from its defeat 
of China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it stayed out of the Russo-Japanese war entirely.363 
Russia was defeated disastrously, and militarily crippled. The Kaiser capitalized on this fact 
and succeeded in convincing the Tsar to sign with Germany a defense treaty, the Bjorko 
Treaty. It remained in force for only a few months before the Foreign Office convinced him 
it was incompatible with the Franco-Russian pact, but it was nonetheless a sign that Russia 
was still not convinced that Germany need be a sworn adversary.364  Moreover, after 
signing an entente with Britain—an important treaty step towards the Triple Entente—St. 
Petersburg also quickly signed an agreement with Austria-Hungary, and refused to use the 
term “Triple Entente” publicly in the prewar years.365  
Lack of Russian support for French endeavors also had the unintended consequence 
of pushing Paris and London towards reconciliation. Russia failed to support France during 
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the Fashoda Crisis, and the French were forced to back down in humiliation.366 The lack of 
Russian backing, St. Petersburg’s entanglements in the Far East, and its reasonably friendly 
demeanor towards Berlin, caused the French to mend fences with Britain so that it would 
have more leverage against Germany.367 The result was the 1904 Franco-British Entente. 
Moreover, in 1906-07, the Russians expressed to the French new reservations about 
committing their forces to any particular military action in Europe.368  
The Franco-Russian record of alliance support remained spotty until the years 
immediately preceding World War I. France gave Russia no backing in the 1908-09 crisis 
over Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and pleaded with its ally to avoid war at 
all costs.369 To quote Glenn Snyder, “France, in effect, demanded that Russia drop its 
support of Serbia and accept the Austrian annexation, and implicitly threated to withhold 
military support if the intransigent position of Russia involved it in war.”370 The Tsar was 
quite displeased by his ally’s behavior, and sought to improve relations with both Germany 
and Italy as a result. He signed a 1909 agreement with Rome that guaranteed the status 
quo in the Balkans and pledged support for Italian colonial interests in North Africa and 
Russian interests in the Turkish Straits. In 1910, the Russians signed the Potsdam 
Agreement with Germany, in which they pledged not to support British policies hostile to 
Germany, and the Germans promised not to support aggressive Austrian behavior in the 
Balkans.371  
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Russia provided France no backing in the 1911 Agadir Crisis with Germany, and 
indeed, advised its ally to relinquish the port to Berlin.372 Nonetheless, France supported 
Russia in the Balkan wars of 1912, and reaffirmed its treaty commitments to in the 1913-
1914 Liman Von Sanders Crisis, although it refused overt aid.373 Despite this mixed record 
of support in distinct crises, however, the 1894 defense treaty was realized in 1914, and 
“immediate and simultaneous” mobilization was indeed the response to Austria and 
Germany’s July preparations. Their disagreements over unrelated wars and crises seemed 
to do little damage to the alliance.   
 
Shared Adversaries Sufficient?  
 There is little evidence to support the alternative hypothesis that the Franco-
Russian alliance formed solely on the basis of a shared rival, with little consideration paid 
to the presence and potential entrapment risks that came along with unshared rivalries. 
While it is absolutely true that for the alliance to form, it was necessary that France had 
Russia shared an adversary in Germany, this was an insufficient condition.  
 There were two important inflection points in Russian decision-making: the collapse 
of the commercial treaty with Berlin, and Germany’s introduction to the Reichstag of the 
new military bill.  These gave the Tsar reason to suspect German intentions, and even 
though Germany was still not a sworn adversary as later attempts at rapprochement 
demonstrate, it was a plausible one. Because St. Petersburg shared French concerns about a 
potential military threat from Germany, they were finally able to consider the proposed 
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defense pact. Germany’s apparent change of tone towards St. Petersburg appears to have 
been necessary to convince the Russians that some formal military preparation against 
Berlin was justified. France and Russia finally had one shared potential adversary, in 
addition to their numerous unshared foes. This condition alone was not enough to bring 
the alliance about, however. Rather, the shared German rivalry coupled with some alliance 
léger de main in the form of secrecy and specificity helped cement the pact.  
 
Explaining Franco-Russian Alliance Formation 
 As of early 1890 there were arguably more obstacles to a Franco-Russian defense 
pact than there were reasons compelling one. Though both Russia and France were each 
isolated diplomatically, making an entente desirable, at that early date they arguably had 
no adversaries in common.  Indeed, the gap between the demise of the Franco-German 
Reinsurance Treaty and 1894 signing of the military convention can largely be explained by 
France (and mostly Russia’s) consideration of their unshared adversaries. In particular, 
Russia’s concerns that France would not support it in a war with Austria, and uncertainty 
about whether it actually considered Germany a true military  adversary at all kept it from 
drafting and then from signing the pact.  
 Ultimately, specificity and secrecy of the treaty itself was what permitted a Franco-
Russian defense pact, despite the two countries’ differing strategic priorities. Germany was 
clearly the focus of the pact, but France was able to secure a promise of aid in case it was 
attacked by Italy backed by Germany. Russia got the same in the case of a German-backed 
attack by Austria, which helped to assuage each state’s abandonment concerns in case of a 
war with an adversary who was not Germany. The requirement that these attacks be 
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German-backed also allayed each states’ fears that it would get pulled into a bilateral 
conflict in which it had no stake. Although somewhat contradictory with Article 1, the 
immediate and simultaneous mobilization clause ensured that either country would 
receive at least some support in crisis from its alliance partner against any member of the 
Triple Alliance, even if it was not obligated to go to war in all cases in which it might 
mobilize.  
 Another crucial aspect of the compact was its inclusion of specific troop allocations. 
With Russia committed to turning half of its armed forces against Germany, it addressed 
earlier French fears that St. Petersburg was preoccupied with Vienna only, and by holding 
half of its army in reserve, Russia could guarantee that it would still be able to keep Austria 
at bay. Moreover, both allies committed to deploying specific numbers of troops to German 
borders without any further need for consultation, and agreed that these plans would 
remain in place as long as the Triple Alliance did. What is so striking about the Franco-
Russian pact is that it is both a political alliance and a fairly detailed war plan, with the 
latter making the former possible despite the two states’ differing security concerns.  
 Secrecy, both in the pact’s negotiation and after its implementation, also helped the 
allies surmount their differing views of Germany in particular. Because the details of the 
alliance were tightly held, Russia had less reason to fear that it would provoke Germany 
unnecessarily (turning it into a true adversary if they were not, in fact, a genuine foe). This 
furtive alliance also mimicked that of its rivals: The Triple Alliance’s provisions were 
clandestine, although its existence was widely acknowledged. Taken together, the 
specificity and secrecy of the Franco-Russian alliance demonstrate that the allies were 
planning for a very specific war against three or fewer specific adversaries. Their 
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commitment detailed the theater of operations in which they would act, their plans for 
mobilization, and even the numbers of troops that would be deployed if war came. Their 
relations, both during and after the treaty negotiations demonstrate that this alliance did 
not extend to other adversaries, crises, or theaters. Yet their failure to support each other 
diplomatically and militarily several times over the course of two decades in no way 
undermined their specific commitment when it was finally invoked, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Despite much diplomatic adversary in the intervening 20 years, the detailed 
Franco-Russian defense commitment held fast, and helped to seal the unhappy fate of 
Europe in 1914. 
 
Adversaries, Anticipation and Alliance Formation 
The United States-Israel and Franco-Russian alliance negotiations provide 
considerable support for Hypothesis 1: An unshared adversary is sufficient to prevent a 
patron from extending a security guarantee to a client, but does not necessarily impede the 
formation of a traditional defense pact. This is true because security guarantees are broad- 
based pacts that do not target their deterrence and come with heavy signaling burdens, 
whereas other alliances may be circumscribed in their contents and permit allies to target 
their alliance signaling.  
 The Kennedy Administration debated several features of a potential security 
guarantee to Israel, but there was never any doubt that it would be a broad promise of 
defense, and that it would be made public for “[m]aximum public utility and deterrent 
effect.” At no time during the summer of 1963 did officials discuss the possibility of 
circumscribing the commitment to apply to particular contingencies or adversaries. And 
while they did favor an executive agreement over a Senate-ratified mutual defense treaty, 
155 
they knew the guarantee would have to be formal and public if it were to assuage the 
Israelis and send a clear deterrent signal.  This led to a belief by the President, Secretary of 
State, and Joint Chiefs of Staff that an American guarantee would necessarily destroy hard-
won relations with Nasser. Alienating the Arab world was of particular concern, because an 
alliance would rely upon joint military exercises, war planning, and other observable forms 
of US commitment. The Israelis were particularly eager to have these for their deterrent 
effect, and the United States could see no way of commencing that kind of public defense 
relationship without destroying its Arab ties.  
 The Franco-Russian negotiations, however, stood in sharp contrast. Despite the fact 
that Russia and France each had multiple allies that the other did not share, an alliance was 
possible because the agreement was precise and partially clandestine. The French were the 
ones to press for a binding commitment from Russia, but at no point did either party 
contemplate a defense relationship that would have applied to all possible adversaries or 
all possible contingencies.  The allies had to negotiate the circumstances and threats that 
would bring the agreement into force, but there was little question that it would be a 
specific agreement, applied to the European theater, and would seek to minimize both 
parties’ fears of involvement in an unwanted war. When completed, the Franco-Russian 
alliance included an extremely detailed war plan that would allow the allies to take up arms 
with no need for prior consultation. This detailed commitment meant that there was 
relatively little need to signal the defense relationship publicly, and the French were willing 
to yield to the Russian desire to keep the pact a secret in deference to the Germans.    
 Establishing alliance deterrence on behalf of the Israelis was too costly for the 
Kennedy administration to pursue, based on the likely effects on other regional actors and 
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the public nature of a guarantee. This raises an additional puzzle about traditional defense 
pacts: If a military treaty can be so specific as to resemble a war plan, and held in 
confidence so as not to provoke other parties unnecessarily, is it rightly thought of as a 
deterrence-producing tool of statecraft? The French and Russians were clearly sincere in 
their commitments to one another, yet there was little impetus to communicate that 
relationship to adversaries in 1894, or in the two decades that followed. St. Petersburg and 
Paris engaged in few public displays of alliance and often declined to support one another 
on the international stage, whereas the Kennedy administration assumed that if it gave a 
public guarantee, it could not avoid joint military exercises or planning with Israel, and 
would therefore inevitably alienate Nasser. The Kennedy administration’s assumptions 
were consistent with the exigencies of deterrence and potential speed and destruction of 
war in the nuclear age. Nonetheless, the differences in how the potential alliance partners 
conceived of deterrence and defense in these two cases are substantial, and underscore just 
how different in their formation requirements security guarantees are from their 
predecessor pacts.  
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CHAPTER 4 - GENERAL DETERRENCE, IMMEDIATE ENTRAPMENT 
PATRON CRISIS INTERVENTION 
 
“I wish it were as simple as drawing a line and saying in effect, ‘this far and no further.’ I 
assure you that there are a thousand and one complicated factors that prevented such an 
easy solution.” 
-Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
Introduction 
In his memoirs, President Dwight Eisenhower recalled the difficulty of sending clear 
signals during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958. He elaborated on the many forces that 
drew the United States into the fray, including the desire to deter Mao Zedong from an 
invasion of Taiwan, and the need to support and simultaneously restrain Chiang Kai-shek, 
who held a US security guarantee. Although it has been well documented, Eisenhower’s 
sense of alliance undertow is somewhat puzzling. Foundational international relations 
theories suggest that in asymmetric commitments like security guarantees, patron states 
should not easily be pulled into conflicts or crises on behalf of their client states. If they are, 
why is this the case? And is this due to the unique features of security guarantee pacts?    
Perhaps the best-known challenge of alliance management is what Glenn Snyder 
termed the “alliance security dilemma”—the perpetual balance that allies must strike 
between entrapment and abandonment.  The first part of this dilemma, entrapment, occurs 
when an ally is dragged into a war over its partner’s interests despite the fact that it does 
not share them or shares them only partially. Lesser forms of entrapment can occur when 
one partner behaves recklessly, or takes an especially firm position towards an adversary 
due to its confidence in alliance support. As I will discuss shortly, there is reason to believe 
that in security guarantees, patrons should run little risk of entrapment. Contrary to this 
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expectation, I argue the opposite: the ambiguous and asymmetric nature of security 
guarantees makes the risk to a patron of entanglement in its client’s conflicts substantial. I 
hypothesize that, despite their superior capabilities and limited intrinsic interests in client 
conflicts, nuclear patrons are compelled to intervene in their clients’ crises, even if those 
crises are not covered by the mutual defense treaty. When a client state becomes party to a 
crisis, the ambiguous and unilateral nature of umbrella alliances begets patron fears of 
entrapment. These, in turn, motivate the patron to intervene demonstrably in the dispute, 
lest it become embroiled in a larger and more costly conflict later on.   
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief discussion of 
nuclear security guarantees, and suggest that their unique features change the way that the 
prominent risk of alliance entrapment may present itself.  I lay out the expectations of 
some leading alliance theories, demonstrating that this seminal scholarship suggests that 
the risk of patron entrapment in client state crises should be low. I argue that, contrary to 
these expectations, the risk of patron entrapment in security guarantee commitments may 
be significant.  I present a hypothesis on entrapment in nuclear security guarantees and lay 
out the observable implications that would substantiate this hypothesis, as well as an 
alternative. I comment on case selection, before turning to some brief summary statistical 
analysis. This analysis demonstrates that when client states become involved in crises, 
nuclear patrons do intervene more forcefully in those disputes than they do in the disputes 
of non-allies, or in the crises of allies who do not hold security guarantees.  
To test whether these intervention patterns occur for the reasons I hypothesize, I 
turn three case studies. First, I examine the US decision to intervene militarily and 
politically on behalf of the Republic of China in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crises. Second, I 
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examine the parallel decision by the Soviet Union to intervene only politically on behalf of 
the People’s Republic of China in the same crisis. Third, I briefly explore the United States’ 
non-intervention in the 1978 Beagle Channel crisis between Argentina and Chile. I find 
support for my hypothesis. 
 
Nuclear Security Guarantees and the Risk of Alliance Entrapment 
In the first chapter of this project, I argued that the ambiguity and unilateral nature 
of security guarantees can be explained by the fact that they signal deterrence by 
punishment in addition to deterrence by denial.374 Given that these alliances are supported 
by incredibly destructive weapons and are long-lasting, grand strategic commitments, 
ambiguous treaty promises allow the patron maximum flexibility. Combined with the 
unilateral nature of these pacts, however, these vague commitments provide allies and 
adversaries with relatively little information about when they should expect the patron to 
intervene, and what form that intervention might take. Nuclear security guarantees are 
alliances that leave something—and in fact, a great deal—to chance. These unique alliance 
attributes, in turn, inform the ways that security guarantees are maintained. This includes 
the way that prominent alliance management challenges may present themselves.  
Leading scholars of alliance relations have argued that the twin dilemmas of 
entrapment and abandonment should be mitigated in post-1945 alliances. In pre-World 
War II alliances, the potential flexibility of alignments meant that allies were at constant 
risk that a partner would defect. This, in turn, made allies more likely to follow each other 
into unwanted conflicts for the sake of preserving these relationships. During the Cold War, 
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however, when only the United States and Soviet Union were leading powers, alliance ties 
were rigid. There was little risk that allies, who were necessarily smaller powers, would 
defect to the other Cold War camp, and the costs of them choosing to do so would have 
been minor.375 Superpowers were therefore unlikely to face serious alliance entrapment 
and be dragged into a war or crisis in which it had little stake.376  Some have argued that 
the risk of superpower entrapment by smaller allies is further mitigated in the post-Cold 
War world. With no great power competitor, the United States has little need to take 
actions to oppose an adversary, and few reasons to defer to weaker parties for the sake of 
consensus building. Since 1991, this argument goes, the leverage that small and medium 
powers possess over their superpower patron may be at an all-time low. 377  
There are a few reasons to believe that super-power patrons have less reason to 
fear entrapment in post-1945 alliances. First, security guarantee patrons extend unilateral 
treaty promises to their patrons, making them less dependent on reciprocal aid for their 
own security, if they are dependent on it at all.378  Second, entrapment risk should be 
greatest where the level of formal alliance commitment itself is high, and mitigated where 
it is less so. 379  When one considers the nature and scope of security guarantees, however, 
it is clear that the formal alliance commitment is not terribly binding.  
Security guarantees detail almost nothing about the exact casus foederis that will 
bring them into force, the adversary they are aimed against, or the form of military aid that 
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will be forthcoming if they are invoked.  Patrons do commit, however, to defend client 
states in case of unprovoked attacks on their home territory.380 While it may be difficult to 
define either an unprovoked attack, or the precise territory that qualifies as an ally’s 
homeland, these two caveats should, in general, substantially ameliorate patron 
entrapment concerns. By restricting the alliance to an unprovoked attack on the client’s 
home territory, the patron mitigates the risk that it will be drawn into a conflict of the 
client’s initiative, or a conflict in an outside area that it deems to be of little strategic 
importance. And by leaving vague its actual military commitment in the case of war, the 
patron creates few concrete expectations even if the treaty promise is invoked. Patrons 
should therefore face little risk of entrapment if the client dispute in question does not 
directly invoke the casus foederis of the treaty, and should retain a fair degree of flexibility 
even if it does. 381  In sum, theory and intuition give us ample reason to believe that post-
1945 security guarantees should have low risks of entrapment for the patrons extending 
them, especially when the dispute in question involves a client interest that is outside of 
promised treaty commitment.  
 
Hypothesis 2: General Deterrence, Immediate Entrapment 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrated that the unilateral and ambiguous nature of 
nuclear security guarantees means that the threat conditions for these alliances’ formation 
are different from those associated with other defense pacts. In this chapter, I hypothesize 
that these same features mean that entrapment risks also present differently in so-called 
umbrella alliances than they do in other defense pacts.  Despite the received wisdom that 
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low levels of patron dependency and vague treaty commitments result in commensurately 
low risk of entanglement, I argue that nuclear security guarantees, in fact, come with a 
substantial risk of entrapment.  
 Security guarantee treaties entail broad patron commitments to aid a client state if 
it is the victim of an unprovoked attack on its homeland. Unlike some other defense pacts, 
however, these pacts do not specify the adversaries they are aimed against, the specific 
contingencies they are designed to deter, or the precise type of defensive aid that will be 
forthcoming. From the patron’s perspective, this ambiguity may be advantageous in a 
general deterrence context, as some uncertainty about its precise commitments may 
dissuade challengers from opportunism and leave superpowers with flexibility. Once a 
client state becomes involved in a crisis, however, this alliance ambiguity may become a 
liability.  Even if a client is involved in only a minor dispute, the risk exists that the skirmish 
will widen. The crisis itself may not obviously qualify as an unprovoked attack on the 
client’s homeland. But because the casus foederis of the security guarantee is not clearly 
defined, the patron may have reason to intervene more energetically in a client state’s 
crisis to signal its alliance commitment than it would be inclined to do in another relatively 
minor skirmish.  It would rather risk relatively low-level entrapment in the short term than 
face deeper, costlier entrapment if the crisis becomes a conflict and the treaty is actually 
invoked. By taking additional risk upon itself, even if its alliance commitment has not yet 
been activated, patrons may restrain clients and deter adversaries from further action, 
diminishing the risk that they will actually be dragged into a full-scale war. Through strong 
public statements or demonstrations of force, a patron may avoid being pulled into conflict 
by altering the local balance of capabilities or interests and bolstering immediate 
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deterrence.382  These same actions may also restrain the client state from further 
escalatory action.  
 Contrary to the expectations of prominent alliance theories, patron entrapment 
risks may be exacerbated precisely because security guarantees are unilateral and 
asymmetric. Although in theory a superpower patron should be able to stand aloof from a 
skirmish if it does not entail an unprovoked attack on its ally’s homeland that jeopardizes 
its sovereignty, a weak client state that has outsourced its security cannot credibly defend 
itself.383 Once a client state is involved in a dispute, the possibility of it being bloodied by a 
challenger and calling for defensive aid from the patron looms large.  Far from minimizing 
patron dependence and commitment, then, I hypothesize that the unilateral and ambiguous 
nature of security guarantees should encourage patrons to intervene in client crises to 
establish immediate deterrence, even if they have little inherent stake in the object under 
dispute. This logic yields my second hypothesis:   
 
H2: Ambiguous, unilateral commitments create incentives for nuclear patrons to intervene 
forcefully in security guarantee client crises to restrain allies and deter adversaries; the same 
entrapment fears will not present in other defense pacts.   
 
 It is, of course, possible that powerful patrons choose to intervene in their weaker 
client’s crises based on shared interests. They are not being entrapped in unwanted conflict 
through ambiguous, unilateral treaty promises and the risk of escalation, but enter allies’ 
disputes because they too have something material at stake.384 This alternative story is 
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consistent with alliance theories that suggest that the risk of patron entrapment in 
ambiguous, unilateral pacts should be low.  
 
H2A1: Patrons intervene in client crises if they share a clear interest in the object over which 
the client is bargaining.  
 
 It is also possible that nuclear patrons intervene in their clients’ disputes not 
because of direct vital interests, but because of domino thinking. Leaders may believe that 
defeat or retreat on one issue is likely to produce further demands or defections 
elsewhere.385 As Timothy Crawford has argued, “alliance commitments do not merely 
“reveal” existing interests, they create new ones, by incurring reputation costs.”386  
According to this logic, truly intrinsic interests may be difficult to discern because the 
world is tightly interconnected. Failing to aid an ally in one dispute may jeopardize all 
allies’ security.  
 
H2A2: Patrons intervene in client crises because they fear that a failure to support them will 
invite challenges elsewhere.  
 
 There are some clear observable implications of each of these hypotheses. If 
Hypothesis 2 is borne out, we should see policymakers intervene primarily because they 
fear that a client disputes will escalate, and they will become entangled in it if they do not 
take action. We should also find some evidence that this fear of entrapment is tied to the 
vague and unilateral nature of the treaty commitment itself. In cases of patron non-
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intervention, we should expect that patrons demur from a dispute because the ambiguity in 
or unilateral nature of the alliance commitment has been mitigated. They are not compelled 
to intervene seriously in the client’s dispute because they have restricted their defensive 
commitments outside of the alliance treaty area or do not fear their weaker client’s defeat. 
This causal logic appears in the schematic below.  




If the first alternative hypothesis is substantiated, in cases of crisis intervention we should 
see decision-makers from the patron state join the dispute because they are compelled by 
the object of the crisis itself. Patrons intervene in client standoffs when there is a harmony 
of interests in the crisis. In cases of non-intervention, patrons make the decision to stand 
aside because their state does not have an obvious stake in the dispute, alliance 
notwithstanding. This logic appears below.  




 If the second alternative hypothesis is substantiated, patron state leaders should 
join client crises because they believe those disputes to be linked to other commitments. 
They should articulate a domino-like logic of intervention, which may act through one of 
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several mechanisms. Leaders may believe that victory in one area may add to an 
adversary’s physical resources or geographic advantage. A domino logic may be less direct 
and more psychological, however, in which case leaders will be concerned about inferences 
that other states will draw from their intervention behavior.387 If this logic is born out, 
leaders will not intervene when they do not believe the client crisis in question to be linked 
to other interests.  
It is worth noting that a domino logic may bear some similarities to the primary 
hypothesis tested in this chapter. In both cases, leaders may argue that earlier intervention 
will be more effective than later resistance.  Where my hypothesis is concerned, however, 
this mechanism occurs within-case: patrons would rather intervene at the crisis stage to 
bolster an ally than face a wider war on behalf of that same client in that same issue area 
later on. Where a domino logic is concerned, this logic is applied across cases and assumes 
the interconnection of alliance commitments.388  Leaders prefer to intervene in a client 
crisis rather than face a challenge at another time or place due to the consequences of prior 
non-intervention.  
Figure 11- Hypothesis 2, Alternative 2 
 
 
If either alternative hypothesis is born out, concerns about entrapment in that 
specific dispute should not feature prominently in decision-making, and conscious efforts 
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to mitigate it should not be observed. If H2A1 is born out, vested interests, rather than 
treaty ambiguity and asymmetric commitments, should compel intervention when it 
occurs. If H2A2 is supported, beliefs in the tight interconnection of commitments, rather 




To test these hypotheses on security guarantees and entrapment, and in an attempt 
to control for a third possible explanation, I select cases in which the crisis in question 
occurs outside of the alliance treaty area. That is, I examine cases in which the object in 
dispute does not entail a direct attack on the client state’s home territory. There are several 
reasons for this choice.  
First, if I were to examine cases in which the alliance treaty’s casus foederis was 
actually invoked, it would be difficult to determine whether patrons chose to intervene 
because of unilateral, ambiguous alliances and concomitant entrapment fears or whether 
they intervened for reasons of alliance credibility and reputation. We know that 
policymakers often worry about the credibility of their international commitments, and 
that alliances may be a signal of reputation.389 If a patron were to intervene in response to 
an unprovoked attack on its client’s homeland, it is not clear that this would actually 
constitute “entrapment” at all. Rather, this would be an instance of the patron making good 
on an alliance promise, which was likely in place because the patron saw some ex ante 
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interest in upholding it.390 If we are to look for evidence of true alliance entrapment, we do 
better to examine cases in which prior, formalized patron interests are not necessarily 
invoked at the outset.  
A second and more pedestrian reason to look at extra-treaty crises is that security 
guarantee client states have rarely, if ever, been victims of major, unprovoked attacks on 
their homelands. This may, of course, be attributable to the selection effects that 
accompany strong deterrent signals like security guarantees, or it simply may be the case 
that potential adversaries have never had interests in the wholesale violation of the 
sovereignty of nuclear client states.391 Regardless, if we were to look for signs of patron 
entrapment in only those cases that clearly met the casus foederis of a security guarantee, 
we would have a paucity of evidence to examine.  
I use both a process-tracing research design and a comparative case design in this 
analysis. I look for evidence of patron entrapment fears that are due to the unilateral and 
ambiguous nature of security guarantee commitments. I also look for a causal connection 
between these fears and patrons’ decisions to intervene in client crises. In an effort to 
undertake a carefully controlled comparison I select two primary cases that involve 
intervention/non-intervention decisions in the same crisis. First, I evaluate the United 
States’ decision to intervene with a substantial military and political commitment on behalf 
of the Republic China in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis.  Second, I evaluate the Soviet 
Union’s decision to intervene with a modest political commitment to the People’s Republic 
of China in the same crisis. This cannot produce a perfectly controlled comparison, but it 
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does minimize the risk that crisis-specific factors, the time period, or the region will 
confound my evaluation. It also holds constant the object at stake—control of the Offshore 
Islands, Quemoy and Matsu.  
 I have also chosen to focus on the Taiwan Straits crisis to gain insight into Soviet 
extended deterrence decision-making. In general, very little information is available on 
how exactly the Soviet Union thought about deterrence and its so-called nuclear umbrella 
commitments, but the Sino-Soviet alliance is one case in which there is a reasonably robust 
source base. Inclusion of this Soviet case will therefore help to establish that my signaling 
theory of security guarantees has application beyond US cases. Put differently, an analysis 
of two different sides of the same crisis provides a more rigorous test of Hypothesis 2. Does 
this hypothesis correctly identify the reasons that Washington intervened forcefully, and 
Moscow intervened more modestly in the Offshore Islands crisis?  
The third case I examine, the 1978 Beagle Channel dispute, does not offer a 
comparison that is nearly as apt as the two Taiwan Straits cases. I include it because it is a 
case of a crisis in a non-security guarantee alliance, and therefore provides some variation 
on the independent variable. This is necessarily an imperfect comparison. Unlike in the 
1958 crisis, the United States had formal alliances with both Argentina and Chile, although 
it did not maintain close ties to either one.  Nonetheless, a brief examination of this case is 
useful to elucidate how patron entrapment incentives may differ when the alliance in 
question does not have the same ambiguities as an umbrella alliance.    
 It is worth noting, however, that this qualitative evaluation of patron crisis behavior 
is plagued by a causal inference problem: the causes of patron intervention in client crises 
may be related to the reasons that these states form security guarantees in the first place. 
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This endogeneity is not confined to my study of security guarantees and patron crisis 
behavior; rather, it is a fundamental liability in any study of alliances. In this chapter I seek 
to examine how a security guarantee commitment may inform patron crisis intervention 
behavior, but it is of course the case that alliances both reflect allies’ underlying interests 
and change them. Acknowledging this endogeneity problem hardly eliminates it, but it 
would also be imprudent to abandon the study of alliances as independent variables simply 
because it exists. 
  In acknowledgement of this problem, I use one minor qualitative “control” in these 
case studies. Accepting that alliance behavior may reflect underlying interests, I explore 
whether patron crisis behavior may be explained by one of the factors that drives security 
guarantee formation in the first place.  In Chapters 2 and 3, I posited that nuclear security 
guarantees formed where prospective client and patron states had exclusively common 
rivals—that is, that the client state did not have adversaries that the patron did not share. I 
found substantial support for this hypothesis using ReLogit models and detailed qualitative 
case studies. As I consider the causes of US intervention and Soviet intervention, then, I will 
not only evaluate the crisis intervention hypotheses presented here, but also consider this 
nuclear security guarantee formation hypothesis, to explore whether there may be a 
selection problem at work. To what extent does the presence of exclusively common rivals 
or unshared adversaries appear to influence the intervention decisions of the patron in 
question? This method cannot eliminate the causal inference problem entirely, but will 
allow me to determine whether or not H1 also seems to have some causal weight where 
patron crisis intervention in concerned.   
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Before undertaking this case study analysis, however, I must establish that there is 
reason to believe that nuclear patrons do, in fact, face some risk of entrapment in their 
clients’ crises. Empirically, does superpower crisis intervention behavior look different for 
client state crises than it does for other crises? To answer this question I turn to a brief 
summary statistical analysis of crisis behavior and alliance data.  
 
Patron Intervention in Absolute Alliances 
 Since the dawn of the nuclear age, both the United States and the Soviet Union have 
intervened hundreds of times in international crises. In some of these cases, the 
superpowers themselves were direct crisis actors.392 In many more, however, the nuclear 
patron states intervened as third parties in other states’ disputes. To establish the premise 
that I explore in the rest of this chapter—namely, that patrons face and react to entrapment 
risks in their security guarantee client states’ crises—I must first explore whether and how 
their crisis intervention on behalf of umbrella allies differs from their intervention in other 
international disputes.  
 Some international relations scholarship has suggested that alliance entrapment in 
conflict may occur rarely, if ever.393 Recent work has found that the United States rarely 
becomes entangled in “military fiascos” on behalf of its allies.394  What little work evaluates 
the empirical record on entrapment tends to focus on the risk of alliance entanglement in 
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393 Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies Vol. 20, No.3 (2011), pp. 
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394 Michael Beckley, “Entangling Alliances?: Assessing the Security Risks of America’s Defense Pacts,” 
September 2014 Working Paper, p. 1.  
172 
full-blown war as opposed to crises.395 To wit, no study has evaluated the relative 
entrapment risks of security guarantees as compared to other alliances. Because nuclear 
security guarantees threaten adversaries with devastating punishment, however, I 
acknowledge and expect that we would find little evidence of patron entrapment in full-
blown war. Such wars are significantly less likely between nuclear-armed powers in the 
nuclear age. Moreover, the hypothesis tested in this chapter posits a reason that we may 
expect to see little overt entrapment in war where security guarantees are concerned. The 
nature of these pacts mean that patrons have incentive to intervene early on behalf of 
clients to bolster their vague, one-sided commitments to prevent escalation.  
 To investigate the relationship between alliance type and patron crisis intervention, 
I draw upon the International Crisis Behavior dataset. The unit of analysis is the 
international crisis actor. For each crisis actor, I examine whether the United States or 
Soviet Union intervened as a third party, and if it did, what form its intervention took. 
Superpower intervention is a categorical variable, ranging from 1-9. A 1 indicates that the 
US/USSR was not involved in the crisis. A 2 indicates that they officially took a non-
interventionist or neutral position. A 3 indicates political involvement, such as public 
statements. A 4 indicates economic involvement, such as the giving or withholding of 
financial aid.  A 5 indicates propaganda involvement. A 6 indicates covert military 
involvement, such as clandestine aid to combatants. A 7 indicates semi-military 
involvement, including direct aid to combatants and military advising. An 8 indicates direct 
                                                           
395 Beckley looks for evidence in of US entrapment in war since 1945 evaluating all US alliances and 
intervention in MIDs. He drops all cases in which the United States does not at least intervene using threats, 
however, so it is not surprising that he finds only modest levels of entrapment evidence. His independent 
variable also does not distinguish security guarantees from other defense pacts. Beckley, pp. 16-21.  
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superpower military intervention. A 9 indicates that the superpower itself was a direct 
crisis actor.396  
 To examine the relationship between superpower crisis intervention and alliance 
commitments, I also include data from the COW 4.1 alliance dataset.  For every crisis actor, 
I code whether or not that state had a formal defense pact with the United States or Soviet 
Union/Russia. Drawing upon my own treaty-based data, I also code whether or not either 
superpower had a security guarantee with the crisis actor in question. This allows me to 
examine the relationship between the type of superpower alliance commitment and their 
level of third-party crisis intervention. This sample is necessarily biased because it relies on 
cases of crisis and excludes cases of non-crisis. It is therefore useful only for describing 
broad patterns of patron intervention across crises, rather than for identifying those 
factors that make crisis entanglement more or less likely.   
 Before proceeding to the data of interest, I consider some general features of 
superpower crisis interventions since 1945. First, most US/USSR interventions did not 
occur on behalf of allies. This is unsurprising and may be due to selection effects. Because 
major powers have made manifest their investments in their client states through formal 
treaty commitments, we should not expect nuclear clients to be the targets of crises very 
often.397 The US and USSR intervened most often in crises in which neither they, nor an ally, 
is directly involved.  
                                                           
396 For the purposes of my analysis of 3rd party crisis interventions, I drop cases with the value of “9” from the 
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 Second, it is important to examine the baseline levels of intervention when the US 
and USSR have intervened in other states’ disputes. In so doing, it is worth emphasizing 
that the levels of superpower intervention are measured as categorical, rather than 
continuous variables. Means and differences in means are meant to give a general intuition 
for levels of superpower crisis involvement, but should not be interpreted as precise 
measures across cases.  
Across 631 crises from 1945-2000 in which it was not a direct actor, the United 
States’ mean level of intervention was 3.96 (close to a 4, signifying economic intervention). 
Its modal, or most frequent levels of involvement, however were 1s (no involvement) and 
3s (political involvement).  The United States had no involvement in 22.49 percent of 
crises, and intervened politically 35.37 percent of the time. During the same period, the 
Soviet Union had a mean level of crisis intervention of 3.14 (close to a 3, signifying political 
involvement). Its modal levels of involvement were also 1s and 3s. The Soviet Union/Russia 
did not intervene in 38.48 percent of crisis, and intervened politically in 33.33 percent of 
crises.  
 
Table 10- US/ USSR Crisis Intervention Levels , 1945-2000  
 
 United States USSR/Russia 
























*means exclude all crises in which the US/USSR was itself the primary crisis actor 
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 Beginning with the United States, I examine mean levels of intervention in third 
party disputes. The US mean for intervention in allies’ disputes in general is 4.32, higher 
than the overall mean of 3.96. The mean level of US intervention for security guarantee 
allies only is higher still, at 4.39. The mean level of US intervention in non-security allies’ 
crises is, predictably, lower at 4.22. From 1945-2000, the United States intervened more 
forcefully in the crises of security guarantee allies than it did in general, and than it did in 
the disputes of non-security guarantee allies. The differences between the mean level of 
intervention for allies, security guarantee allies, and non-security guarantee allies and the 
overall mean level of intervention are statistically significant.  
 The Soviet Union’s mean level of intervention in allies’ disputes is 5.42, which is 
significantly higher than its overall mean of 3.14. Its mean level of intervention in security 
guarantee allies’ is higher still, at 5.8, while its level of intervention in non-security 
guarantee allies’ crises is much lower at 4.0. Like the United States, and even more 
dramatically, the Soviet Union/Russia intervened more energetically in the crises of its 
umbrella allies than it did in general, and than it did in the disputes of non-security 
guarantee allies. The differences between the mean level of intervention for allies, security 
guarantee allies, and non-security guarantee allies and the overall mean level of 
intervention are statistically significant.  
  For the two countries that have actively extended deterrence to allies since the early 
Cold War, a similar pattern emerges. Patrons intervene at higher levels of involvement in 
their security guarantee clients’ crises than they do in other crises. This pattern appears to 
be attributable to the distribution of intervention tools that patrons select. As mentioned, 
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in most crises since 1945, both the USSR and US either did not intervene at all, or 
intervened politically. In the crises of non-allies, the superpowers also occasionally took 
official neutrality positions, or used economic tools, propaganda efforts, and covert military 
action. When allies were involved in crises, however, patron intervention was restricted to 
fewer policy tools: The US/USSR either did not intervene at all (1s), intervened with public, 
political statements (3s), or intervened using semi-military (7s) or military means (8s). 
Economic, propaganda, and covert military tools were not brought to bear on behalf of 
security guarantee allies between 1945 and 2000.  In no allied crisis did either of the 
superpowers ever taken an officially neutral position.  
 Superpower patrons were relatively unlikely to stand completely aloof when their 
allies were in crisis. They also resorted to military or semi-military intervention a much 
higher percentage of the time when allies were crisis actors.  There is, however, an obvious 
distinction between superpower intervention behavior in security guarantee ally crises 
and non-security guarantee ally crises.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
much more likely to use military force in the crises of security guarantee allies than they 
were to use that tool in the crises of other allies, although they relied on semi-military 
means for other allies fairly frequently.  
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 These finding seem to accord with the hypothesis proffered in this chapter: 
Ambiguity may be advantageous in upholding general deterrence, but once a weaker ally is 
involved in crisis and a patron wishes to reinforce immediate deterrence, it is more likely 
to turn to overt signals of commitment. Public statements and military maneuvers are 
better-suited for sending clear signals to allies and adversaries than are economic or covert 
measures, which may not attach directly to the signal-sender, and may take time to become 
effective. This pattern in the selection of intervention signaling tools, in turn, helps to 
explain why, on average, patrons intervene at higher levels in their client states’ crises than 
they do in other crises.  It also suggests that patrons may feel compelled to intervene 
militarily in the crises of security guarantee allies more than they do in the crises of other 
allies.  
 It is worth noting, however, that there may be significant selection bias in these 
patterns. Most obviously, superpower patrons may choose to intervene in their client 
states’ crises for reasons that are related to why they formed their security guarantees in 
the first place. I attempt to deal with this in the case study analysis by examining whether 
determinants of security guarantee formation (namely, exclusive/unshared adversaries) 
also influence patron crisis intervention choices. It should also be acknowledged that these 
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observations are based on relatively few cases. The Soviet Union, for example, was involved 
in only 22 disputes that involved security guarantee allies.  
 This summary statistical analysis has provided support for a premise of this 
chapter: superpower patrons intervene more forcefully in their allies’ crises than they do in 
other states’ crises. Moreover, they are more likely to resort to military force on behalf of 
security guarantee allies than they are on behalf of other allies. To ascertain whether this 
occurs for the reasons I hypothesize—namely, that the ambiguous and unilateral nature of 
security guarantees compels patrons to intervene forcefully at the crises phase, rather than 
face costlier entrapment in a war later on—I turn to three historical case studies of patron 
crisis intervention.  
 
Crisis Intervention in Absolute Alliances: Three Case Studies  
Introduction 
This case study section examines patron intervention decisions in allies’ crises over 
disputed territories. The bulk of this analysis focuses on United States and Soviet Union’s 
decision-making in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis—a dispute in which each had a security 
guarantee ally. I also briefly examine the US role in the 1978 Beagle Channel Crisis 
involving non-security guarantee allies, to determine whether, as I posit, it is the ambiguity 
and unilateral nature of umbrella alliances that inspires patron crisis intervention. The 
three cases examined here provide substantial support for Hypothesis 2, with some 
caveats. Namely, exclusively shared adversaries identified in Hypothesis 1 may also play 
some role in patrons’ crisis intervention decisions.    
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The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis was in many ways a continuation of 1954-55 
skirmishes between the PRC and ROC over Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachen Islands. One 
scholar has argued that the Offshore Islands crises were “really one crisis with intermission 
for buildups.”398 Because I am interested in how security guarantees influence patrons 
crisis intervention decisions, however, I make the 1958 crisis the subject of my inquiry. The 
1954-1955 crisis occurred as the United States was preparing to extend its security 
guarantee to the ROC, so the alliance was not in place for much of the crisis.399 Indeed, 
scholars have argued that Mao initiated the 1954 crisis because he wished to preclude a 
US-ROC alliance, so examining this case in depth may confound my attempts to isolate the 
relationship between umbrella alliances and entrapment incentives. Because of the close 
relationship between the two Offshore Islands crises, however, I will make reference to the 
1954-55 episode throughout the case study.  
I begin my analysis with a brief review of the facts of the 1958 case. I then examine 
the specifics of the United States’ involvement, and look for evidence relevant to 
Hypothesis 2. I detail the nature of US intervention in the crisis. I go on to look for evidence 
that US policymakers feared entrapment in a broader war, and that this motivated their 
decision to intervene. I examine the extent to which the ambiguous and unilateral nature of 
the US-ROC alliance commitment was responsible for these entrapment fears. I also look 
for evidence to support the alternative hypothesis, that the United States intervened on 
behalf of the ROC due to intrinsic interests or domino fears in the Offshore Islands. Finally, 
                                                           
398Waldo Heinrichs, “Eisenhower and the Sino-American Confrontation” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, 
eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 98.  
399 In 1950, the United States had moved the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, signaling its intent to 
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to address potentially-confounding selection effects, I consider how factors influencing 
security guarantee formation might have also influenced the American decision to 
intervene—namely, whether the United States shared Taiwan’s adversaries, and how this 
factored into its crisis intervention behavior.  
I repeat this same process for the Soviet Union’s side of this crisis. I detail the form 
that its intervention took, and look for evidence of entrapment fears, as well as their link to 
the vague and unilateral nature of the USSR-China treaty commitment. I look for evidence 
to support the alternative, interest and domino-based hypotheses and consider the role of 
shared/unshared adversaries in Soviet intervention behavior. Finally, I briefly examine the 
United States’ decision not to intervene in the 1978 Beagle Channel Crisis. I review the facts 
of that case and then evaluate it using the same criteria employed in the Taiwan Straits 
cases. I analyze the case findings, and find good support for Hypothesis 2, and conclude 
with some broader implications.   
 
Dire Straits 
Following the Chinese civil war, Taiwan became the outpost of the nationalist 
Kuomintang party, led by Chiang Kai-shek. As Chiang and his forces fled mainland China for 
Taiwan in 1949, they retained control over Quemoy, Matsu, the Dachens, and several other 
clusters of offshore islands. The communist and nationalist Chinese forces skirmished over 
the islands periodically from 1949 onwards. Washington considered the legal status of 
Taiwan and the Pescadores to be unsettled by virtue of the Chinese civil war. It considered 
the offshore islands, however, many of which were within miles of the mainland cost, to be 
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Communist Chinese territory, despite the fact that Chiang had reinforced them with tens of 
thousands of ROC troops.400  
As the United States prepared to extend a formal security guarantee to Taiwan in 
autumn 1954, the Chinese bombarded Quemoy and Matsu. Mao believed that a US-ROC 
alliance would result in permanent American involvement in the Chinese civil war, and 
hoped to derail the pact.401 The gambit backfired, and the United States pursued the 
alliance despite the shelling, believing it to be an important counterweight to the 1950 
Sino-Soviet guarantee. 402  
Like the US-ROC treaty, the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance provided defensive protection 
to uphold Chinese sovereignty, but was silent on the Offshore Islands. It promised “military 
assistance” in case of “aggression,” but neither of these was defined. This ambiguity was 
compounded by the Sino-Soviet pact’s unusual alliance formation process. The Soviets had 
originally signed an alliance with the Nationalist Chinese government in 1945, and 
switched their allegiance to the Communists through a series of diplomatic notes. These 
resulted in the abrogation of the Soviet-KMT alliance, and creation of a USSR-PRC pact in 
February 1950. Where the Offshore Islands were concerned, however, the Sino-Soviet 
guarantee was at least as opaque as the US-ROC pact. The treaty contained no mention of 
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the islands, and there existed no other public evidence to clarify Moscow’s view of their 
legal status or whether they fell under the purview of the guarantee. 403  
 



















  While the US-ROC guarantee was being negotiated in 1954-55, the shelling of 
Quemoy and Matsu continued for several months, and Beijing forced Chiang to evacuate 
another offshore position in the Dachen Islands. Awaiting treaty ratification, President 
Eisenhower sought and was granted permission by the US Senate to use force to repel an 
invasion of Taiwan via the Formosa Resolution. The Formosa Resolution granted 
Eisenhower permission to commit troops outside the US-ROC treaty area if this was 
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necessary to uphold the treaty commitment to Taiwan.  The first crisis ultimately ended in 
April 1955, when Chou Enlai dramatically announced that Beijing did not want war with 
the United States. Washington seized the opportunity for negotiations, and the US and 
China established ambassadorial talks in Geneva. 405  
Despite the pause in the crisis, Taipei continued to tighten its grip on the offshore 
islands, with some US assistance. Chiang’s troops regularly harassed communist shipping 
from the outpost, and briefly blockaded the Chinese port of Xiamen. 406  Chiang also 
engaged in a substantial troop buildup on Quemoy and Matsu. 407  By 1958, the KMT leader 
had stationed 100,000 troops, nearly one-third of his total ground forces, on the islands.408  
After several years of Geneva negotiations with the United States, Beijing was 
unsatisfied. Washington remained unwilling to recognize it as the legitimate government of 
China, and would not promise to support unification with Taiwan.409 In late 1957, shortly 
after the Soviets began to call for “peaceful coexistence” with the United States, the Chinese 
ended the Geneva talks, and began preparations for renewed military action in the Taiwan 
Straits.410  
 For the entirety of its short nationhood, the PRC had been heavily reliant on Soviet 
military and economic aid. In 1955, however, Mao advised the Chinese military to develop 
its own modern weapons, including nuclear weapons. 411 In a June 21, 1958 meeting with 
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the Central Military Commission, Mao announced his plans for an accelerated, indigenous 
nuclear weapons program.412 This Chinese shift towards self-reliance was part of Mao’s 
“Great Leap Forward”—a radical domestic economic and political agenda designed to 
modernize the PRC. As he began the implementation of this bold new initiative, he also 
planned an attack on Quemoy. 413   
   Evidence suggests that Mao probably did not intend to invade the island in 1958, 
but hoped that renewed bombardment and interdiction of Nationalist ships would result in 
a quick victory in which Chiang withdrew his troops. 414 With the United States bogged 
down in a crisis over Lebanon and Jordan, Mao calculated that the risk of American 
intervention was low, and that Washington would probably pressure Chiang to abandon 
the island. Mao did not, however, consult with his Soviet counterparts on this strategy.415  
Beijing began its attack on Quemoy on August 23, 1958, with 50,000 shells falling in 
the first day of the bombardment alone. In addition to the artillery barrage, Mao also 
instituted a naval blockade to prevent the Nationalists from resupplying.416 As I will discuss 
shortly, both the United States and Soviet Union intervened to varying degrees within the 
first two weeks of the shelling. On September 6, Chou Enlai called for the resumption of 
suspended talks with the United States, which appeared to mark the end of the most 
dangerous phase of the crisis. By late September, the Nationalist position was no longer in 
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imminent danger of collapse, and on October 6, the Chinese Defense Minister called for an 
end to the siege.417  Despite international efforts to the contrary, KMT did not withdraw 
from the islands after the crisis concluded. The PLA continued to bombard Quemoy on odd 
calendar days until the United States ended its security guarantee to Taiwan and 
recognized China in 1979. 418 
The United States in the Taiwan Straits 
In the year prior to the 1958 crisis, the United States had deployed Matador nuclear 
missile to Taiwan, and constructed a runway that could accommodate B-52 bombers.419 
Washington also observed a PLA buildup across from Quemoy during that summer, and 
preemptively increased its naval presence around Taiwan. 420 After the shelling 
commenced on August 23, Eisenhower’s military intervention on behalf of the ROC was 
swift. He upgraded the combat readiness of and reinforced the Seventh Fleet. 421 Within 
days, the United States had assembled six carriers, three cruisers, forty destroyers and a 
submarine division in the Taiwan Straits.422  On August 29th, the US Navy began to convoy 
escort Nationalist ships to help resupply the islands and break Mao’s blockade. 423 
In addition to naval assistance, Washington also provided Chiang with sophisticated 
weaponry. This included F-86 Sabre jets and Sidewinder missiles, to help the Nationalist 
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troops seize and retain air superiority.424 It also included massive amounts of ammunition, 
fuel, and other support equipment.  
On Eisenhower’s orders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared the theater for the use of 
nuclear weapons, but the administration did not inform the public or their ROC allies of 
that order for fear of emboldening Chiang.425  By September, 1958, 200 nuclear-capable 
aircraft were in theater, the US introduced 8-inch nuclear-capable howitzers to Quemoy, 
and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was alerted to be ready to use nuclear weapons if the 
conflict escalated dramatically. Fearing escalation, however, Eisenhower rejected Chiang’s 
requests to degrade Chinese artillery positions through strikes on the mainland.426  
On September 4, the administration made its first public statement of the crisis. In 
his Newport Declaration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invoked the 1955 Formosa 
Resolution and declared that the United States’ would help the ROC protect the islands 
because of their link to the broader defense of Taiwan.427 By the third week of September, 
the blockade was broken and the US-ROC resupply effort was smoothly under way. Shortly 
thereafter, the Americans suggested demilitarization of islands under UN supervision, or a 
World Court decision on the future of the islands. They also began to pressure Chiang 
unilaterally to abandon Quemoy.428 Washington ended the Seventh Fleet’s convoy mission 
on October 8.429  
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 In sum, US military intervention in the crisis consisted of a military buildup in the 
area, a naval convoy to help Nationalist forces break the blockade, substantial arms 
shipments to the ROC, and secret preparation for nuclear use. Publicly, the United States 
suggested it would defend the islands after they had been under attack for two weeks, and 
then walked back that political support once the worst of the crisis appeared to be over.  
 
Entrapped in the Straits 
The American decisions to provide limited naval support, and later, public support 
to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu were linked to clear fears of entrapment. Eisenhower 
was committed to upholding the security guarantee to Taiwan, but was wary of 
entanglement in at least two different forms. First, the United States was committed to 
aiding Taipei so long as Chiang had not initiated or provoked the attack.430 Second, it would 
defend Quemoy and Matsu if their assault was part of a larger offensive by Beijing. This 
first caveat had been relayed to Chiang when the US and Taiwan negotiated their treaty, 
and appeared in the treaty text itself. The second caveat was embodied in the 1955 
Formosa Resolution, and one that Eisenhower repeated throughout the 1958 crisis. But 
how could the president determine whether an attack was truly unprovoked by his ally, 
and whether the crisis was part of a broader attack? 431   
Following the 1954-55 episode, US contingency planning formally provided for a 
first phase of crisis intervention in which Washington would provide logistics and support 
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to the ROC, but would withhold direct military action pending evidence that conflict was 
not provoked by Chiang, and had the potential to be part of a broader assault on Taiwan.432 
This was precisely the plan that was used in August 1958. In addition to this phased 
strategy, Dulles and the National Security Council issued further guidelines to ensure that 
the ROC would not provoke the mainland during the crisis. Eisenhower gave orders that 
any airstrikes on the mainland by US or ROC forces would require his express approval.433 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued strict rules of engagement in an effort to prevent US clashes 
with Chinese military forces and inadvertent escalation.434 US military engagement in the 
Taiwan Straits was prompt but tentative. This intervention directly reflected the fact that 
Eisenhower was committed to defending Taiwan, but reticent about being drawn into 
conflict unnecessarily.435  
Because of these concerns, the President decided that he would provide military 
support to the ROC but would not immediately take a public stand on the crisis. 
“Statements could be dangerous as they tended, sometimes unnecessarily, to limit and 
commit us,” he observed. 436 Eisenhower maintained this opaque position “to keep the 
communists guessing,” and to avoid giving Chiang a blank check.437 Within several days, 
however Washington had determined that the assault had indeed been unprovoked, and 
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Eisenhower decided that Chinese “should not be led to believe that we would not 
intervene.” He therefore opted to clarify the equivocal US commitment.438 This came in the 
form of the Newport Declaration, in which Dulles declared that offshore islands are 
“increasingly related” to the defense of Taiwan, and suggested that the US would consider 
bombing the communist mainland if China attempted to invade Quemoy.439 Both the US 
strategy for military support to Taiwan, and its approach to public statements on the crisis 
were born of a desire to uphold the treaty commitment while minimizing the risk of 
entrapment in a wider war.  
 
Ambiguity in the Unilateral US-ROC Alliance 
Even after he had determined that Chiang was not responsible for provoking the 
crisis, the ambiguous status of Quemoy and Matsu in the US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty 
made it difficult for Eisenhower to draw clear red lines with respect to Beijing in 1958. He 
struggled both to signal and to bound his commitment to Taiwan because of the security 
guarantee. In devising the treaty commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, the Eisenhower 
administration deliberately replicated other defensive commitments but neither included 
nor excluded Quemoy and Matsu from the treaty area. American officials told their ROC 
counterparts in private that they would be willing to defend the Offshore Islands only if 
their attack was part of a larger threat to Taiwan, and that aid would only come following 
joint agreement. 440 Eisenhower later sought the Formosa Resolution so that he would have 
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the authority to defend the islands if a broader Chinese attack appeared to be under way. 
The United States did not, however, specifically name the islands in that congressional 
resolution for fear of creating a hard and fast obligation to defend them in any contingency. 
Their uncertain status in the US-ROC alliance is likely why Mao chose to attack them again 
in 1958.441   
As soon as the 1958 bombardment began, US State Department officials discussed 
whether the islands should be incorporated into the treaty area to clarify the American 
commitment.  They also debated making an immediate, strong public statement in support 
of Taiwan, but ultimately demurred, fearing that a firm commitment to specific islands 
might invite Beijing to target others.442 Eisenhower quickly enacted plans for naval 
assistance, but he and his top advisors could not determine how exactly they would judge if 
Chinese actions suggested an imminent attack on Taiwan that would invoke US treaty 
obligations. 443   
The United States began to strengthen its public commitment to Taiwan and the 
islands after Beijing began radio broadcasts announcing the “imminent invasion of 
Quemoy” and their intent to “liberate Taiwan.”444 Had these threats been carried out, they 
would have more clearly invoked existing US commitments. The September 4 Newport 
declaration was an effort to clarify how the US-ROC alliance applied to the Taiwan Straits.  
In a public statement, Dulles reiterated the US treaty commitment to Taiwan, and the 
President’s authority through the Formosa Resolution to defend Quemoy and Matsu if he 
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believed them to be part of a broader attack. The Secretary of State averred that the United 
States could not, at that time, either confirm or reject the fact that the assault was an effort 
to conquer Taiwan.445 He stated that “securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have 
increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan,” using this to justify US military 
assistance to Chiang, and called upon Beijing not to escalate further.446 The US position 
appeared the strengthen further still, when, following a private meeting with Dulles, a US 
Senator announced that the United States had “definitely” decided to use its own forces to 
prevent an invasion of Quemoy.447 
Once the crisis began to subside, however, Washington stepped back from this 
obligation to the offshore islands. On September 30, Dulles declared in a public statement 
that the United States had no legal commitment to defend Quemoy or Matsu, or to aid the 
Nationalists in returning to the mainland.448  Dulles and Eisenhower then began to 
pressure Chiang to drawn down his troops from the area.  The security guarantee’s 
ambiguity on the offshore islands appears to have sparked serious entrapment fears and 
compelled US intervention when an attack was under way, but allowed for quick 
disassociation once danger had passed. Indeed, one scholar of the crisis has noted that 
Eisenhower and Dulles were careful to avoid declaring any legal commitment to the islands 
throughout the crisis, making the apparent September 30 volte-face quite compatible with 
their prior approach.449 Of this enigmatic alliance approach, Eisenhower later declared: “I 
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wish it were as simple as drawing a line and saying in effect, ‘this far and no further.’ I 
assure you that there are a thousand and one complicated factors that prevented such an 
easy solution.”450 
In addition to the ambiguity surrounding whether the US-ROC security guarantee 
applied to the islands, policymakers intervened because of the unilateral nature of the 
alliance. Throughout the crisis, Eisenhower’s position was informed by the belief that 
without US assistance, Chiang’s troops might not survive the bombardment and blockade. 
In the earlier days of the crisis, the United States believed that the shelling could well be 
part of a broader attack, and that if a wider war did ensue, Washington would have little 
advanced warning.451 As time passed, they determined that a larger attack was less likely, 
but nonetheless agreed that Chiang could not stand his ground on Quemoy without US 
support.452 The day after the bombardment began, US officials agreed that the Quemoy 
garrison would fall quickly if it could not be resupplied.453 On August 26, Chiang told the 
American ambassador that he could not hold his position for more than a few days. 454  US 
military officials at the highest levels assessed that the Chinese could indeed cut off the 
Nationalists’ supplies quickly, and called the siege a “critical situation.” 455 Chiang’s relative 
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weakness meant that if the United States did not intervene, it faced the prospect of a much 
more serious war if Mao took Quemoy and then moved on to Taiwan itself.  
 
Offshore Interests at Stake? 
There is little evidence that Eisenhower intervened in the 1958 crisis because of a 
clear US interest in the islands themselves. Indeed, between 1954 and 1958, top US 
decision makers denied that the offshore islands were of any strategic import. During the 
1955 crisis, some of Eisenhower’s closest advisors, including the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Defense Secretary, and Treasury Secretary, thought that Quemoy 
and Matsu had no value whatsoever. They urged Eisenhower to defend Taiwan and the 
Pescadores and “let the others go.” 456 The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that “the offshore 
islands were not militarily necessary to the defense of Formosa.”457 During the 1958 crisis, 
Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh A. Burke told Eisenhower that the islands “don’t mean 
anything…it’s a purely symbolic thing.”458  During debates over US intervention that 
included the president, one high-level official called the Nationalist commitment to the 
islands “psychopathic.” 459 Another advised Dulles “the Offshore Islands are not intrinsically 
of any real military significance.460 Eisenhower himself was duly skeptical that the islands 
had strategic import.461  
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Influential reporting corroborated this insider opinion. The Washington Post argued 
that US military involvement could lead to “war, probably nuclear, in the wrong place and 
at the wrong time over some wholly insignificant piece of real estate,” calling entanglement 
“tragically unwise.”462 
This wisdom appears to have been reflected in Eisenhower’s position on the islands 
once the worst of the 1958 bombardment had passed. After providing massive US 
assistance to Taiwan to break the blockade, Eisenhower pressed Chiang to permanently 
withdraw his forces from the islands. 463 Dulles told the American press that it would be 
foolish to sustain major military deployments in the Straits if a cease-fire could be 
negotiated.464 The president acknowledged that the islands were symbolically important 
but counseled Chiang that they were militarily useless. He came to believe, however, that as 
long as the KMT did not appear to have been driven from the islands, neither the US nor 
ROC would suffer reputational or material damage from their evacuation.465 Washington 
also pushed for international arbitration on the islands’ status, demonstrating that it placed 
little value on Chiang’s retaining them. 466 
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Domino Decision-making? 
 There is a small amount of evidence that the Eisenhower Administration considered 
a domino logic during the 1958 crisis. On September 4, President Eisenhower wrote to 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that he feared a Nationalist loss of Quemoy would 
result in the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, which could, in turn, jeopardize 
other non-communists governments in East Asia.467  That this logic would be raised at all is 
not terribly surprising—President Eisenhower is believed to have pioneered the metaphor 
of falling dominoes.468 There is also evidence that Chiang Kai-shek attempted to stoke 
Eisenhower’s fears that a Nationalist loss on Quemoy could lead to rapprochement 
between Taiwan and the Mainland.469 Yet an intervention justification based on the 
interdependence of commitments does not pervade the historical evidence from the 1958 
crisis. The policymakers involved appear to have been much more concerned about the 
potential for Chiang to be defeated in that standoff, as opposed to its implications 
elsewhere. The President and Secretary of State were most preoccupied with the idea that 
the fall of Quemoy could lead to the fall of Taiwan and reunification with China.470 
Furthermore, Eisenhower’s subsequent pressure on Chiang to evacuate the islands 
indicates that he did not view them as a crucible for the United States’ broader alliance 
reputation. 
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Shared Adversaries and US Intervention 
 In the 1958 crisis, the United States made plain that it shared Taiwan’s adversaries, 
even if it did not find an intrinsic interest in the dispute. Despite the fact that the White 
House was not actually certain whether Moscow had supported Beijing’s attack, 
Eisenhower publicly stated that the Chinese and the Soviets were likely “working hand in 
hand.”471 He charged the Soviets with initiating the dispute and repeatedly referred to 
“Sino-Soviet armed aggression.”472 The United States mobilized for a full-scale war with 
China, and accused Moscow of “collusion for instigating the troubles.” 473  Even though 
Eisenhower believed that the crisis was likely an isolated incident, he maintained that “the 
US was the prime target in the Cold War.” 474  In a speech on August 19, before the attack 
had occurred, Dulles emphasized the need to maintain “the capacity and the will to retaliate 
against the Soviet Union.” Simultaneously, he reaffirmed all of the United States’ security 
guarantee commitments.475 Despite the fact that relations with Moscow had improved in 
the year prior, Washington publicly took on both China and the Soviet Union in the interest 
of defending Taipei. There was no discernable daylight within the US-ROC alliance on the 
question of shared adversaries.  
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The USSR and the Taiwan Straits Crisis  
Strait Talk from the Soviets 
Soviet intervention in the offshore islands crisis took different forms from that of 
the United States. Moscow provided some public, political support for its ally, but no direct 
military aid. In late July and early August 1958, with Mao’s preparations for the 
bombardment firmly in place, Khrushchev paid a hurried trip to China. 476  Mao did not 
inform the Soviet premiere of his plans to launch the attack, or otherwise consult with him 
on the advisability of renewed rancor in the Straits.477 After the bombardment commenced 
on August 23, Russian officials and the media were completely silent on the crisis for as 
many as five days. 478   
Initial public statements by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders argued that there 
simply was no pressing threat in the Taiwan Straits.479  After several days of bombardment, 
however, they changed their stance. On August 31, an editorial appeared in Pravda, with 
the byline “Observer,” and was presumed to be a government statement. The piece warned 
that anyone who threatened China threatened the Soviet Union, and stated that Moscow 
would give China “the necessary moral and material aid in its just struggle.”480 This was 
widely interpreted as a reaffirmation of the Soviet security guarantee to the Chinese. On 
September 5, following Dulles’ Newport Declaration, another “Observer” article declared 
that the Soviet Union could not “stand idly by” if the crisis escalated “at the frontier or on 
the territory of its great ally.” The article went on to threaten that if the United States 
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attacked the Chinese mainland, Washington “should not calculate that a retaliatory blow 
will be confined to the Taiwan Straits, and no less the offshore islands.” 481 It went on to 
state, however, that the Russians “watch the efforts of the Chinese people and wish them 
success,” implying detached passivity where the Straits were concerned.482  The Soviets 
clearly intended to defend Chinese territorial integrity, but they declined to make a 
commitment to the islands themselves. They also declined to specify what, if any, form 
their alliance aid might take.483  
On September 7, Khrushchev sent a letter to Eisenhower, warning him directly 
against attacking the Chinese mainland. In the letter, he repeated the language of a security 
guarantee: “An attack on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and 
neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will 
do everything in order together with the People’s Republic of China to defend the security 
of both states…”484 This missive still did not clarify, however, whether the Soviets 
considered the offshore islands to be Chinese territory, or otherwise articulate a position 
on their status.  
In a September 18 speech to the UN General Assembly, Gromyko accused the United 
States of provocative actions over the Straits, warned that the Soviet Union would not 
hesitate to come to the aid of China, and declared that the situation could only be stabilized 
by US withdrawal from the area.485 On September 19, as the crisis was subsiding but before 
the blockade had clearly been breached, Khrushchev sent another letter to Eisenhower. 
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The Premiere warned that a world war over China was now possible, and that the Soviets 
intended to honor their alliance commitments. Khrushchev explicitly reminded Eisenhower 
that if the US was considering nuclear use, it should keep in mind that “the other side” 
possessed nuclear weapons as well. If China was the victim of a nuclear attack, the US 
would face a response by the same means.486 The September 19 note was so pugilistic in its 
language that Eisenhower officially rejected its receipt.487 On October 5, just before the 
siege ended, Khrushchev issued a final statement in Pravda, declaring “the Soviet Union 
will come to the aid of the Chinese People’s Republic if it is attacked from without, or, more 
concretely, if the USA attacks the Chinese People’s Republic.” 488  
After complete silence in the early days of the crisis, the Soviet Union made several 
strong public statements reaffirming its alliance commitments to the Chinese, but declined 
to clarify how the offshore islands fit into that commitment. It did not give direct military 
aid. Years later, it was revealed that during the month of September, Khrushchev had twice 
offered to send anti-aircraft squadrons to Fujian province on the Taiwan Straits. 489  He also 
offered up naval vessels equipped with nuclear missiles.490 The condition of both offers was 
that the military hardware remain under Soviet command. Mao twice rejected them 
both.491   
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Entrapment Fears in Moscow 
 The Soviets’ initial silence and subsequent public statements were almost certainly 
tied to a fear that they might become entrapped in a wider war with the United States, yet 
those fears presented differently than those that abounded in Washington.492 The outbreak 
of the 1958 crisis took Moscow by surprise, and its immediate concern was that the 
Chinese had begun the “liberation” of Taiwan.493 The Soviets’ initial silence on the crisis 
signified that, like the Americans, they were trying to determine whether the bombardment 
was the first phase of a broader attack. Moscow was also taken aback by the rapid 
American moves to provide naval assistance, and feared that Eisenhower was preparing for 
a wider conventional and perhaps nuclear war.494  
 Even once they had determined that Beijing did not immediately intend to attack 
Taiwan, Moscow was still sensitive to the potential for entrapment. Gromyko was horrified 
to arrive in Beijing on September 5 to find Mao speaking of a larger war against the United 
States and Taiwan. The Chinese leader appeared to be unconcerned that that this could 
lead to US nuclear use, and he encouraged Moscow to begin thinking seriously about the 
use of nuclear weapons on China’s behalf.495 Letters between the USSR and PRC exchanged 
in 1960 state plainly that, during the crisis, the Russians had feared that their Chinese allies 
would drag them into a wider war that might include nuclear weapons. 496  
 The Soviet dismay at Mao’s calls for nuclear preparations was only compounded by 
the allies’ differing views on escalation and nuclear weapons in general. Mao believed 
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sincerely that local wars could be fought and won for limited, coercive purposes. Mao’s 
insistence that nuclear weapons were “paper tigers” implied that the communist allies 
should take a more assertive policy towards the US and Taiwan. Khrushchev and his 
colleagues, however, were fixated on the fact that the skirmish over the Straits could lead 
to general war and a nuclear exchange. 497 Russian civilian and military leaders scorned 
Mao’s “paper tiger” concept. 498  Coupled with his sanguine stance on escalation in the 
Taiwan Straits, Mao’s nuclear views distressed Moscow, and provoked a profound fear that 
his limited bombardment could invoke their treaty commitment and require nuclear aid. 499  
In contrast to the Americans, who worried about the escalation of the conflict in general, 
the Soviets were primarily concerned that they would be entrapped in a nuclear exchange.                                     
 
Ambiguity, a Unilateral Guarantee, and Soviet Anxiety 
Soviet fears of entrapment do appear to have been linked to the vague nature of the 
Sino-Soviet treaty.  Moscow’s seeming absence in the early days of the crisis is now 
understood to have been a pause to allow the Kremlin to determine what exactly the 
bombardment meant for their alliance obligations. Had the ROC or United States attacked 
the mainland, Moscow would have been compelled to provide defensive aid. But Mao’s 
decision to launch the attack without notifying Khrushchev had actually contravened 
Article IV of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, which called for mutual consultations in areas of peace 
and security. 500 Absent this consultation, or any broader understanding of Mao’s intent, 
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Khrushchev was loath to take up a stake in the conflict whose purposes he did not entirely 
understand.  
Two weeks into the crisis, seemingly-strong official statements began to emanate 
from Moscow. In reality, however, Khrushchev’s letters and public remarks were no less 
ambiguous than the Sino-Soviet agreement itself. By reiterating Moscow’s defensive 
commitment to Beijing, they aimed to dissuade Washington from sanctioning or executing 
an attack against the mainland, but they did not suggest direct Soviet support in the Straits.  
Puzzled by this uncertainty in the Sino-Soviet alliance, Eisenhower recalled wondering: 
“Was Khrushchev trying to hold Mao back, as some believed, or was he urging him on?”501 
Khrushchev’s decision not to clarify his treaty commitments was quite purposeful: he 
hoped to avoid issuing a blank check to Beijing or an excessively binding ultimatum to 
Washington. 502 Moscow’s vague treaty commitments to Beijing created some incentive to 
intervene, lest Washington take escalatory actions that could invite a wider war.  
Unlike in the US-Taiwan relationship however, the Soviets did not feel compelled to 
enter the crisis because of their one-sided commitment and their ally’s relative weakness. 
Indeed, Mao increasingly rejected alliance aid from the Soviet Union. From 1950-1958, the 
PRC was highly reliant on the USSR for economic and military assistance. As early as 1955, 
however, Mao had begun to push the Chinese military to develop its own modern weapons 
and doctrine. 503 The summer of 1958 marked the first phase of Mao’s “Great Leap 
Forward”—a country-wide effort to increase Chinese industrial and military power relative 
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to the Soviet Union as well as to the west. Scholars have argued that the 1958 
bombardment may have been an effort to drum up domestic support for this new, 
revolutionary agenda. 504 The year before the crisis, Mao had warned Khrushchev against 
interfering in Chinese foreign policy without an explicit request from Beijing.505 In 1958, 
Mao likely asked of Khrushchev “only very general statements” “designed to suggest Soviet 
defensive support,” but not implying a deeper Soviet involvement in the crisis. 506   
Indeed, some of Moscow’s public statements, while supportive of China, also spoke 
of Beijing’s independence. In the September 5 Pravda article, “Observer” averred “the 
Chinese People’s Republic has sufficient strength to counter the aggressors fully,” implying 
that Soviet aid was not essential.507 In his September 7 letter to Eisenhower, Khrushchev 
stated that if a major war was forced on China, “we have not the least doubt that the Chinese 
people will strike back at the aggressor in a fitting manner.” In his September 19 letter, he 
warned that if American troops and vessels were not withdrawn from the area, “People’s 
China will have no other recourse but to expel the hostile armed forces from its own 
territory.”508 In each of these instances, Khrushchev threatened Chinese, rather than Soviet 
action.  
Beijing’s independence was also reflected in Chinese statements to their Soviet 
allies. On September 5, after the United States had issued the Newport Declaration, Chou 
Enlai told the Soviet Charge D’Affaires in Beijing: “if we get in trouble, China will assume all 
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consequences and will not drag the Soviet Union into the water.” 509 And when Gromyko 
expressed serious trepidation over being pulled into a nuclear conflict, he was assured that 
China would “make national sacrifices in case of war… and the Soviet Union would not have 
to participate.” 510  
The Chinese insistence on independence was not just represented in word, but in 
deed. In the early summer of 1958, Beijing had rejected a proposal for the development of a 
joint Sino-Soviet naval fleet, and refused to allow Moscow construct military radio 
transmitters on Chinese soil, calling both proposals an infringement on their 
sovereignty.511 During the crisis, the Chinese ambassador in Moscow warned Beijing that 
the Soviets might use the skirmish to increase their military presence in the area. Mao 
consequently rejected two offers by Khrushchev to station Soviet interceptor squadrons 
near the Taiwan Straits because those forces were to remain under Moscow’s command. He 
offered Khrushchev a counterproposal to deploy them under PLA auspices, which 
Khrushchev rebuffed. 512 Mao later told the Soviets that the “offer had offended them.”513 In 
contrast to the US-Taiwan alliance, in which the former felt entangled in the crisis by virtue 
of the latter’s weakness, Moscow was concerned about entrapment, but its intercession 
was circumscribed by Beijing’s vociferous insistence on independence. 
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Soviet Offshore Interests 
 As in the US case, there is little evidence that Moscow believed the Offshore Islands 
to be of any real strategic import. The Soviets consistently supported the Chinese position 
on Taiwan and condemned outside interference when it came to the issue of 
reunification.514  Long after the Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev maintained that he had 
backed Mao’s attack on Quemoy and Matsu, and offered more support than the Chinese 
were willing to accept.515 In 1955, however, the Soviets reportedly told their Chinese allies 
that they considered the offshore islands to be a local problem, and one that was 
inconsistent with their broader strategic aim of reducing Cold War tensions.516   
 Khrushchev did not reveal Moscow’s fundamental lack of interest in Quemoy and 
Matsu while the crisis was at its height. But as it wound down, he laid bare the true Soviet 
position. In response to a question from a reporter, the Soviet Premier reaffirmed the Sino-
Soviet alliance. But he added:  
“Does this contain the slightest hint that the USSR is, as President Eisenhower would 
have it, ready to take part in a civil war in China? No, we have stated and do state 
something quite different: The USSR will come to the help of the CPR if the latter is 
attacked from without; speaking more concretely, if the United States attacks the 
CPR.”  
 
Khrushchev added: “we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war 
which the Chinese people are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique.” 517 Moscow had 
presumably seen fit to keep ambiguous its position on the islands during the worst of the 
                                                           
514 Peter Ivanov, “U.S. China Policy in the Eisenhower Era: A Soviet View,” in Cohen and Iriye, eds. p. 218.  
515 Sergei Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964 (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), pp. 441-445. 
516 Chang, p. 137.  
517 Zagoria, p. 216.  
206 
crisis. His October 5 statement made clear that the Soviets saw no intrinsic interests in the 
islands themselves, and had no intention of intervening unless the United States attacked 
mainland China.  
 
Sino-Soviet Dominoes? 
 There is no evidence that Soviet intervention in the 1958 crisis was motivated by a 
domino logic. In his memoirs, Khrushchev offered up a defensive justification for Moscow’s 
backing of Beijing—Chiang’s outposts had to be eliminated lest he use them to retake the 
mainland—but the Premiere made no effort to connect this crisis to other Soviet 
commitments.518  
  
“Peaceful Coexistence” and Shared Adversaries 
The fact that Moscow saw Taiwan as an internal Chinese matter also had 
implications for how the Soviets thought about Beijing’s adversaries. Khrushchev had spent 
the first few years of his tenure attempting to defuse tensions with the West. He had 
announced his “peaceful coexistence” strategy, and in summer 1958 was seeking a wide-
ranging arms control agreement with the United States.519  Months earlier, Mao had 
repudiated “peaceful coexistence,” and increasingly feared that accommodation between 
the US and USSR would allow the world to coalesce behind a “two Chinas” solution, in 
which Washington bartered recognition of Communist China for Soviet recognition of 
Taiwan. 520 Mao had explicitly pressed Khrushchev to give Soviet support to the Chinese 
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“liberation” of Taiwan, and hoped that the United States could eventually be forced to 
withdraw from Asia altogether.521 Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” program was also instituted 
without any consultation with the Soviets.522 Scholars have suggested that Mao may have, 
in part, initiated the second Taiwan Straits crisis to sabotage the embryonic détente 
between Moscow and Washington.523 Unlike Eisenhower, who did not demur from 
coupling Beijing with Moscow for the purposes of backing Taipei in crisis, the Soviet Union 
was not eager to face down Washington as an adversary in the Offshore Islands dispute, 
and completely derail efforts at reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing took very different 
views on how to engage this adversary.  
Moscow verbally supported Chinese claims but hesitated to jeopardize its 
geostrategic interests on behalf of Mao’s gambit.524 Khrushchev’s deep hesitation to risk a 
nuclear confrontation with Washington helped to convince Beijing that it could not rely 
upon Soviet aid in a crisis, which in turn helped to speed along the Chinese nuclear 
program.525 Not eager to become entangled in a third Taiwan Straits crisis, Khrushchev 
suggested to Mao in 1959 that he halt further attempts to recover Taiwan by force. 526 The 
same year, the Soviet Union withdrew prominent advisors from China, including several 
who were crucial to Beijing’s nuclear endeavors. Chinese officials reported that they had 
the “ominous premonition” that Moscow was preparing to “tear up unilaterally all Sino-
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Soviet accords.” 527 Their fundamentally different views on both Taiwan and the United 
States were clearly catalysts in the Sino-Soviet split.  
 
The Beagle Channel Crisis: A Dog that did not Bark 
In late 1978, Argentina and Chile found themselves at the brink of war over the 
Beagle Channel and three uninhabited islands that sit in it. The Beagle Channel dispute 
dated back to the colonial period. When Spain divided the Southern cone of South America 
into two states, it traced a line from north to south along the highest peaks of the Andes. 
Everything to the east of the line was apportioned to Argentina, and everything to the west 
was given to Chile. In 1881, the two countries concluded a boundary treaty to clarify 
ambiguous parts of the border, but that failed to settle their disagreements over the Beagle 
Channel.528  
The Beagle Channel is 125 miles long, and links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 
separating Tierra del Fuego from small islands to the south. Under the terms of the 1881 
treaty, all territory to the south of the channel belonged to Chile. These terms were 
unambiguous, but the two countries did not agree on the channel’s position, and therefore 
disagreed on what was south and what territory belonged to Chile. At issue were three 
islands, Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, known as the PLN group. The islands themselves 
totaled only 40 square miles, but their possession established an additional 30,000 square 
maritime miles, rich in fish, and possibly in oil and minerals. These waters also allowed 
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access to Antarctica, which both countries were eager to exploit.529 In 1902, the British 
government was given arbitration power over the ongoing dispute over the 1881 treaty. 530 
The exact position of the channel and the easternmost boundaries of Chilean sovereignty 
were not settled before the Second World War.  
 
Figure 13- The Beagle Channel and PLN Islands, as decided in 1977531 
 
 
In 1958, tensions between Argentina and Chile flared over the southern Snipe Isle, 
and negotiations over the border resumed.  In 1967, Chile notified Argentina of its intent to 
submit the dispute to the UK government for arbitration.532 Under its military government, 
however, Argentina had become increasingly assertive in its claims to the 
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Falklands/Malvinas Islands, and declared that the British government was not an impartial 
mediator. 
 




The case was therefore brought before a panel of five international judges with the 
British government having the power to accept or reject their ruling.534 Argentina expected 
that, at worst, it would be awarded one of the three disputed islands. Instead, in May 1977 
the panel found that Argentina could keep its one existing Beagle Channel naval base, but 
awarded all three islands to Chile.535  
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The Argentine government was shocked, and feared that the ruling would allow 
Chile to claim significant parts of the Atlantic, undermining its longstanding “bioceanic 
principal,” whereby Argentina was an Atlantic state and Chile a Pacific one. Buenos Aires 
immediately descried the ruling, its Foreign Minister Oscar Montes declaring “[n]o 
commitment obliges a country to comply with that which affects its vital interests or that 
which damages its rights of sovereignty.”536 Buenos Aires proposed joint governance of the 
Channel, which Chile predictably rejected, and Argentine ships and aircraft began to violate 
Chilean waters and airspace regularly.537 In January 1978, Montes announced “the decision 
and Her Britannic Majesty’s Award…are null and void,” arguing that the court had 
misinterpreted the Argentine case and misconstrued historical facts.538 
Further attempts at bilateral negotiations were fruitless, and Argentina began to 
stockpile sophisticated weaponry, purchasing 26 Dagger fighters from Israel and 17 tanks 
from Austria.539 In June the Argentine army and air force began regular exercises near the 
Beagle Channel. During the summer, rumors began to circulate that Buenos Aires was 
contemplating occupation of the islands. In September, several cities in Argentina 
conducted air raids and blackout drills. Reports abounded that schools were being 
prepared to house troops, rail yards were being readied for military transport and red 
crosses were being painted on hospitals. The standoff became a full-blown crisis on 
October 12, when Argentina called up 50,000 reservists.540   
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In mid-October Chile also began to reinforce its military units, and minor clashes 
were reported near the Chilean border. Both countries began mobilization. Chile canceled 
long-planned exercises with Peru and the United States for fear that Argentina would take 
the opportunity to seize the islands, and both countries sent their armies to the border and 
navies southward.541  
On November 10, with the crisis peaking, the United States called on the 
Organization of American States to mediate. The OAS is the treaty organization associated 
with the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Pact. The United 
States, several Caribbean countries, and most of Latin America, including Argentina and 
Chile, are parties to this defense pact. As will be discussed shortly, however, the Rio Pact is 
not a US security guarantee to Latin America.  
In December, with little progress from the OAS, Chilean officials received word that 
Argentina had signed a secret pact with Peru for the simultaneous invasion of Chile, and 
speculated that Bolivia might be tempted to join the fray as well. In Argentina, rumors 
spread that Brazil would join the Chilean side.542  In a December 14 meeting, Argentine 
President Videla informed a Chilean emissary that he had given orders to invade the 
islands, and that the invasion would take place on December 21 or 22. Videla explained that 
Argentina’s military junta would remove him from power if he did not carry out the attack-
- “invasion was inevitable.”543 Chile put 45,000 troops on full alert on December 16, 
                                                           
541 Princen, p. 138.  
542 Washington Post, November 3, 1978; Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 1978, p. 15, as quoted in 
Princen.  
543 Princen, p. 143. 
213 
prompting Argentina to appeal to the UN Security Council, the OAS, and the Vatican to 
intervene. Chile pressed for prompt OAS intervention as well. 
In Buenos Aires, December 22 was chosen as the date for the Beagle Channel 
invasion, and armed forces in both countries stood at full alert. When the date arrived, the 
operation was postponed for 24 hours due to inclement weather. In the early hours of 
December 23, however, Pope John Paul II notified both countries that he would dispatch 
personal emissaries to both capitals. Military action on both sides of the border ground to a 
halt. Argentina suspended maneuvers, reopened its borders, and quickly withdrew its fleet 
from the Southern cone. On January 8, 1979, under the Pope’s supervision, Argentina and 
Chile signed the Act of Montevideo, committing them to avoid hostilities and settle the 
Beagle Channel dispute through mediation.544 The Vatican-mediated treaty ending the 
Beagle Channel standoff was signed in 1985.  
 
The US and the Beagle Channel 
As the Beagle Channel crisis reached a fever pitch in November, Washington turned 
to the Organization of American States, encouraging it to help defuse tensions. On 
December 15, President Jimmy Carter publicly called upon both Argentina and Chile to 
cease belligerent acts and resolve the dispute peacefully.  Despite pleas from Santiago that 
it take a more active role in the crisis, however, Washington did not.545    
 After both Chile and Argentina expressed a willingness to consider Vatican 
mediation, the United States acted as a conduit for information from the region to the Holy 
See. By the third week of December, American intelligence suggested that an Argentinean 
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invasion of the islands loomed. The Pope, however, was incredulous that one Catholic 
country would invade another during the Christmas season. Washington assured the 
Vatican that an invasion did appear to be imminent, but made no moves towards direct 
action despite the coming conflict. Indeed, had the Pope not reached out to both crisis 
actors on the morning of December 23, it is almost certain that war would have begun that 
day, without any direct US intervention. In sum, the United States’ involvement in the 
Beagle Channel dispute consisted of entreaties to the OAS and to the Pope to mediate and 
some selective intelligence sharing. There was, however, no sign that the Americans felt 
that their treaty obligations gave them a stake in the crisis, and no consideration 
whatsoever of direct political or military action.546  
 
Entrapment Fears 
 There is no historical evidence to suggest that the Beagle Channel crisis provoked 
fears of entrapment in the United States.  
 
Ambiguity in a Non-Security Guarantee 
 The status of the Beagle Channel and PLN islands was no clearer to the United States 
than it was to Argentina or Chile. One obvious reason that the United States was not 
compelled to intervene more energetically in the crisis, however, is that its defensive treaty 
commitment to Argentina and Chile was in no way ambiguous when it came to its 
obligation to use force. This is because the Rio Pact, the United States’ defense agreement 
with much of Latin America and the Caribbean, is not a formal security guarantee.  
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The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was Washington’s first 
postwar multilateral arrangement, predating NATO. The pact is an extension of a 1945 
agreement, the Act of Chapultepec, which served as a loose collective security arrangement 
at the end of the Second World War.547 Concluded on March 6, 1945, the Act of Chapultepec 
aimed to secure the treaty area from pernicious outside influences, and in particular was 
intended to prevent collaboration with the Nazis. Washington worried that Argentina, 
which had not yet declared war on the Axis, might allow the Germans base access.  For the 
United States, Chapultepec was essentially a negative security assurance, and a 
formalization of the Monroe Doctrine. The Rio Pact was simply a post-war extension of 
Chapultepec. 548 That the Rio Pact functions as a negative assurance to the region is 
confirmed by the ways in which it has been invoked since 1947. Perhaps the best-known 
instance was as justification for the United States’ naval quarantine during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.549  
 In addition to its status as a negative assurance from the United States, the Rio Pact 
and its attendant treaty organization, the Organization of American States, have a goal of 
promoting regional peace. Unlike NATO or the Warsaw Pact, the OAS is chartered through 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations, and relies on Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter, 
whereas most formal security guarantees rely solely on Article 51. This makes OAS a 
regional organization qualified to adjudicate disputes among members in the name of 
inter-American security.   The Rio Pact is therefore different from most other US alliances 
in two ways: First, the US commitment to the arrangement comes in the form of a negative 
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security assurance intended to minimize external influence in the Americas; second, the 
organization itself has a regional conflict mediation function.  
Beyond these two overarching aims that distinguish the Rio Pact, there are some 
additional features that make it distinct from true extended deterrence arrangements. 
First, while any Rio Pact member state retains the right to use military force to assist 
another member under the UN charter, collective military action is not easily invoked in the 
Rio Pact/OAS. The Organ of Consultation, OAS’s central coordinating body, can recommend 
military action in case of armed attack against one or more member states, but action 
requires a 2/3 vote from member states.550 Second, the treaty stipulates that no state can 
be required to use armed force without its consent.551  If one or more member states 
becomes involved in war, then, the Rio Pact structure makes it highly unlikely that other 
members will vote to use force collectively, and even if they do, no state is obligated to give 
military aid. Under the Rio Pact, there is no contingency in which the United States is 
obligated to use force on behalf of another member. When Washington called for OAS 
mediation during the Beagle Channel crisis, it therefore did so with the knowledge that this 
intervention would not result in any military obligation to it. The features that distinguish 
the Rio Pact from a formal security guarantee mean that in the Beagle Channel Crisis, the 
United States had no impetus to intervene forcefully in the dispute to minimize more 
serious entrapment later if war broke out, as appeared likely in December 1978.    
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Intrinsic Interests 
 The United States had no obvious intrinsic interests at stake in the Beagle Channel 
dispute.  
 
Interdependent Commitments  
  
There is no evidence that US leaders considered the effect that their intervention or 
non-intervention in the Beagle Channel would have on other alliance commitments.   
 
Shared Adversaries 
 The United States had defensive security arrangements, if not true security 
guarantees, with both Chile and Argentina. There was no treaty-based reason why 
Washington should have supported one state as opposed to the other in 1978. Before the 
Beagle Channel dispute was fully resolved in 1984-85, however, the United States might 
have had reason to favor Chile’s claims over Argentina’s. During the 1982 Falklands War, 
the United States remained officially neutral, but in fact supported the United Kingdom in 
its claims against Argentina. Washington provided London with extensive intelligence 
assistance and feared that the Soviets would intervene on behalf of Buenos Aires.552 Chile 
also supported the United Kingdom’s claims to the Falklands/Malvinas, and the dispute 
between the UK and Argentina over the islands was already ongoing at the time of the 
Beagle Channel crisis. Based on these alignments, one could argue that the United States 
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shared with Chile a rival in Argentina. Nonetheless, it did not have a history of outright 
animosity with either country, and did not support either side.  
 
Analysis: Alliance and Crisis Intervention 
Taiwan Straits and Beagle Channel cases provide substantial support for Hypothesis 
2. In 1958, the United States intervened in the Taiwan Straits with naval aid, weapons 
shipments, and later, public statements, and this intervention was linked to a clear fear of 
entrapment in a broader war on Taiwan’s behalf. These entrapment fears were, in turn, 
connected to the fact that the US-ROC security guarantee was opaque in its commitment to 
the offshore islands, and the fact that the Eisenhower administration had not done much to 
clarify that ambiguity since 1955. Indeed, it had declined to clarify this commitment for the 
purposes of restraining Chiang and minimizing its own entrapment risk. Once the crisis 
was under way, however, the US clarified its commitment in the form of the Newport 
Declaration. Taiwan’s relative weakness was also a key factor prompting swift US 
intervention. The unilateral nature of the alliance meant that if Washington did not enter 
the fray, the Nationalist position on Quemoy might not hold, inviting a broader attack on 
Taiwan in which the US would have had to provide defensive assistance.  
The US case demonstrates little support for the alternative hypothesis, that 
Washington intervened based on intrinsic interests in the dispute. To the contrary, 
Eisenhower and his key advisors understood Quemoy and Matsu to have little strategic 
value, and their pressure on Chiang to abandon the islands once the crisis subsided laid this 
bare. And with regards to Hypothesis 1, US policymakers clearly saw themselves as sharing 
Taiwan’s adversaries in both China and the Soviet Union during the crisis. Exclusively 
219 
shared rivals, which are one important factor in security guarantee formation, may have 
added to, or at least did not detract from the United States’ decision to intervene.  
One scholar of the Taiwan Straits Crisis has called Soviet policy a “mirror image” to 
that of the United States.553 While the two nuclear patrons clearly took different 
approaches to their protégés, the logic of Soviet intervention also provides support for 
Hypothesis 2. First, the Soviet Union intervened only modestly in the crisis with public 
statements beginning in early September. Since 1958, Chinese analysts have often argued 
that this timing evinced a weakness of commitment on the part of their patron, because 
China had already signaled a willingness to return to negotiations on September 6.554  This 
intervention pattern, however, may also be explained by clear Soviet entrapment fears, 
which peaked when Gromyko visited Beijing on September 5. After standing aloof from the 
crisis for nearly two weeks, the Foreign Minister was shocked to hear Mao talking of 
expanding the war against the United States, and suggesting that the Soviet Union make 
nuclear preparations. The Soviets may have decided to take a more muscular public stance 
not because the worst of the crisis had passed, as some Chinese allege, but because Beijing 
appeared to take such a sanguine view on the potential for escalation to catastrophic levels. 
Soviet fears, however, appear to have been linked to the prospect of entrapment at the 
highest levels of escalation—a nuclear war. Unlike their American counterparts, they did 
not appear to be preoccupied with the day-to-day conventional conflict in the Straits.   
 These nuclear entrapment fears were, in turn, clearly linked to the nature of the 
Sino-Soviet treaty commitment. All of Moscow’s statements, whether public or in the form 
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of correspondence, reiterated the Soviets’ defensive commitment to China, and clearly 
aimed to dissuade a US attack on the mainland, but were silent on the question of the 
offshore islands themselves. This left Eisenhower and his advisors guessing about whether 
Beijing had Moscow’s backing in the assault, or whether Khrushchev was trying to restrain 
Mao.  
Soviet entrapment concerns were, however, circumscribed by the fact that Mao used 
the 1958 crisis to change the asymmetry in the USSR-PRC security relationship. In addition 
to pursuing independent economic and military policies, he had expressly decreed that the 
Soviet Union could not intervene in Chinese foreign policy without permission, and had 
rejected several forms of Soviet military support shortly before the crisis. Not only did he 
not consult with Khrushchev before launching the attack, but Chinese officials assured the 
Soviets on multiple occasions that they would bear the burdens of a major war if one 
occurred. Moreover, they actually rejected two offers of direct Soviet military assistance. 
Soviet intervention in the 1958 crisis was therefore relatively minimal because the Chinese 
expressly promised to bear the brunt of a wider conventional war, and Moscow’s attempts 
at more comprehensive military assistance were spurned. As in the US-ROC case, the treaty 
commitment was ambiguous on the status of Quemoy and Matsu, but Mao was insistent 
that he would not accept asymmetric alliance aid. Soviet leaders clearly did not, however, 
see any intrinsic interest in the offshore islands, but this was not articulated to China or the 
United States until the crisis had passed.  
The Soviet intervention decision was also informed by the factors identified in 
Hypothesis 1.  Firmly committed to achieving some form of détente with the United States, 
Khrushchev was not eager to see his “Peaceful Coexistence” campaign sunk by Mao’s 
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Offshore Islands bombardment, and did not want to take on the United States as an 
adversary. In addition to Mao’s own resistance to the Soviet unilateral provision of aid, 
Moscow and Beijing increasingly did not share adversaries, and this, in turn affected 
Moscow’s decision making in 1958.  
The United States’ non-intervention in the Beagle Channel dispute also provides 
support for Hypothesis 2. Although it cannot be proven that its inaction was solely 
attributable to the fact that the Rio Pact was not a security guarantee, the United States 
evinced no concern whatsoever that it would be drawn into conflict in Latin America as the 
crisis approached war. The fact that Washington did not have an open-ended, positive 
defense commitment to either country surely played a role in its ability to stand aloof. That 
it also did not have a true adversary in conflict may also have contributed to US non-
intervention.  
In all three cases examined, then, whether or not the patron state shared the client’s 
adversaries may have shaped the patron’s intervention incentives.  Patron crisis behavior 
cannot be considered independently of the causes of security guarantee formation. We 
cannot conclude that security guarantee ambiguity and asymmetry are the sole causes of 
patron crisis intervention. Nonetheless, these cases have demonstrated that these factors 
did play a central role in explaining the origins of patron entrapment fears and great 
powers’ involvement in disputes.  
Indeed, ambiguous treaty commitments were a primary consideration for both Cold 
War superpowers in 1958. Each struggled to bound and signal its alliance commitment to 
contested territory. In both cases, this stemmed from a desire to restrain the client state 
and deter the challenger, reducing the risk of entanglement. For both the United States and 
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the Soviet Union, the ambiguous commitments that were best-suited to upholding general 
deterrence were not forceful enough once Beijing challenged Taipei’s control of the 
Offshore Islands. Interestingly, as soon as the 1958 crisis began to subside, both 
Washington and Moscow backed away from commitments to the islands, stating clearly 
that neither had a legal obligation to defend them.  For either superpower, however, this 
position would have been anathema during the crisis, when fears of escalation loomed 
large and more muscular intervention seemed necessary to support immediate deterrence.  
Interestingly, when the Beijing once again built up forces opposite Quemoy in June 1962, 
President John F. Kennedy, once a vocal critique of Eisenhower’s Straits policy, invoked the 
Formosa Resolution to suggest the possibility of US intervention.555  There is little evidence 
to be found that patron intervention patterns can be explained by intrinsic interests or 
domino logics, however.  
Beyond the hypothesis examined here, the Taiwan Straits cases also shed light on 
the role that power asymmetries may play in security guarantees and crisis involvement. 
The Soviet entrapment fears were linked to the possibility of nuclear war, whereas the 
United States’ concerns also included any escalation of the conventional conflict. This was 
because Moscow had expressly been told by Beijing that it would absorb the costs of 
conflict, and its efforts to provide conventional military aid had been rejected. Mao’s efforts 
to shift the Sino-Soviet alliance from a traditional, asymmetric guarantee to something 
more closely resembling a relationship of equals meant that he would not accept direct 
conventional military aid from Moscow. Mao desired a great degree of conventional 
independence, but still hoped for a nuclear guarantee from his patron. The Soviet risk of 
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entanglement was therefore lower than the United States’ with respect to Taiwan, and their 
overt intervention concomitantly measured.  
Mao’s rejection of alliance asymmetry, and the more limited Soviet intervention in 
the Taiwan Straits in turn had far-reaching effects on the security pact. Because of their 
hesitation to promise nuclear aid, Mao felt he could no longer be confident in the Soviet 
nuclear umbrella, and sped along China’s domestic nuclear weapons pursuits.556 Beijing’s 
exhortations to the Soviets to commit to a nuclear war over Quemoy were an important 
driver in Moscow’s 1959 decision to rescind a promise to give the Chinese a model A-
bomb.557 The Sino-Soviet split was not completely assured by the 1958 crisis, but the 
ambiguity of the Soviet commitment, and Mao’s determination to recalibrate their 
unilateral relationship certainly helped to precipitate the alliance’s unraveling.  
The Sino-Soviet case also highlights a counterintuitive point about the role of power 
asymmetries in alliance bargaining and entrapment. Prevailing alliance theories suggest 
that great powers should run little risk of entanglement in the crises of much weaker 
clients, but that more symmetric allies will face stronger entrapment incentives. The 
Taiwan Straits crisis demonstrated the opposite: The United States felt obligated to defend 
Chiang militarily because the possibility of his defeat loomed large; the Soviets made only 
broad public statements because their Chinese ally would not accept much more. With a 
more equal power relationship came less risk of immediate entrapment, but also far less 
control over allied crisis actions.  
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Influential alliance theory has suggested that large powers extending unilateral and 
vague promises defensive aid to smaller ones should face little risk of entanglement in 
unwanted conflicts. My theory of security guarantees, however, points in a different 
direction: the ambiguous and unilateral nature of nuclear umbrella pacts creates a 
substantial risk of patron entrapment in client state crises. When security guarantee 
arrangements are more circumscribed, however, so too is a patron’s intervention impetus. 
In a non-security guarantee the patron’s intervention impetus may be all but obviated. 
These cases have provided strong support for my hypothesis.  
These findings have some important implications. If security guarantee patrons 
seeks to reduce the risk of crisis entrapment they may attempt to temper the degree to 
which their security guarantee is ambiguous, or the degree to which it is unilateral. In the 
case of the former, this means constructing an alliance or revising an existing pact to 
specify the conditions under which client states can expect aid, and specifying only those 
conditions in which the patron sees a vested national interest. The obvious consequence of 
this, however, may be that it allows adversaries to use so-called “salami tactics” to harass 
the client in ways that do not activate the patron’s commitment.  If this is unacceptable to 
the allies, an alternative is for patron and client to reduce among themselves ambiguities 
over the conditions under which the patron will intervene. This may be accomplished by 
developing within an alliance specific guidelines for patron and clients’ expectations in 
crisis. If allies have specific plans for how to deal with the failure of general deterrence, 
patron intervention at high levels may be less necessary.  
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The second way patrons may mitigate their risk of crisis entrapment is by ensuring 
that their alliances are not completely unilateral. This means allowing and perhaps even 
encouraging the development of client state military capabilities that allow them to 
credibly defend themselves in more ancillary skirmishes and at lower levels of escalation. If 
the client state is not at risk of being pummeled and becoming the victim of a more serious 
attack, the patron’s impetus to intervene at the crisis stage should be substantially less. 
This, however, creates the risk that the client state will use its capabilities independently 
and in ways that are inimical to the patron’s interest. It may not only be able to defend itself 
from minor attack, but behave more aggressively than it otherwise might have, a classic 
moral hazard problem.  
It is worth recalling, however, that while the vague and unilateral nature of security 
guarantees may increase the risk that patrons become entangled in crises, these same 
qualities may deter numerous crises and wars from breaking out at all, and lower-level 
crises from escalating. Indeed, nuclear patrons grant security guarantees for precisely this 
purpose, and as this chapter has demonstrated, lower-level intervention may prevent 
higher-level entrapment later on.  Because we cannot observe those cases in which security 
guarantees have successfully deterred challenges, it is difficult to know how the costs of 
potential lower-level entrapment stack up against the deterrence benefits of these 
uncommon alliances. The absence of cases of full-blown attacks on client states’ territorial 
integrity and sovereignty suggests that these patron intervention costs may be worth 
paying.  
 Any strategy for mitigating the risk of patron crisis entrapment also raises an 
additional conundrum: How can the patron reduce its own exposure to unwanted conflict 
226 
without provoking acute abandonment anxiety in its client? This is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5-ABANDONMENT IN ABSOLUTE ALLIANCES:  
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND DETERRENCE CONSULTATION 
 
 “NATO is an alliance, not a psychiatrist’s couch!” 
Secretary Of State Dean Acheson558 
 
“Skilled practice in the art of consultation is important to a big power. It helps to take the 
sting out of its bigness.” 




The history of alliance management in NATO can be told as a series of debates 
among the allies about the requirements of extended deterrence. These anxieties are by no 
means confined to the North Atlantic Alliance. For as long as they have existed, nuclear 
client states have worried that their patrons will not follow through on their vaguely-
defined alliance promises. Beyond worrying that their patrons may stand aloof in the case 
of war, nuclear client states have persistently despaired that their patrons’ security 
guarantees are insufficient to prevent war from breaking out in the first place. Allies’ 
concern that partners will fail to make good on their alliance promises—their fear of 
abandonment—is the second half of the alliance security dilemma. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
project, I demonstrated that the unilateral and ambiguous nature of nuclear security 
guarantees means that the threat conditions of their formation are different from those 
associated with other defense pacts. In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that these same features 
had implications for the way that entrapment risks presented themselves in so-called 
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umbrella alliances. In this chapter, I argue that another consequence of the unilateral and 
ambiguous nature of security guarantees is that fears of abandonment also manifest 
differently in these alliances. I hypothesize, however, that because of the significant 
information deficits that plague security guarantees, these client abandonment fears may 
be managed by patron and client using some counterintuitive means.  
Allies are generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they formally abrogate the 
alliance treaty, fail to support the ally when the agreement’s casus foederis arises, or 
decline to back a partner in a dispute with an adversary.560 A central challenge of any 
alliance is managing partners’ fears that these events will occur, and the intensity of a given 
ally’s abandonment fears has two components.  The first is the subjective probability that 
its partner will defect. The second is the cost incurred by the client if it does.561  The most 
common way a state can respond to its partner’s abandonment fears is by increasing its 
alliance commitment to bolster perceptions of loyalty. This may increase the fearful ally’s 
expected benefit from the alliance, and reduce its temptation to defect. Increased support, 
however, also increases the risk that one will be entrapped by the anxious partner later.562  
As I will discuss shortly, the ambiguous and unilateral nature of nuclear guarantees 
gives client states significant reasons to fear abandonment by a patron. But these same 
alliance features mean that nuclear patrons have some unique tools at their disposal for 
combatting these anxieties. Prominent alliance theories suggest that allies’ abandonment 
fears can be addressed when one partner increases its commitment to the other. I argue, 
however, that in some cases, security guarantees’ anomalous features mean that patrons 
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may attempt to address client abandonment fears without actually augmenting alliance aid. 
Instead, because of the information deficits that plague these pacts, patrons can mitigate 
their client’s fears by revealing information about policies and strategies that are already in 
place using deterrence consultation mechanisms. 
This chapter investigates the relationship between client fears of abandonment and 
deterrence-related institutions, and aims to explain why deterrence consultation 
mechanisms form, treating them as a dependent variable.  I begin this chapter with a 
theoretical discussion of abandonment in nuclear security guarantees. I present one 
hypothesis on why patrons agree to nuclear consultation arrangements with their clients, 
as well as an alternative hypothesis and discuss case selection. I then move on to test this 
hypothesis on two primary case studies: the formation of United States’ nuclear 
consultation arrangements in NATO, and in the US-Japan alliance. I also briefly examine the 
role of consultation in the US-Thailand alliance, to explore whether deterrence 
consultations are used to combat client abandonment fears in a non-security guarantee 
defense pact.  I analyze the evidence from all three cases, finding strong support for my 
hypothesis and conclude. 
Abandonment in Absolute Alliances 
Nuclear security guarantee clients may experience peacetime fears of abandonment 
that are unique in both degree and kind. As is the case in many defense pacts, nuclear client 
states may fear that their patrons will fail to intervene militarily on their behalf if they are 
victims of attack. This abandonment fear may be unusually severe in nuclear umbrella 
alliances, however: If a patron were to use nuclear weapons on behalf of a client state 
against a similarly-capable adversary, it would invite devastating retaliation on its own 
230 
homeland. This means that such a pledge is of dubious credibility, with credibility defined 
as incentive-compatibility.563  
Beyond this, nuclear clients may experience persistent abandonment anxieties that 
are different in kind from those experienced by other allies. This is because the primary 
goal of a security guarantee is deterrence and the prospect of war is devastating: Client 
states accept unilateral patron pledges because they hope never to be attacked at all. Unlike 
other pacts, in which allies expect defensive aid if the treaty’s casus foederis is met, client 
states hope for more than patron support in wartime. They must believe that, through the 
security guarantee, their patron is taking all necessary steps to prevent them from being 
the victim of aggression in the first place.   
Because extended deterrence commitments are both ambiguous and unilateral, 
however, clients have neither a good a priori reason to believe that their deterrence needs 
will be met, nor the ability to meet them themselves if they are not. Clients do not possess 
the primary instruments of existential deterrence—nuclear weapons— and do not hold 
specific commitments from the patron that explain the conditions under which they will 
intervene. Nuclear security guarantee clients should therefore be especially hard to assure.   
The costs to a patron of failing to assuage client states’ abandonment fears may also 
be different from those that allies face in other types of defense pacts.  Alliance patrons 
generally worry that their partners may defect and seek out other partners. Security 
guarantee patrons, however, must also worry that their clients will acquire the strategies 
and capabilities necessary to defend themselves, be those in the form of conventional 
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military power or independent nuclear weapons capabilities. If this occurs, it may result in 
significantly curtailed patron influence over the client, diminishing the patron’s power 
projection capabilities. Although a nuclear patron is not itself particularly dependent on its 
client for security support, its interests as a major power may nonetheless be seriously 
damaged by a client’s anxiety-induced defection.  The nature of extended deterrence 
relationships leaves client states persistently anxious about the patron’s intentions to 
defend them. Patrons, in turn, must be reasonably attentive to their client’s abandonment 
fears to keep these potentially precarious relationships intact.  
In a security guarantees, however, allies also have significant common interests--
namely, the client state’s enduring political sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
patron-client relationship may seem to be represented as an assurance game, also known 
as a Stag Hunt. In an assurance game, players with overlapping interests may reach two 
different equilibria. The first results from mutual defection—the condition that would 
obtain if client fears of patron abandonment caused it to seek alternative alliances or 
guarantee its own security, impoverishing patron influence.  The second is a Pareto-
superior outcome that may be reached through mutual alliance cooperation and a 
continued guarantee.564  
Figure 15-Assurance Game (Stag Hunt) 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate [4,4]* [1,3] 
Defect [3,1] [2,2]* 
                                                           




Prominent institutional theories have argued that where Stag Hunt-like conditions 
prevail, allies form institutions to achieve a mutually best outcome.565 We know that 
security guarantees contain broad, vague, long-lasting commitments that aim first and 
foremost to prevent conflict, but give little indication that they will actually do so. Alliance 
institutions may improve coordination and lower transaction costs. Defense institutions 
may also make security guarantees more credible in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike 
if they result in patron commitments that otherwise would have been absent, such as the 
forward deployment of trip-wire troops.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Deterrence Consultation in Security Guarantees 
 Contrary to expectations that assurance can be achieved using institutions for 
mutual policy adjustment, I posit that because of the unilateral and ambiguous nature of 
security guarantees, deterrence-related consultations need not actually induce real 
cooperation between the allies. Rather, because client states have so little a priori 
information about how their patrons are providing for their security, deterrence 
institutions can address abandonment fears by giving patrons a vehicle through which to 
unilaterally communicate existing strategies and policies. I hypothesize that nuclear 
patrons form deterrence consultation mechanisms to assuage client abandonment fears 
through unidirectional information, and with the aim of keeping the guarantee unilateral 
and ambiguous. 
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H3: Patrons form nuclear consultation mechanisms to increase unilateral information 
sharing.   
 
The most obvious alternative explanation is that patrons respond to client 
abandonment fears in line with existing theories.  Namely, patrons may use institutions to 
increase their commitment to the alliance by increasing burden sharing and lowering 
transaction costs, thereby changing the unilateral and ambiguous nature of the 
guarantee.566 By engaging in security cooperation, defined as mutual policy adjustment, 
patron and client can make more binding commitments to one another and policy 
coordination may allow alliance partners to capture greater gains than would have been 
possible if the patron alone provided the guarantee.567 Deterrence institutions may form 
when client abandonment fears give allies a common interest in developing cooperative 
strategies to cope with threats.568 Patrons may be interested in forming nuclear 
consultation mechanisms because they lower the transaction costs entailed in confronting 
a common adversary, allowing allies to develop economies of scale in their coordinated 
strategies and policies.569  If patron states make their commitments more binding, this may, 
in turn, also make the guarantee more credible in the eyes of allies and adversaries.570    
 
H3A: Patrons form nuclear consultation mechanisms to increase alliance cooperation.  
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The primary and alternative hypothesis each beget some observable implications. 
H3 and H3A provide different explanations for what patrons hope to achieve with the 
establishment of deterrence-related institutions. If H3 is born out, evidence should reveal 
that patrons begin nuclear consultation to assuage client abandonment fears by providing 
those states with information about the policies and strategies they are already pursuing, 
but with no intention of making those any less unilateral. If H3A is born out, on the other 
hand, patrons should begin deterrence consultation because they hope to increase allied 
cooperation to facilitate burden sharing and economies of scale.  More cooperation may be 
desirable because it makes a vague, one-sided alliance “stickier.” Cooperation may entail 
greater contributions by the client state to the alliance, or may entail some policy or 
strategy adjustment by the patron to meet perceived client needs.  
Figure 16- Hypothesis 3 
 
 




 Because I hope to locate in the historical record the origins of deterrence 
consultation mechanisms, I rely on qualitative case studies and use process tracing and the 
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comparative method.  I select two security guarantees in which nuclear consultation 
mechanisms have formed. The first is NATO in the 1960s, and the second is the US-Japan 
alliance in 2010. Examining the motivations at work in both the NATO and Japan cases 
allows me to make broader generalizations about deterrence consultation than would be 
possible if only one case was analyzed. If patrons form nuclear consultations for similar 
reasons despite the regional, temporal, and structural differences in these alliances, this 
allows for stronger inferences.  I also include a short case study on the US-Thailand 
alliance—an alliance that was formerly a security guarantee, and was transformed into a 
non-security guarantee defense pact. Including the US-Thailand case provides variation on 
the dependent variable and allows me to make inferences about whether or not 
consultation mechanisms are, indeed, a product of the ambiguous and unilateral nature of 
security guarantees as posited here, as opposed to being attributable to factors that are 
prevalent in other types of defense pacts.   
 Within the US-NATO and US-Japan case studies, I begin by presenting a simple 
summary of the facts leading up to patron decision to form a nuclear consultation 
mechanism with its client(s), and describe how the deterrence institution functioned once 
it was formed. I assess the degree to which the United States was motivated by a desire to 
provide allies with information unilaterally, and whether or not the deterrence institution 
remained a unilateral one once it was in place (H3). I also evaluate whether nuclear 
consultations were formed to encourage alliance cooperation and mutual policy 
adjustment (H3A). I briefly examine the US-Thailand case, to contrast these security 
guarantee dynamics with a non-security guarantee defense pact. I analyze the evidence 
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from all three cases, finding strong support for H3 and less for the alternative, and 
conclude.  
 
Nuclear Planning in NATO 
From NATO’s inception, European client states have had limited information about 
the form and function of the United States’ nuclear umbrella in peace and wartime, and 
how it related to its broader alliance strategy. This was due in no small part to the 1946 
Atomic Energy Act, also known as the McMahon Act, which prevented the United States 
from sharing with other countries information relating to nuclear weapons and their 
development. 571 The prohibition included a ban on discussions of how nuclear weapons 
might be used militarily, including with allies.  This legislation was accompanied by a 
general policy of “nuclear exclusion”—the strong desire to restrict any discussion of 
nuclear strategy or technology out of a desire to keep other powers, including allies, from 
developing nuclear weapons.572  
Although it had extended its umbrella to the alliance since its inception, in 1954 the 
United States first deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of its guarantee to 
NATO. The alliance would no longer rely solely on the promise of nuclear aid from US 
bombers, and NATO countries could host nuclear weapons. This led to the policy of 
“nuclear sharing” in NATO, whereby some host countries owned the delivery vehicles while 
the United States owned and retained control over the NATO-dedicated warheads. These 
nuclear arrangements were governed through secret bilateral agreements between the 
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United States and the hosting ally.573  “Shared” weapons only constituted a small fraction of 
US nuclear weapons in Europe. Host countries could theoretically veto a US decision to use 
a delivery vehicle based on their soil, but they had no say over US nuclear use decisions 
more broadly.  
The deployment of nonstrategic (so-called tactical) US weapons for battlefield 
purposes changed the strategic posture of NATO.574 It also raised for the allies a set of 
questions that would be debated throughout the Cold War: How and under what conditions 
might nonstrategic weapons be used in Europe, and what was their relationship to the 
United States’ strategic arsenal? The United States retained full custody and decision-
making power over its NATO-dedicated weapons, but possibility of a limited nuclear war in 
Europe, or a war in which US-based nuclear weapons did not immediately become 
involved, made European allies hungry for more information about theater nuclear 
operations and strategy.   
Following the NATO nuclear deployments, the United States amended the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1954 to allow the Department of Defense to discus with NATO allies some 
nuclear information necessary develop of war plans, test capabilities, and train 
personnel.575 These weapons were part of the “Overall Strategic Concept for the NATO 
Area,” known as MC 14/2, the implementation of Massive Retaliation in Europe. The 
introduction of these weapons and the secretive nature of the bilateral hosting agreements 
underscored to the allies the fact that central components of NATO’s defense strategy lay 
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outside of any existing institutional framework that would allow them to understand their 
role.576  
 NATO clients’ lack of nuclear-related information was exacerbated by prevailing 
strategies and policies in the 1950s. Eisenhower’s Massive Relation strategy threatened an 
overwhelming US nuclear response to aggression against its allies, but NATO partners 
began to question its credibility in the face of growing Soviet capabilities, particularly 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).577  Allies’ anxiety increased after 1961, when the 
Kennedy Administration sought to revise Massive Relation in favor of a strategy of Flexible 
Response, which put greater emphasis on the role of conventional forces. The Kennedy 
revisions were an effort to address Massive Retaliation’s “suicide or surrender” dilemma, 
but European allies feared that the increased emphasis on conventional responses was a US 
attempt to spare the homeland from nuclear war.578 NATO allies were disturbed by the 
implication that conventional war was somehow preferable or more limited, and 
discussions of “thresholds” below which nuclear weapons would not be used seemed to 
ease the Soviet risk calculus in their eyes.579   
European allies began to search for ways that they might exert some influence over 
the form and function of the US security guarantee, but consultation was not the immediate 
answer. The North Atlantic Treaty’s only explicit commitment to consult came in the form 
of Article IV, which states: “The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of 
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any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the 
parties as threatened.”580 NATO’s nuclear dilemmas did not constitute direct threats to the 
sovereignty or security of any state.  Instead, allies first looked to assuage abandonment 
anxieties through physical proximity to the nuclear capability that backstopped their 
security, in the form of nuclear sharing.  
 Between 1959 and 1965, the United States entertained and rejected at least five 
proposals that would have provided NATO clients with some physical, multilateral control 
over NATO-dedicated nuclear weapons. Two proposals originated with Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR) Lauris Norstad and conceived of ground-based stockpiles of 
medium-range weapons. These would have allowed for allied control over delivery 
vehicles, while nuclear warheads remained in US custody.581 Two other proposals 
envisioned sea-based nuclear assets that would have been jointly operated by the US and 
its allies.582 This included the proposal by Secretary of State Christian Herter, based on a 
report written by Robert Bowie, which is the most often-referenced Multilateral Force 
(MLF) scheme.  Finally, the British also circulated a proposal for a sea-based Atlantic 
Nuclear Force (ANF).583  
 All five MLF proposals were responses to allies’ doubts about the credibility of US 
guarantees and their desire for greater influence in policy concerning nuclear weapons. In 
none of the proposals, however, did the United States envision delegating to allies the 
decision to use nuclear weapons; the US President would have had the sole authority to 
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order their release. The Kennedy Administration was skeptical of all nuclear sharing 
proposals, however, because it averred that a credible nuclear threat required an increase, 
not a decrease, in centralized control, and believed that the suggestion of allied veto power 
would erode the guarantee.584 It continued to publicly entertain the proposals until 1965, 
however, with the hope of convincing the French to eschew their nascent nuclear arsenal 
and assuaging West Germany’s desire for some access to the nuclear option.  The 
possibility of these allies moving towards nuclear self-reliance was of paramount 
concern.585  
 As early as 1962, however, the Kennedy Administration began to advocate for 
nuclear consultations with NATO allies.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pursued 
this approach in 1961 and 1962 through NATO briefings to allies. These covered relative 
US and Soviet force levels and US strategic concepts and contained more information on 
nuclear matters than the allies had ever received before. In his 1962 speech at NATO’s 
ministerial meetings in Athens, McNamara called for the establishment of a NATO Nuclear 
Committee.586 NATO allies were enthusiastic, but the momentum behind McNamara’s initial 
efforts dissipated because there was no standing channel through which to regularly 
communicate sensitive information.587  
 By 1965, it was clear that none of the MLF proposals would be feasible or desirable, 
and McNamara revived his consultation initiative with a proposal for a NATO “Select 
Committee” of several allied defense ministers.  The McNamara Committee, as it came to be 
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known, would look for ways to augment the role of allies in planning for the possible use of 
nuclear weapons.588  The McNamara consultation proposal was not advertised as a direct 
substitute for the nearly moribund MLF due to continued German interest in the latter, 
although it was widely understood to be one.  
  In November 1965, a nuclear working group was established and tasked with 
examining the nuclear resources at the alliances’ disposal, the circumstances under which 
these might be used, and with organizing future discussions.589 The first meeting of the 
working group took place in February 1966, was chaired by McNamara, and included 
defense ministers from Britain, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (France was preparing to 
withdraw from the NATO military structure). The group was given a detailed briefing on 
the difficulties involved in American nuclear planning. McNamara stressed the size and 
expense of the US nuclear infrastructure, and his discussion of Russian nuclear forces was 
so revealing that it disturbed the US intelligence community.590 The group met three more 
times in 1966 and focused mostly on NATO’s tactical nuclear capabilities and the potential 
circumstances under which they might be used.591 The nuclear working group also 
recommended the establishment of a seven-member Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which 
would be its successor organization. The NPG was where all nuclear consultation 
discussions would take place, and its membership was capped at seven defense ministers 
to reflect the American desire for intimacy surrounding nuclear information.592 
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At the first meeting of the NPG on April 6, 1967, McNamara led discussions on 
strategic nuclear forces, ballistic missile defense, and possibilities for US-Soviet arms 
control. Other defense ministers led discussions on nuclear technologies that their country 
had an interest in exploring.593 During its first few years, the NPG focused almost entirely on 
the role of theater nuclear weapons in the newly adopted Flexible Response strategy, as MC 
14/3 had been instituted the previous year. The group debated the objectives and 
consequences of tactical nuclear weapons use in Europe, and explored what, if any, veto 
power a NATO ally might have in a decision to use these weapons.594 McNamara also began 
to invite individual countries to prepare short papers on separate aspects of the theater 
nuclear weapons problem. A 1968 paper jointly prepared by the NPG focused on the role of 
TNWs in signaling and escalation. 595 In 1969, the NPG approved a document entitled 
“Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons 
by NATO,” which suggested how allies might be consulted on nuclear use in crisis.596 These 
documents served to generate some allied consensus on thorny issues, although they did 
not tend to reach particularly firm conclusions.597 The final Political Guidelines, for example, 
recommended “appropriate use,” “low yields,” and “low collateral damage,” with the 
political wartime goal of restoring the status quo ante (already NATO’s strategic end).598  
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 In addition to creating institutions for nuclear consultation, the United States also 
implemented arrangements for some allied access to the NATO nuclear planning process. 
At Supreme Allied Headquarters, Europe (SHAPE), SACEUR oversaw plans for the use of 
NATO-dedicated nuclear weapons. Although SACEUR is always an American, SHAPE’s 
nuclear planning staff included other NATO allies. SHAPE nuclear planning is functionally 
separate from the NPG but taken together they constituted the political and operational 
avenues through which NATO allies gained proximity to US nuclear policy and strategy.599 
These secured for them a more substantial role in nuclear-related discussions that they 
could have hoped to obtain through participation in a small, joint nuclear force.600  
NATO allies warmly received the new NPG. Defense ministers found McNamara’s 
early “seminars” to be a great improvement over the “kindergarten” briefings they usually 
received on NATO nuclear policy and strategy.601 One original NPG participant remarked 
that this was the first time that the United States had “take its allies fully into its 
confidence.”602 Another told McNamara “there had been more progress in NATO nuclear 
matters in the past 12 months than in the preceding 17 years.”603  The British Prime 
Minister praised the NPG for its role in promoting alliance unity on controversial nuclear 
questions.604  
As time went on the NPG was used to discuss a number of politically sensitive 
nuclear weapons issues. American officials used the NPG to marshal support for the 
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Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly from the Germans. They also used the body to 
prepare allies for the advent of US-Russia bilateral arms control. Through the NPG, 
American officials briefed NATO allies on technological developments in the nuclear field, 
including the neutron bomb and long-range theater nuclear forces.605 They also used it is as 
a forum for discussing and garnering support for broader strategy and policy, such as the 
implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and American strategy in Vietnam.606  
 In 1977, another nuclear-related NATO body was formed. The High Level Group 
(HLG) was originally a task force concerned with theater nuclear weapons, but it became 
the working body for NATO nuclear issues, and continues to report to the NPG at annual 
meetings.607 The HLG is comprised of senior subject matter experts from NATO capitals. Its 
Assistant Secretary-level officials meet several times per year to discuss nuclear strategy, 
policy, force structure, and safety. Since 1979, the NPG has been open to all NATO members 
who wish to attend (with the exception of France), including those countries that do not 
host nuclear weapon or delivery vehicles.608 The HLG works at NATO headquarters with a 
staff that interacts regularly, and it delivers its reports to the NPG. An American always 
chairs the HLG and its reports are delivered by US officials or occasionally by SHAPE 
representatives.609  
 Particularly during and since the end of the Cold War, the NPG and HLG have been 
used as fora for issues beyond the conditions and consequences of tactical nuclear weapons 
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use in Europe. As the United States prepared for the 1991 unilateral drawdown of nuclear 
weapons known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, it used HLG meetings to determine 
that vast reductions in Europe would not cause the alliance excessive anxiety.610  This and 
other drawdowns took the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe from approximately 
8,000 for most of the Cold War to the 200 that remain in 2014.611  The NPG and HLG have 
been used to brief European allies about the content of the United States’ three Nuclear 
Posture Reviews, before changes in doctrine or force structure are actually announced.612  
The NPG and HLG were also used to reach the decision, announced in 1999, that 
NATO would no longer maintain formal war plans for the use of nuclear weapons against 
any particular adversary. Since that date, SHAPE planners use an “Adaptive Planning” 
method in which they draw up nuclear war plans for particular contingencies and discard 
them at the end of each workday. SHAPE planning relies on maps labeled with fictitious 
country names, so as to avoid formal nuclear planning against Russia.613   
The NPG and HLG continue to review and discuss the strategy and policy governing 
the remaining 200 US warheads, despite the markedly changed strategic environment. 
Countries that have joined NATO since the end of the Cold War may participate in NPG 
briefings but are prohibited from hosting nuclear weapons.614 In debates over whether to 
withdraw the remaining B-61 warheads from NATO countries, several allies have 
expressed opposition on the basis of the institutional, rather than the military effects of 
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such a decision. If Europe was guaranteed by the United States’ strategic arsenal and no 
NATO-dedicated tactical weapons remained, there would be no reason for the NPG and 
HLG to persist as alliance institutions.615 Nuclear consultation, devised to make acceptable 
to allies US nuclear force structure and strategy, may now be at least as important to allied 
assurance as the weapons themselves.  
 
Patron Motivation in Deterrence Consultation 
Despite legal and normative prohibitions on sharing nuclear-related information 
with allies, the United States encouraged the development of nuclear consultation and 
planning institutions in NATO to combat European allies’ abandonment fears. The issue of 
NATO nuclear control became salient because of the forward deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe, the emergence of a Soviet ICBM capability, and, most importantly, 
Flexible Response—a strategy that aimed to keep US guarantees credible, but engendered 
acute abandonment fears in NATO. Once France had left the NATO military structure in 
1966, the United States was most concerned that West Germany would follow, pursuing its 
own nuclear weapons and military self-reliance.616  
 In a sharp departure from controversial MLF proposals, Robert McNamara 
maintained that allies’ abandonment fears could be assuaged without any changes in 
physical nuclear custody. If allies could see nuclear policy and strategy as Washington did, 
top officials argued, they could be brought around to supporting Flexible Response. This 
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would require that the veil of nuclear secrecy be lifted somewhat, and that allies be given 
more detailed information about weapons technical characteristics, deployments, and 
operations.617 In his Athens speech, McNamara proposed a nuclear consultation committee  
so that allies might be better informed about the location of nuclear weapons in Europe 
and the rationale behind American strategic policies.  
 Once the Nuclear Working Group was formed, American officials agreed that  
A standing consultation committee would “meet [ ] the needs of our allies,” and “end 
discussion” of the MLF for the anxious Germans and do much to assuage other allies’ 
abandonment fears.618  Because NATO nuclear discussions were no longer taboo, allies 
related “newly and fruitfully to one another,” on major issues of strategy and “a great deal 
of fresh air” circulated in the alliance.619  As they prepared to establish the NPG, US 
policymakers knew that they would be restricted in what they were authorized to discuss 
with allies -- the scope of consultations would be circumscribed to NATO nuclear 
operations only.  In the first-ever NPG meeting McNamara set precedent by beginning with 
a briefing on American strategic policy, and all subsequent NPG and HLG meetings followed 
this model. In short, US officials believed that European abandonment fears would be 
mollified by sharing information on US nuclear strategy and policy, although they did not 
intend to allow consultation to meaningfully change either one of these.  
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Once these institutions were in place, US officials continued to maintain that the 
primary purposes of the NPG and HLG were to encourage allies to develop a “common 
view” of the strategic landscape facing NATO. NPG Meetings were aimed at encouraging 
allies to draw conclusions about the optimal mix of nuclear and conventional forces in 
Europe, with the basic assumption that client states would arrive at the same outcomes 
that Washington had already ascertained.620   
  Harlan Cleveland, former US Ambassador to NATO, observed that the primary 
purpose of deterrence consultation was to allow smaller, weaker allies proximity and some 
participation in those decisions that determined their fates. “The problem for smaller 
nations is to be taken seriously on big questions,” he observed. “For, to maintain 
themselves as primary objects of their citizens loyalties, the politicians who govern each 
nation must seem to have free and easy access to the places where ‘destiny decisions’ are 
made.”621 Cleveland elaborated: “We Americans need [consultation] to keep our ‘destiny 
decisions’ more or less in line with our friends’ notion of what their destinies should be.”622 
The purpose, however, was “to discuss together before acting separately.” Nuclear 
consultation was not to be considered a constraint on US action.623  
 McNamara likewise believed that nuclear consultation was a “learning process” 
intended to exhibit to allies the nature of nuclear threats and the means that might be used 
to engage them.624 As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted, “the NPG was of value to us 
in exposing non-nuclear members of NATO to the realities and complexities of nuclear 
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issues and nuclear strategy.”625 Indeed, in developing and implementing his nuclear 
consultation vision, McNamara highlighted the contribution of the NPG to planning as 
opposed to decision-making, because he did not want to suggest that the alliance might 
move towards multilateral nuclear control in crisis or war. Other US officials who have 
worked closely with NATO nuclear bodies aver that the purpose of nuclear consultation is 
to give allies “a full understanding of the capabilities, the weapons systems, and the 
nuances and intricacies of the planning process, and a fair and clear understanding of the 
threat, so that if things went wrong, there was a context into which to place all of this.”626 
Beyond this shared strategic foundation, however, the US was also clearly interested 
in building support for specific American policies. At the NPG’s inception, the cause in 
question was Flexible Response, but as already noted it served as the vehicle for allied 
acceptance of all manner of strategic changes, which were almost always unilateral US 
decisions.627 By keeping allies informed of nuclear-related changes before they occur, 
Washington managed to secure “passive acceptance which does not lead to outright 
dissent.”628  One scholar of NATO institutions has argued that the NPG restricts allies to 
auditing an essentially American debate over force structure and strategy. 629 US officials 
have noted, however, that nuclear consultation has its benefits for the United States. Over 
time, the NPG and HLG came to represent a highly knowledgeable group of officials who 
forced the United States to examine and re-examine the force structure and strategy 
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surrounding some of its tactical nuclear weapons.630 Others have called NPG proceedings 
“formal alliance endorsement of American strategic policy.”631 In short, there is ample 
evidence that US officials sought to assuage NATO abandonment anxieties by sharing 
information about unilateral US policies and strategies.  
 
Unilateral Information Provision in Practice  
There is little evidence to suggest that the United States used deterrence institutions 
to change the unilateral or ambiguous nature of its guarantee to NATO once they were in 
place. Consider first the circumstances in which consultation was designed to operate.  The 
NPG was devised as a mechanism for routine, ongoing dialogue. It was never designed to 
operate in crisis. In the event that actual nuclear use was being contemplated, it is wholly 
unclear whether and how allies would be consulted, as will be discussed in detail shortly. 
Instead, the purpose was to elucidate for allies those factors that might lead to a US 
decision to use nuclear weapons and to build confidence among them that a credible 
posture exists.632 Due to the Atomic Energy Act and a political inclination towards “nuclear 
exclusion,” however, the United States has consistently kept tight control on the flow of 
information through the NPG and HLG, making it difficult for allies to challenge American 
positions or undertake independent initiatives. Consultation has always been 
circumscribed by available information.633  
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Moreover, American personnel and US strategy have always dominated the joint 
planning that takes place at SHAPE headquarters. During the Cold War, military authorities 
in SHAPE who were responsible for NATO’s General Strike Plan took primary guidance 
from Washington, because the GSP was linked to the SIOP. The SIOP was, in turn, developed 
by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), dominated by Strategic Air Command 
(SAC), and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. American officers, who are especially 
sensitive to US policy and strategy, also conduct the bulk of NATO planning. SHAPE 
planners remain subordinate to Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the JCS today. 634  
Consultation is further circumscribed by the fact that it is limited to the NATO 
nuclear arsenal only. For the 1960-1980 period, the United States dedicated approximately 
8,000 operational nuclear weapons for NATO use. Of that 8,000, however, approximately 
6,000 were for US use only, while approximately 2,000 were under some type of NATO 
sharing arrangement and part of the Quick Reaction Alert Force (QRA).635  The heart of the 
American nuclear posture in Europe was therefore always in exclusively American hands. 
This should also be compared to the total size of the US arsenal, which for many years 
hovered around 30,000 reentry vehicles. Consultation through the NPG and HLG and allied 
planning at SHAPE is concerned with shared NATO weapons only, a tiny fraction of the 
broader US arsenal. And while a hosting ally could theoretically veto the use of a nuclear 
weapon mated with a delivery vehicle on its soil, Washington retains the option of 
releasing another US weapon for the same purpose.636  
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Consultation, joint planning, and even nuclear sharing therefore do not circumscribe 
independent US action, as the bulk of American forces are subject to none of these and all 
NATO nuclear mechanisms are subordinated to US control.637 Indeed, NATO-dedicated 
theater nuclear weapons became the NPG’s chief focus because the allies both appreciated 
their role in Flexible Response and recognized that they could never hope to affect 
American strategic weapons decisions from below. They also understood that the 
Americans retained the right to change their nuclear strategy at any time.638 Changes in the 
US nuclear stockpile in Europe do not require consultation with or permission from those 
national authorities hosting the weapons.639  





Total US Warheads 
in Arsenal 
1960-1980 8,004 2,013 30,000 
2014 200 200 2,130 
 
 Perhaps the greatest limitation on the role of allied nuclear consultation, however, is 
the fact that it in no way changes the US President’s unilateral war making authority. When 
McNamara first called for allied nuclear consultation in his 1962 Athens speech, he added 
the caveat that consultation in crisis would be “time and circumstances permitting”—a 
loophole that a former US Ambassador to NATO called “almost as wide as the 
commitment.”641 This caveat has been applied to US nuclear consultation ever since, making 
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consultation a political factor to be considered rather than a true constraint.642 In 1968, 
Germany pushed for special consultation weight to be given to the country on whose 
territory the weapons would be employed and to the country providing the delivery 
vehicle.643 The United States agreed to honor this request in principle, but with the 
stipulation that the hosting country does not possess a national veto or in any way 
compromise the release authority of the United States.644 Before the NPG was officially 
established, McNamara testified before the US Senate that NATO allies understood that the 
United States could not and would not delegate decision power over its use of nuclear 
weapons “to any other state or group of states.”645  
 As the NPG began, the President’s unilateral nuclear authority was not just of 
interest to US officials, but to the Soviet leadership as well. Following the first NPG, 
meeting, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin sought assurances that the United State did 
not plan to “dilute the authority” of the President through consultation with allies. 
President Lyndon Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow assured him that the United 
States did not intend to do so, nor could it by law. Rostow assured Dobrynin that no NATO 
country had requested that Washington circumscribe or predelegate Presidential 
authority.646 
One important way that the President’s unilateral decision authority was preserved 
was through the continued ambiguity of its guarantee. While the United States was 
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perfectly willing to discuss potential uses and consequences of theater nuclear weapons, it 
was not willing to endorse firm guidelines or commit itself to any particular course of 
action in advance.647 As Harlan Cleveland has argued of this consultation process: 
“Sovereign governments do not and cannot decide ahead of time how they will act or even 
whom they will consult; that depends on time and circumstance....The presumption of 
cooperation is not that strong.”648  
In addition to passively preserving unilateral authority through ambiguous 
commitments, the United States has actively preserved it through the formal NATO 
channels for nuclear release authority. Bottom-up requests for nuclear release may come 
from NATO capitals or some commanders, and can be routed through the Defense Planning 
Committee (DPC) to the United States. NATO states can also place capital-to-capital nuclear 
release requests, but these too must be reported to the DPC. 649 The role of the DPC is to 
convey the views of concerned allies to the United States. Once a formal nuclear release has 
been approved by the United States, this decision must be passed down to NATO 
commanders as well as the North Atlantic Council itself. In formal NATO nuclear exercises, 
the bottom-up release of nuclear weapons has often taken two or three days from first 
release request to use. 650 The United States must therefore balance the political desirability 
of consultation with the need to avoid the addition of “inflexible or overly elaborate” 
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procedures to this chain of command.651 The NPG/HLG play the role of ongoing peacetime 
body precisely because there existed a Cold War presumption that time and circumstances 
might not permit consultation in crisis.652  
Sixty years after nuclear weapons were deployed in NATO these procedures remain 
in place. In its most recent declaration of its nuclear posture, NATO remains ambiguous on 
the circumstances under which forward-deployed nuclear weapons might be used. It also 
states that it remains the responsibility of NATO nuclear powers to determine how and 
when to threaten their use.653 It continues to abide by a principle declared by McNamara in 
1967: “Nuclear war is indivisible.”654 In sum, the United States pursued nuclear consultation 
because it sought to assuage allies’ abandonment fears while also retaining ultimate control 
over its nuclear weapons and strategy. The intent of the NPG was to “mitigate” the impact 
of unilateral American power on its clients’ confidence in the commitment, but not actually 
to change it.655  
 
Consultation as Cooperation? 
 There is relatively little evidence that the NATO nuclear consultation structures 
were founded to foster cooperation, defined as mutual policy adjustment. On a very broad 
level, the United States was interested in gaining allied support for its strategy of Flexible 
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Response. Flexible Response, in turn, sought to have the Europeans contribute more to 
conventional defense.656 American officials also hoped (and found) that consultation would 
convince allies to forswear nuclear weapons of their own, while simultaneously 
centralizing all nuclear decision authority in Washington.657 There is little to suggest, 
however, that the United States was interested in nuclear consultation because it expected 
to receive contingent conventional contributions from its allies in response.  There is also 
no evidence that it expected to meaningfully adjust its own nuclear strategies and policies 
to assuage allied abandonment fears.  
  Much more than they intended to use consultation to induce cooperation across 
NATO military matters, McNamara and his colleagues thought the NPG would be useful in 
isolating nuclear weapons issues from other security issues. American officials thought that 
consultation would foster alliance cohesion precisely because it allowed NATO states to 
discuss a narrower range of nuclear issues and disentangle them from other thorny 
military matters.658 While scholars and NATO practitioners often refer to a “Transatlantic 
Bargain,” whereby participating countries face tradeoffs between sovereignty and the 
resources they contribute to the alliance, the United States’ in no way intended to trade 
away any sovereignty when it decided to consult with allies to assuage their nuclear 
abandonment fears.659   
There is also little evidence that the NPG was founded to augment the strength of 
the US guarantee to NATO, increasing for Washington the costs of backing down from its 
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commitment.  As has already been noted, no part of the nuclear consultation or planning 
process changed the US President’s unilateral decision-making authority, or committed the 
United States to particular actions under particular circumstances. A premise for 
establishing the NPG was that neither of these things would be up for discussion. 
Furthermore, the fact that consultation never concerned more than a small fraction of US 
nuclear weapons also meant that it could no more restrain US action than it could enable it. 
Instead, consultation served the purpose of informing allies of those factors that would lead 
to a decision to use nuclear weapons, to build confidence among them that a credible US 
nuclear posture already existed, despite the fact that client states themselves could not 
determine how the guarantee would be implemented.660  
 Instead, nuclear consultation ensured client states’ concerns would at least be 
heard, and created a vehicle that might allow these concerns to affect policy on the 
margins, even if this was far from guaranteed. Consultation could subtly transform the 
diplomatic context in which nuclear decisions were made by reducing their political 
sensitivity. Furthermore, the expectation that peacetime consultation would occur meant 
that the NPG and HLG became the fora for discussion US nuclear changes in progress. 
Whether it was Flexible Response, the debate over building the neutron bomb, or the 
decision to remove nuclear weapons from Europe as the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
existence of this institution meant that allies were likely to be informed of unilateral 
decisions earlier than they would have been otherwise.661 Unlike in the 1960s, when Davey 
Crockett and Jupiter systems were withdrawn from Europe without any advanced notice to 
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allies, the existence of a consultation institution reduced the likelihood that allies would be 
surprised, even if it did not foreclose it.662  
 Interestingly, both US officials and NATO allies believed that consultation should not 
compromise the unilateral nature of the guarantee if it was to remain credible.663 If nuclear 
policy and planning had truly become multilateral, NATO would have faced many veto 
players in any nuclear use decision, making markedly less likely that it would respond 
using nuclear weapons and undermining its long-standing First Use doctrine.664 Much as 
they wanted proximity to their patron’s nuclear policies so that they might know that their 
security was, in fact, being provided for, NATO clients have consistently understood that 
limiting their patron’s decision-making authority could compromise the whole enterprise. 
They also understood that continued ambiguity was in the alliance’s interest. If the Soviets 
knew exactly under what conditions theater nuclear weapons or strategic weapons would 
be used, they could take provocative actions just below those thresholds. 665 It is actually 
curious that Ambassador Dobrynin was concerned that the NPG might compromise the US 
President’s war making authority. If, in fact, the United States had opened up to multilateral 
nuclear decision-making, this should have advantaged the Soviets by making NATO nuclear 
use less likely, at least insofar as the logic held by the US and its allies is concerned.   
Thus, without any intention of altering the unilateral or ambiguous character of 
NATO to increase cooperation or raise the costs of backing down in crisis or war, the 
United States established the NPG to assure allies. It sought to reveal to them enough 
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nuclear-related information to allow them to believe that a functional US umbrella already 
existed, and that it could conceivably be used for their defense.  
 
The Extended Deterrence Dialogues and the US-Japan Alliance 
The US-Japan alliance, signed in its original form in 1951, has existed for almost as 
long as NATO, but has involved no formal discussion of extended deterrence for much of its 
life.  Several Japan-specific factors made the discussion of nuclear or deterrence-related 
issues a taboo subject within the alliance, even in periods when Tokyo feared abandonment 
by its patron. Only when Japan’s leaders came to feel sufficiently anxious due to North 
Korea’s nuclearization, China’s rise, and major changes in US strategic policy did they 
demand and receive institutionalized assurance in the form of the Extended Deterrence 
Dialogues, which were founded in 2010.   
 As the only state to ever have had nuclear weapons used against, the Japanese have 
traditionally had a “nuclear allergy”—strong normative opposition to the presence or even 
discussion of nuclear weapons and related technology. Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution underscored this robust aversion. Drafted with the help of its US occupiers, 
Article 9 renounces Japan’s right to resort to war as an instrument of national policy, and 
has generally been interpreted to mean that Japan may only possess the military 
capabilities required for self-defense.666 How exactly this is implemented has changed over 
time, but until June 2014, Article 9 was interpreted as prohibiting “collective self-
defense”—that is, the use of military force to support an ally, guaranteed to all sovereign 
states by Article 51 of the UN Charter.   
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Although the US-Japan alliance is termed a “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security,” little about it was “mutual” before the 21st century: Unlike NATO, a true collective 
defense arrangement, or other US security guarantees in East Asia, American troops and 
personnel could not expect military aid from the Japanese if they became the victims of 
attack, and there was little interest in Japan in cooperative conventional defense planning. 
Although Article IV of the US Japan alliance provides for allied consultation relating to 
treaty implementation if Japan is threatened, Japan’s anti-militarist, nuclear-averse 
postwar foreign policy meant that this security guarantee was as unilateral as could be, and 
the nuclear component was rarely mentioned among the allies.667   
 Japan’s aversion to nuclear discussions only grew stronger during the height of the 
Cold War. In 1955, the Diet passed the Basic Atomic Energy Law, declaring that Japan 
would use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. 668  Following the first Chinese nuclear 
test in 1964, Prime Minister Sato told his US counterparts that he was seriously considering 
an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan. Shortly thereafter, however, he announced 
Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” which were formalized by a 1971 Diet Resolution.  
The Principles state that Japan will not manufacture, possess or import nuclear weapons.669  
During the Cold War, this led Japan’s leaders to formally prohibit the transit of US nuclear 
weapons into its ports or through its territory. 670  It has since been revealed that a 
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clandestine agreement allowed the United States to bring weapons into Japan as was 
necessary to provide its client with a security umbrella, but this caveat in no way gave 
Japanese officials the ability to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in their security. 671   
Over time, the US-Japan pact has undergone some modest revisions to allow for 
conventional defense collaboration between the allies. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Tokyo grew anxious that its American ally was disengaging, following the 1964 Chinese 
nuclear test, President Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, and negotiations over the reversion 
of Okinawa to Japanese control. In 1976, the allies responded to this period of alliance 
anxiety by establishing a bilateral Security Consultative Committee, and drawing up US-
Japan Defense Guidelines, which were the first-ever codification of any kind of cooperative 
military procedure between the allies.672  Tokyo once again grew anxious that Washington 
was disengaging following the end of the Cold War. Following the US worldwide nuclear 
drawdown, the first North Korean nuclear crisis from 1993-1994, and a proposal to remove 
most US troops from East Asia, the US and Japan declared their intent to strengthen 
bilateral conventional cooperation with the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Doctrine.673  In the 
1997 Defense Guidelines that followed, the US and Japan provided for bilateral training and 
exercises, and Tokyo’s leaders made some amendments to their interpretation of the ban 
on collective self-defense by promising some limited assistance to the United States in a 
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war on the Korean Peninsula or on behalf of Taiwan. 674  The 1997 Defense Guidelines laid 
the foundation for the US-Japan alliance to become a “normal” security guarantee.675  But 
only after two major strategic changes in East Asia, and the perception that the United 
States was once again turning away from the region did Japanese officials insist that they 
receive more intimate knowledge of the US security umbrella.  
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs and China’s rapid rise and 
military modernization radically changed the way Japanese leaders perceived the regional 
threat environment, creating what many saw as the first “existential” postwar dangers the 
country had faced.676  In 1998, North Korea tested long-range missiles that overflew Japan 
before crashing into the ocean—an incident Japanese officials have referred to as “our 
Sputnik.”677 Eight years later, Pyongyang detonated its first nuclear device. In the wake of 
the test, President George W. Bush reaffirmed the US defense commitment to Japan and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a statement pledging US defensive aid using “all 
available means” if Japan was the victim of attack. Japanese officials understood this to be 
an affirmation of the US nuclear commitment specifically, and were pleased when their 
American counterparts reiterated a willingness to use nuclear weapons on behalf of Japan 
at a May 2007 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee.678  
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Despite these reaffirmations, officials in Tokyo began to request stronger deterrence 
commitments. By 2007, Defense and Foreign Affairs ministers were frustrated that 
Secretary Rice’s “all available means” message had not been repeated publicly, or more 
consistently through other diplomatic channels.679 For the first time, Japanese officials 
sought an explicit and regular declaration by the US that it intended to use nuclear 
weapons on its ally’s behalf if it was attacked. 680 Japanese officials were also increasingly 
concerned that North Korean long-range missile developments would lead to “decoupling,” 
whereby the United States would decline to use nuclear weapons on Japan’s behalf for fear 
of devastating retaliation.681 They insisted that they did not intend to pursue an 
independent nuclear capability, but nonetheless compared their strategic situation to 1964, 
when then-Prime Minister Sato had threatened to go nuclear. 682  
Officials in Tokyo also expressed consternation at Washington’s demonstrated 
defense priorities. The Japanese were indignant when the United States eased sanctions 
against North Korea and later removed it from the State Sponsors of Terror list.683 Japanese 
leaders feared that the United States had “lost focus” due to its engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and had grown increasingly willing to accommodate Pyongyang because it 
was stretched thin militarily.684 To their US counterparts, they cited testimony by then-
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Pace suggesting that deployments to Iraq had 
limited US ability to respond North Korean provocations. 685 
By 2008-2009 Japan was also growing increasingly concerned about China’s rapid 
rise, military modernization, and lack of transparency.686 China’s defense overhaul 
emphasized power projection with the development of sophisticated naval, air, and missile 
capabilities, and Beijing was consistently posting double-digits defense expenditures each 
year. 687 China’s investment in diversified delivery systems, including ICBMs, and its 
expanding nuclear arsenal provoked another wave of “decoupling” fears from the Japanese, 
which was exacerbated by Beijing’s test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007.688 Officials in 
Tokyo also increasingly worried that their interest would fall victim to the “stability-
instability” paradox: With an increasingly survivable second-strike nuclear capability, 
Beijing would feel free to pursue lower-level opportunism, amounting to “creeping 
expansion” at Tokyo’s expense.689 For years, the US security umbrella had meant that the 
US-Japan alliance would have dominated any regional conflict. The North Korean nuclear 
threat and China’s emergence as a superpower meant that Japan had to contend with the 
prospect of a “security deficit” for the first time.690    
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In addition to their burgeoning nuclear abandonment fears, Japanese officials also 
began to assert a positive agenda: Beginning in 2007 they urged their US counterparts to 
initiate “bilateral planning activities” to convey “concrete” commitments to defend Japan 
against non-conventional threats. 691  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told top US military 
officials that the Japanese “nuclear allergy” was on the wane, and that US conventional and 
nuclear extended deterrence was more important than it had ever been. 692 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Defense officials informed their US counterparts that they wanted to 
know more about “how US extended deterrence works in our alliance—we felt entitled to 
know that for the sake of Japanese security.”693 Despite assurances that US extended 
deterrence had applied to Japan consistently since 1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Defense officials requested of their Pentagon counterparts “continued dialogue 
to gain better understanding of US policy and dissuade doubters in Japan.” 694  
In 2007, officials in Tokyo reached out to several former seniors US defense officials 
and began to ask questions about US nuclear strategy and policy. These officials were 
shocked by the change in substance—they had often spoken with Japanese colleagues 
about arms control or proliferation, but “we never, underscore never, talked about 
deterrence.” 695 The threats from North Korea and China, however, made Japanese officials 
“vitally interested in talking to us.” Yet Tokyo’s initial entreaties were not embraced. 
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Cabinet-level officials in the George W. Bush administration were informed of Japan’s 
desire for standing deterrence consultations, but no moves were made to establish them. 
Instead, in 2008, Japanese officials were invited to participate in a Track 1.5 dialogue at a 
Washington DC-based think tank, hosted by several nuclear strategy and policy experts.696   
The initial Track 1.5 meeting was extended into a series of dialogues, all of which 
involved former US officials briefing their Japanese counterparts on US nuclear strategy 
and policy decisions. Japanese officials were eager to know how specifically the United 
States would respond to a nuclear attack on Tokyo by North Korea or by China, and were 
alarmed to learn that no single response was planned in crisis or war. They also asked 
numerous questions about the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) – a 
nuclear-armed cruise missile that was widely expected to be retired.697   
When President Barack Obama was inaugurated in 2009, his new senior Pentagon 
and State Department appointees found that East Asian allies “had a lot of anxiety.”698 They 
had come to view the United States as “not being as present or as committed as they 
thought appropriate.”699 This was attributed to “hyperfocus” on Iraq and Afghanistan. 700 
They also worried that the new administration would privilege its relationship with China 
and ignore Japan. 701 Through the Strategic Posture Commission, a congressionally 
mandated review of US nuclear strategy that took place in 2008-2009, Japanese officials 
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pressed their counterparts to provide them with more deterrence-relevant information.702 
Those senior US officials who served on the Commission came away from it with the 
knowledge that Washington would need to make near-term revisions to its nuclear policy 
and strategy, and that concerted allied assurance would be necessary to assuage 
concomitant anxieties, especially in East Asia.703  
 In the spring of 2009, the Obama Administration began the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) process, another legislatively mandated assessment that would establish US nuclear 
strategy, policy, and force structure for the subsequent 5-10 years.  As this review process 
was beginning, however, the President made a speech that would frame it as well as US 
assurance policy going forward.  
 On April 5, 2009, on a visit to Prague to mark the 10-year anniversary of the Czech 
Republic’s NATO membership, President Barack Obama called for “the peace and security 
of a world without nuclear weapons.” He stated that the United States would reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in its own security strategy, pursue further bilateral arms control 
with Russia, and support global nonproliferation efforts. President Obama also promised 
that as long as nuclear weapons existed, the United States would maintain an arsenal to 
deter any adversary and guarantee the security of its allies.704  
 Just as soon as the President concluded his Prague remarks, the White House 
received two phone calls: one from South Korea and one from Japan. Both Asian allies 
congratulated the administration on its ambitious agenda, and immediately asked what this 
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would mean for the umbrella that guaranteed their security.705 Japanese officials were 
particularly keen to know how the Prague Agenda would change the “visible components” 
that comprised Pacific extended deterrence. Unlike the European landmass, where it was 
possible to envision how escalation might unfold and where the front lines of conflict 
would be, Japanese officials still knew little about how their US patrons thought about 
potential nuclear use in East Asia. Moreover, the United States no longer forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Would they retain the capabilities necessary to provide 
nuclear aid against North Korea and China?706 Publicly, the Japanese praised the President’s 
Prague Speech, but privately they sought repeated assurances that nuclear reductions 
would not come at the expense of extended deterrence. 707 
 One sensitive nuclear issue that the Prague Agenda thrust to the fore of the NPR was 
the status of the Tomahawk Land Attack-Nuclear Missile (TLAM-N): a nuclear cruise 
missile that had once been deployed on attack submarines, but had been in storage since 
1992, following the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. The TLAM-N technology was now 
obsolete, and its replacement would be costly, so the question was not whether the Navy’s 
last-remaining non-strategic nuclear weapon would be retired, but whether there would be 
a follow-on system when it was.708 Despite their public support for the Prague Agenda, 
Japanese officials had repeatedly lobbied their US counterparts not to retire TLAM-N, or to 
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replace it with another cruise missile.709 Their attachment to the system, however, was of 
Washington’s own doing: at the conclusion of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, Japanese 
officials had been told that the non-deployed TLAM-N was earmarked as part of “their” 
umbrella because it could be redeployed to the Pacific in the case of crisis or war.710  If the 
system was to be retired and not replaced as part of the Prague Agenda, the Japanese 
insisted, their counterparts in Washington should explain to them how the US could 
demonstrate its nuclear commitment if the circumstances required it.  
The twin US goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons while strengthening 
extended deterrence seemed to be broadly contradictory to Japanese officials. “The US says 
its deterrent is strong and unchanging, but at the same time reduces the role of nuclear 
weapons and prepares to take away one system that we were told exists to protect Japan. 
We needed to understand this ‘strategic magic’.” 711 Of the Japanese anxiety over the TLAM-
N retirement, senior Pentagon officials insisted that no one weapons system provided 
extended deterrence to any one country. The retirement decision had not officially been 
made at the beginning of the NPR, however, so Administration decided to consult the 
Japanese during the process.712  
 Another pressing concern among the Japanese was the future of US-Russia arms 
reductions. It was well understood that the NPR would create some “headroom” for further 
strategic arms control in the form of a New START Treaty. 713  Japanese officials were 
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increasingly worried that the Chinese nuclear arsenal was expanding qualitatively and 
quantitatively, and feared that if the United States cut its numbers too low, the Chinese 
could “sprint to parity” with the Cold War superpowers.714 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense officials impressed upon their US counterparts the importance of close 
consultations between the US and Japan prior to any “deep cuts” in the US arsenal, as these 
could embolden Chinese modernization efforts. 715  
 Japanese officials were also concerned by rumors that the NPR might lead the US to 
change its nuclear declaratory policy. The United States has never circumscribed its right to 
the “first use” of nuclear weapons in conflict, but following the Prague Speech many 
advocates, practitioners, and scholars pushed for the adoption of a “No First Use” or “Sole 
Purpose” nuclear doctrine. 716 A No First Use doctrine declares that the country will not 
introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict unless it is first attacked by nuclear weapons. A 
Sole Purpose doctrine maintains that the nuclear power’s arsenal is exclusively dedicated 
to deterring the use of nuclear weapons.  The ability to use nuclear weapons preemptively 
has long been considered crucial for extended deterrence by US allies and Japanese officials 
feared that the “loosening” of US nuclear doctrine would undermine the guarantee to 
Japan.717  
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 Finally, in summer 2009, a former Japanese Vice Foreign Ministry leaked to the 
press the “secret” agreement with the United States that provided for the transport of US 
nuclear weapons into Japan, in violation of Japan’s third Non-Nuclear Principle. American 
officials assessed the leak was driven by the former Minister’s desire to generate debate 
about dropping the non-introduction principle to allow the US to once again forward-
deploy nuclear weapons in Japan.718 
 This litany of Japanese extended deterrence-related concerns, coupled with 
increasing Japanese requests for sustained dialogue on nuclear issues led US officials to 
include their allies in the NPR process for the first time. In 1994 and 2001, officials in allied 
countries had been briefed about the NPR findings after the review concluded, but this had 
resulted in a great deal of confusion among nuclear clients. The process had been 
particularly fraught in 2001, when the George W. Bush administration decided to introduce 
the unfamiliar concept of a “New Triad,” leaving allies to wonder whether nuclear 
deterrence was being augmented or attenuated.719 Instead of presenting allies with a 
nuclear posture fait accompli in 2010, Pentagon officials met with their allied counterparts 
throughout the review.  Given their concerns and requests for information, the Japanese 
were briefed on a monthly basis, more than any other ally.720 Moreover, prior NPRs had 
been conducted on a classified basis. This meant that when the 2001 document was leaked 
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to the press, the administration could not clarify the now public content or its implications 
to allies. Clarity of communication with security guarantee clients was one of several 
reasons that the Obama Administration decided to conduct an unclassified review. 721 
Several times during the NPR review process, top Pentagon officials traveled to Tokyo and 
received their colleagues in Washington to explain how extended deterrence could be 
strengthened while the role of nuclear weapons in US defense policy was reduced. 722 
 As the NPR process drew to a close, Japanese and US officials agreed that the allies 
should make permanent a standing deterrence consultation mechanism.723 US officials 
agreed that a new deterrence institution should be a joint venture between the Defense 
Department and Department of State, and found strong support from the top leadership of 
both agencies, and from Strategic Command and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.724 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the primary agency of responsibility in Japan, and the 
mechanism was termed the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. A discrete, but similarly 
structured bilateral consultation was formed between the United States and South Korea, 
and named the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee.725 Both began to meet at the US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Level in 2010.  
From inception, the Extended Deterrence Dialogues (EDD) had three components: 
regular policy consultations on nuclear deterrence-related issues; visits to US sites relevant 
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to the maintenance of its security umbrella; and tabletop exercises and scenario 
planning.726 Through the EDD, Japanese officials have visited ICBM silos at Malmstrom Air 
Force Base in Montana, toured a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in Bangor, Washington, 
and viewed the B-2 bomber wing at Whiteman Air Force Base.727 They have also visited 
Sandia National Labs, although they cannot view actual nuclear weapons due to the Atomic 
Energy Act.728 The Extended Deterrence Dialogue meets twice yearly and rotates between 
the United States and Japan.  
 
Unilateral Patron Motivation? 
Although Japanese officials’ desire for deterrence consultation was not initially 
embraced in the United States, early Track 1.5 dialogues and later steps to create the EDD 
were motivated by the US belief that its allies’ abandonment fears were reaching critical 
levels. In the eyes of these experts, nuclear dialogues were necessary to keep the alliance 
together, and the Japanese from growing increasingly interested in a nuclear capability of 
their own.729 Obama Administration officials entered office aware of the fact that East Asian 
allies were in need of assurance given the growing threats from North Korea and China. 
After receiving allies’ feedback following the Prague Speech, US officials knew that 
impending changes to Washington’s nuclear strategy could very well estrange its already-
jittery ally. And because US officials understood that the Nuclear Posture Review would 
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probably end with the decision to retire TLAM-N, a uniquely neuralgic point for the 
Japanese, they understood that they “would have to engage in serious assurance just to 
break even.”730  Furthermore, the leak of the secret Cold War-era US-Japan deal 
underscored for US officials how controversial of an issue extended deterrence was 
becoming domestically. They had no intention of considering the reintroduction of nuclear 
weapons to Japan, but this episode reinforced the need for the United States to explain to 
its client how it envisioned providing extended deterrence with fewer weapons and 
mounting regional security challenges. 731 
 Pentagon officials decided to include Japanese officials in the NPR process rather 
than surprise them with its findings later. Like McNamara, they intended to expose the 
Japanese to challenges entailed in US nuclear policy and strategy, and believed that the 
more access to nuclear-related information Japanese officials had, the more likely they 
would be to support Washington’s twin goals of reducing its nuclear stockpile and 
strengthening extended deterrence. This aim remained as officials decided to formalize a 
consultation mechanism in 2010. Like NATO’s NPG, the Extended Deterrence Dialogue was 
never intended to change the fundamental nature of the US guarantee. The Extended 
Deterrence Dialogues have aimed and served primarily to educate the Japanese about the 
US deterrent.   
As in NATO’s NPG and HLG, the agenda of the EDD is largely driven by the United 
States. US officials are eager to know what questions and concerns the Japanese have so 
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that they can address them, but “the model is not allies as demandeurs.” 732 American 
officials, however, have purposely tried to dissuade direct analogies between NATO nuclear 
institutions and the EDD. Both South Korea and Japan expressed in 2010 a desire for a 
consultation mechanism that was “NATO-like.” This was inappropriate for North East Asia 
from the US perspective, however, because there are no forward-deployed nuclear 
weapons in the region, no nuclear sharing and no joint operational planning.  Despite the 
fact that these factors in no way restrict US unilateral nuclear action in the European 
theater, they do give allies additional access points to that policy and strategy. From the 
American standpoint, attempting to replicate this model, itself an outgrowth of forward-
deployed theater nuclear forces in Europe, would have been foolish.733 The component of 
NATO that was applicable to East Asia and that was clearly missing from the US-Japan 
alliance was the political consultations that occur through the NPG and HLG.734  
US officials came to believe that what the Japanese wanted when they requested 
“NATO-like” consultations was a seat at the table if and when nuclear weapons were going 
to be employed in the service of their interests. 735 This, however, was not difficult to 
provide: If the United States was to employ nuclear weapons against North Korea or China, 
it already planned to consult with allies. As in NATO, this assumes that time and 
circumstances permit, and does not allow allies any sort of veto power or positive decision 
authority. Nonetheless, it took only some policy transparency for the United States to 
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manifest to its counterparts in Tokyo that Washington would not want to release nuclear 
weapons without their input if it could be avoided.  
 
Unilateral Information-Sharing in Practice  
 Since the dialogues were made permanent in 2010, US officials have relied on 
political consultation, tabletop exercises, and on-site visits to share information with their 
allies about how they provide extended deterrence. The primary goal of the exercises is to 
demonstrate to Japanese officials how the United States would think through particular 
crisis or warfighting scenarios and make relevant political and military recommendations. 
The purpose of the Triad site visits is to expose allies to the vast US nuclear infrastructure 
that already exists. Despite the fact that US officials believe US-Japan deterrence 
consultations should not be based on a “NATO model,” the EDD shares with its predecessor 
the fact that the United States initiated it with the intent of making manifest and clarifying 
existing nuclear policies and strategies.   
The Extended Deterrence Dialogues have served to make the existing US umbrella 
more concrete in the eyes of it clients, but they do not actually alter the ambiguity 
embedded in this unilateral commitment. When the US and Japan began track 1.5 dialogues 
in 2008, American participants regularly received questions from their counterparts on 
how exactly the United States would react to particular actions by North Korea or China. 
The Japanese expected, for example, that if the Chinese used a nuclear weapon on Tokyo, 
the United States would execute a standard, pre-planned nuclear response—that there was 
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a “nuclear cookbook” with recipes for allied defense. They were shocked and somewhat 
disappointed to find automatic contingency plans did not exist.736  
Instead, tabletop exercises have aimed to make the Japanese more comfortable with 
that inherent ambiguity. By walking through how the United States would potentially think 
about nuclear use in specific scenarios, allies are exposed to the situations in which 
Washington may see an interest in employing them.  Through scenario-based exercises, US 
officials can demonstrate their thinking on how to avoid or minimize escalation and can 
give allies a sense of the considerations that would go into recommendations for nuclear 
use.737 These exercises do not actually take the ambiguity out of whether the United States 
would use nuclear weapons in a crisis, but they aim to mitigate some of the uncertainty 
over how it might approach that decision if it decided to do so. 
The Japanese search for pre-planned US nuclear options led American officials to 
explain to their counterparts the consultation caveat that has defined assurance efforts 
since McNamara’s Athens speech: Despite the existence of war plans and sophisticated 
planning mechanisms, nuclear decision-making authority rests with the President alone.738 
In all of its security guarantees, the United States retains “the right to employ nuclear 
weapons on behalf of our allies.”739 Rather than circumscribe or crystallize that prerogative, 
deterrence consultations serve to convince allies that their patron has taken the necessary 
steps to prepare for nuclear operations if they are deemed necessary. “It takes it from an 
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abstract concept, a political commitment, into a world in which they have actually taken the 
necessary steps to give the President real options if it came to that.”740  
Where military command authority is concerned, the US-Japan alliance is a far cry 
from NATO. The United States and Japan do not have a combined military command or a 
permanent body that allow them to coordinate operations in crisis or war.741 A decision to 
employ nuclear weapons on behalf of Japan would be a top-down one by the US President 
alone. With no forward-deployed nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing arrangements, 
Washington would have no concrete obligation to inform its Japanese counterparts of its 
decision to do so (although presumably it would for obvious political reasons). The nuclear 
chain of command between the US President and use in Japan could not be more unilateral, 
and deterrence consultation has done nothing to change that fact. Nonetheless, the EDD has 
been well-received by the Japanese.  
The Extended Deterrence Dialogues have been used to secure Japanese support for 
several US nuclear policies, including the Prague Agenda, the retirement of TLAM-N, and 
bilateral US-Russia arms control. It is used to discuss the strategic challenges posed by 
China and North Korea. The EDD also been used to keep the Japanese apprised of US 
strategic policy and technological developments. This includes US plans for missile defense 
deployments, research and development on Conventional Prompt Global Strike, the 
development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and US nuclear stockpile modernization 
efforts. 
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 From the US perspective, Pentagon and State Department officials have found it 
useful to learn what their Japanese counterparts do and do not understand, and what kinds 
of information they seek.742 They have found that by holding regular talks, they can explain 
to their Japanese counterparts how US strategic policy is changing and what its 
implications are for the recipients of extended deterrence.743 American officials have also 
found that the quality of their deterrence-related exchanges with their Japanese 
counterparts improved dramatically after just a few meetings.  
 Although in most areas of government, Japanese officials remain reticent on nuclear 
issues, the dialogues have helped Tokyo to develop a small cadre of theoretically and 
strategically sophisticated thinkers who rival their nuclear patrons in their knowledge of 
deterrence. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Self Defense 
Forces who have participated in the Extended Deterrence Dialogues have read widely on 
deterrence theory and the history of the Cold War.744  New policy officials in the US-Japan 
Treaty Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are instructed upon arrival to complete a 
syllabus of readings that is equivalent to a graduate-level strategic studies course at an elite 
American university.745 Approximately 30-40 Japanese officials have participated in the 
EDD and moved on to other policy jobs. According to one former Pentagon official who was 
associated with the dialogues, this has made Tokyo “the most deterrence-fluent 
government out there… including, perhaps, my own.”746 
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Japanese EDD participants have received the institution enthusiastically.  Beginning 
with the Track 1.5 dialogues in 2008-2009, officials found that these conversations helped 
them to become more comfortable speaking to their counterparts about nuclear issues, and 
more deterrence-literate. This, in turn, led to serving Pentagon officials being increasingly 
willing to engage with them on Japan-specific deterrence issues.747 Since the EDD was 
permanently established, officials in Tokyo have found that the depth and breadth of their 
deterrence knowledge has expanded significantly.748 Moreover, officials in Tokyo extol the 
effects of their on-site visits. Because Japan has traditionally not engaged with its patron on 
nuclear policy topics and it does not possess nuclear weapons, its leaders have not been 
able to associate US policy with anything concrete. Exposure to the US nuclear 
infrastructure makes tangible policies and strategies that they have long read about on 
paper.749 Japanese officials also emphasize the importance of being briefed by and meeting 
the Air Force and Navy personnel who man US strategic delivery vehicles.  “We are not 
allowed to see your nuclear weapons,” one official explained, “but the technology and the 
people are tangible evidence that the umbrella is real. That we should believe it.”750  
 One important remaining obstacle to assurance in Japan, however, is the fact that 
this small group of deterrence-savvy officials is much more comfortable discussing nuclear 
issues than the public as a whole. They do not publicize the activities of the EDD and their 
newfound knowledge of the nuclear umbrella because they do not believe that the Japanese 
public is prepared for the same type of acquaintance with US nuclear strategy and policy 
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that they have been receiving. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for them to 
communicate with domestic audience how Tokyo is thinking about threats from North 
Korea and China.751  
Nonetheless, nuclear policy consultations and practical exposure has helped to 
convince Japan’s leaders that the US nuclear umbrella is more than an abstraction. A 
National Security Council official explained: “Seeing those systems and talking with those 
who worked on them, it means something…we realize those technicians work partly for 
Japan. We don’t have the weapons for ourselves, but at least now we have the familiarity.” 
He added: “No particular weapons system is more important than the others, but seeing is 
believing, both on the enemy’s side and on the ally’s side.”752  
 
Consultation as Cooperation? 
There is not much evidence that the United States expected the Extended 
Deterrence Dialogues to result in mutual policy adjustment, either in the form of more 
alliance contributions from Tokyo or in a less unilateral policy from Washington. One 
exception to this general rule is the fact that Washington consulted with Japan and South 
Korea over the possibility of changing its nuclear doctrine to adopt a No First Use or a Sole 
Purpose pledge during the NPR process. It is unknown whether there was enough Sole 
Purpose support within the Obama Administration for the doctrine to have been adopted if 
the administration had not chosen to consult with allies, but it is also clear that the 
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Japanese and South Koreans voiced their opposition to this change during NPR 
consultations.753 Ultimately, the United States did circumscribe its declaratory policy, but 
did not move as far as adopting a No First Use or Sole Purpose doctrine. It is possible, but 
not probable, that this was a significant nuclear policy adjustment made as a result of allied 
consultation. 
 Like the NPG, US-Japan extended deterrence consultations were instituted at a time 
when Washington was eager to have its allies contribute more to their own security. 
Following the largely unilateral foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration and 
the 2008 financial crisis, US President Barack Obama assumed office with the goal of 
restoring the importance of US alliances and partner contributions.754 Despite this fact, 
there is little evidence that the Extended Deterrence Dialogues were established to induce 
conventional contributions from Japan. There is also scant evidence that the United States 
intended to significantly adjust its nuclear policies once deterrence consultation began.  
Since its founding, the Extended Deterrence Dialogues, like the NPG and HLG, serve 
to hive off nuclear consultations from other security dialogues, creating less, not more, 
issue connectivity. And while a broad, diffuse pattern of bilateral security consultation may 
have encouraged Japan to increase its contributions to the alliance, discussions of Japanese 
conventional contributions take place in the Security Consultative Committee or the 
numerous other bodies devoted to US-Japan conventional defense issues.755 Moreover, the 
EDD was established in 2010, while Prime Minister Shinto Abe’s overhaul of Japanese 
security policy only began in 2013-2014. These changes are part of a long Japanese 
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evolution towards defense “normalcy,” and are not contingent responses to Tokyo’s 
improved nuclear umbrella knowledge.  
The Extended Deterrence Dialogue also does not in any strict sense change the 
credibility of the US security guarantee by making it more likely that the United States will 
intervene on Japan’s behalf, or by clarifying the specific circumstances under which it will 
take specific actions. Indeed, as we have seen, nuclear decision-making authority remains 
with the US President and US officials cannot commit to their Japanese counterparts to 
taking any specific actions in crisis or war.  
 
Consultation in the US-Thailand Alliance 
 The United States began providing military aid to Thailand in 1950 after its military 
leader, Field Marshall Plaek Phibun, eschewed ties with the Soviet Union and People’s 
Republic of China.756 After formally recognizing the French-backed Bao Dai government in 
Vietnam and sending food aid and troops to aid in the defense of South Korea, Bangkok 
received its first $10 million in US aid, most of which came in the form of arms.757 Phibun 
persistently pressed for a full-fledged bilateral defense pact with the United States, but was 
rebuffed until 1954.  
 Two days after the fall of the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu, John Foster Dulles 
proposed to the Thais a bilateral mutual defense pact in exchange for basing rights.758 That 
summer, however, the US commitment to Thailand was folded into an eclectic multilateral 
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security guarantee that included the United States, Thailand, the United Kingdom, France, 
Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, and Pakistan.759 The Manila Pact, signed on September 
8, 1954, became the basis of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which Asian 
members hoped would be their regional NATO analogue.760   
 The Manila Pact is a collective defense treaty that uses similar language to the 
United States’ other guarantees in East Asia. It declares that armed attack within the treaty 
area endangers the peace and security of all members, and pledges to meet the common 
danger in accordance with “constitutional processes.”761 The Asian members of the Manila 
Pact were disappointed that the treaty did not emulate the language of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which many interpret to imply an automatic commitment, but they embraced it 
nonetheless. The Thais were especially enthusiastic and ratified the treaty just two weeks 
after signing it, hoping that it would effectively serve as a US-Thai bilateral pact that would 
protect them from the Viet Minh threat to Laos and potential communist subversion among 
Thailand’s Vietnamese minority.762 They also hoped for a significant increase in US 
defensive aid.763  
 American aid to Thailand quadrupled after the Manila Pact was signed, and the 
Thais became its most energetic participant.764 The first alliance meeting was held in 
Bangkok, where SEATO was formally established. The organization’s headquarters were 
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placed there with a Thai at the helm. The alliance created a permanent secretariat and a 
military organization in 1955, so that members could consult about potential security 
dangers.765  From the pact’s inception, Bangkok pressed for SEATO-dedicated military 
forces and a joint military command structure, as existed in NATO and the US-ROK alliance. 
Both Thailand and the Philippines believed that these commitments would make US 
intervention practically automatic if a crisis did occur, but Washington resisted.766 In 1957-
58, the Thais and Filipinos consistently worried that the United States would abandon them 
to communist subversion despite the pact, so Washington agreed to engage in some 
limited, joint conventional military planning and consultation.767  
 SEATO quickly proved to be a wildly ineffective alliance, primarily because the 
threat of major power conventional or even nuclear military intervention was poorly suited 
to deterring and defending against communist subversion.768 Members could not agree on 
whether or not the Laotian crisis invoked the pact, because it did not entail open armed 
attack.  They also held sharply diverging views about the United States’ war in Vietnam and 
their obligations to support it, and Britain and France began to disengage for that reason.769 
Because the security guarantee was increasingly viewed as ineffective, the United States 
made a private pledge to Bangkok to assist it outside of the Manila Pact if it became the 
victim of major communist aggression. Known as the Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962, 
this promise was extended to ensure Bangkok’s basing support of US operations in Laos.770   
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 SEATO’s demise was all but guaranteed by the election of Richard Nixon. In a pre-
election Foreign Affairs article in 1967, Nixon had called the alliance an “anachronistic 
relic,” and his 1969 Guam Doctrine made plain that the United States intended to draw 
down substantially from its Asian commitments once it disengaged from Vietnam. 771 Nixon 
stated, however, that the United States would continue to honor all of its existing treaty 
arrangements, including through the use of nuclear weapons if allies were so threatened.772  
 Thailand was the primary obstacle that prevented Washington from dismantling 
SEATO. After Pakistan withdrew from the treaty in 1972, all remaining members held 
distinct security guarantees from the United States through other agreements. The United 
States was not especially interested in attempting to form a separate bilateral security 
guarantee with Thailand, as its interests in the country would be limited once it was out of 
the business of fighting communism in South East Asia.  It also believed that it would face 
congressional opposition if it attempted one.773 Washington therefore convinced its other 
SEATO allies to keep the alliance in place for Thailand’s sake, at least until the US 
withdrawal from Vietnam was complete.774  
 Aware that the other active members would not remain engaged forever and that 
the United States would not form a new bilateral pact, the Thais began to advocate for a 
reorientation of the alliance away from military issues and toward economic and political 
matters, which the other alliance members accepted.775 In 1974, the allies approved a plan 
to dissolve the military structure of the alliance, which led to the decision to terminate the 
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treaty organization in 1975. The last official SEATO activities concluded in 1977, and 
headquarter buildings were returned to the Thais. American forces withdrew from 
Thailand entirely, but the Manila Pact was not abrogated, as it remained the only formal 
treaty tie between Washington and Bangkok.776  
 Since that date, the United States has not promised to guarantee Thailand’s security 
if it is the victim of attack. There exists a tacit understanding that with the end of SEATO 
and the Manila Pact’s “reorientation” to non-military affairs, the US commitment has been 
downgraded substantially. A 2012 US-Thai “Joint Vision Statement” signed by the Thai 
Defense Minister and the US Secretary of Defense reaffirmed that both governments still 
consider this to be a “defense alliance.” It stated, however, that its purview includes: 
responding to natural and manmade disasters, confronting transnational threats, 
contributing to global peacekeeping, and addressing maritime security issues.777  There is 
no language that suggests that the United States has a direct military obligation to aid 
Thailand if it is attacked, nor has any US leader suggested as much in a public statement. 
The United States and Thailand continue to conduct regular joint military exercises, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally. Since SEATO’s demise, however, they have not had in place 
any formal defense consultation mechanism whatsoever. Without a security guarantee in 
place, the United States does not appear to have had much motivation to attempt to engage 
any Thai abandonment fears that might emerge.   
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Analyzing Nuclear Consultation Formation 
 The NATO and US-Japan cases provide strong support for Hypothesis 3. Both 
deterrence consultation mechanisms formed in response to mounting allied abandonment 
fears. In both NATO and Japan, nuclear client states were plagued with chronic anxieties 
following the increase of a strategic threat from the adversary and what each feared to be a 
reduced commitment from its patron. In neither the NATO nor the Japan case did the 
United States believe that its allies would defect to another alliance, but rather that there 
was some risk that clients’ abandonment fears would cause them to eventually acquire 
their own nuclear weapons, permitting self-reliance. In neither case did the United States 
form deterrence consultation mechanisms with the aim of fundamentally changing the 
nature of its guarantee: rather, it hoped to provide assurance by exposing allies to existing 
policy and strategy.  
NATO nuclear consultations and the Extended Deterrence Dialogues were embraced 
by patrons and clients alike primarily because client states had possessed so little nuclear 
knowledge to begin with. By allowing allies to develop some understanding of how their 
security could be provided for in the event of war, and giving them proximity to the nuclear 
decision-making process, nuclear consultation made an abstract umbrella more concrete.  
Nuclear consultations do not circumscribe or compel the United States’ ultimate use of 
nuclear weapons and do not change the fact that the US President retains sole nuclear war 
making authority. They also do not alter the ambiguous nature of a nuclear guarantee, 
because consultation and planning do not result in any commitments by the United States 
to use nuclear weapons under specific circumstances. These consultation mechanisms do 
not change the probability that the United States will defect from its umbrella allies in crisis 
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or war, or the cost to the client if it does so. 
Deterrence consultations appear to have been embraced by non-nuclear allies 
precisely because clients’ states began with so little information about the nuclear umbrella 
in the first place. Because of the significant nuclear information asymmetry that existed in 
each alliance, the opportunity to acquire basic deterrence literacy was celebrated by clients 
as a major innovation. Mechanisms that made more tangible the otherwise-abstract US 
nuclear guarantee helped clients feel significantly more secure, even if Washington’s 
commitment to use it was not markedly changed. This was manifest in allies’ accession to 
nuclear-related policies to which they had previously been hostile, including West 
Germany’s embrace of Flexible Response and the NPT, and Japan’s endorsement of the 
TLAM-N retirement and the broader belief that the US nuclear stockpile could be reduced 
without undermining extended deterrence. 
 There is much less evidence to support the alternative hypothesis. The United States 
did not initiate consultation arrangements with the aim of securing mutual policy 
adjustment, except in the broadest of senses. Both the NPG and EDD were born at times 
when nuclear patrons were hoping to increase conventional contributions by allies 
broadly, but there is no indication that the United States thought of nuclear consultations 
as a quid pro quo in either case, or that they served that role once they were in place. Nor 
did the United States seek to use these institutions to make their commitments more 
credible by increasing their back-down costs in crisis or war. Indeed, in both instances, the 
patron approach was to hive off nuclear consultations from other defense issues to more 
clearly explain nuclear policy and strategy. To the extent that nuclear consultations 
induced broader defense cooperation, this was at best a secondary motivation and 
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outcome. The United States also did not expect to adjust its own policies to meet allies’ 
needs in either case.  
 The NATO and US-Japan cases permit a number of additional generalizations that 
are consistent with Hypothesis 3. Both nuclear dialogues were formed in similar 
international environments, characterized by increased adversary threats and client fears 
of patron disengagement, especially in the nuclear realm. In both cases, patron and client 
understood there to be a growing strategic threat from an adversary, but the most 
proximate precipitant of nuclear dialogue was the perceived change in commitment from 
the patron.  To US policymakers, the Soviet ICBM threat and advent of strategic parity and 
China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclearization were important background conditions that 
contributed to client states’ abandonment fears. Both the nuclear patron and its clients 
became convinced of the need to share nuclear information in conjunction with impending 
patron revisions to its nuclear strategy and policy in the forms of Flexible Response and the 
2010 NPR, with plans for future arms control.  Increased adversary threat and changes in 
patron commitment combined to create abandonment anxieties that made nuclear 
consultation desirable in Western Europe in the early-to-mid 1960s.  The same forces only 
grew strong enough to break the nuclear gag rule in Japan in the early 21st century.     
 The Thailand “control” case also permits some inferences. Because Thailand was 
from 1954-1977 part of a formal security guarantee in the form of SEATO, and 
subsequently a client in a non-security guarantee defense pact, this case is as close as one 
might hope to come to an alliance “natural” experiment. When SEATO was active, the 
United States resisted but then ultimately agreed to formal military consultation and 
planning mechanisms in response to Thailand’s fears about the regional communist threat. 
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SEATO allies did not request information about US nuclear capabilities, but nuclear 
weapons would have been ill suited to the defense challenges they did face. Had the treaty 
organization lasted, perhaps they would have demanded information to this effect. Once 
SEATO was disbanded, however, and only the hollowed-out Manila Pact remained, 
Thailand did not request nor did the US offer formal defense consultation mechanisms of 
any kind. These are similarly absent from the Rio Pact—Washington’s only other non-
security guarantee defense pact.  
 The evolution of defense consultation in the US-Japan alliance is also instructive. For 
the first 25 years of the alliance, Tokyo wanted to know almost nothing about how it would 
be protected if it were the victim of attack. It changed this view following Nixon’s troop 
withdrawal from Asia, resulting in the earliest form of US-Japan conventional defense 
consultation. Conventional consultation increased again in the late 1990s, after Tokyo’s 
anxieties peaked following the end of the Cold War. Japan only began to request nuclear 
consultation when it faced growing nuclear threats from both China and North Korea, 
however. Recalling that Thailand’s request for military information sharing related to US 
responses to communist subversion, we can infer that detailed defense consultation may 
indeed be a response to the uniquely unilateral and ambiguous character of security 
guarantees. The specific nature of clients’ abandonment fears and patrons’ inclinations to 
provide assurance is, however, calibrated to the types of military threats they face.  
 This relationship between client assurances needs and security institution creation 
may help to shed light on some puzzling results in recent alliance scholarship. Surprisingly, 
scholars have not found a relationship between the level of alliance institutionalization and 
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alliance reliability.778 That is, alliances that begin as more formalized, cooperative 
institutions make it no more likely that alliance partners will join one another if the casus 
foederis of the treaty is actually met.779 One explanation for this may be that important 
alliance institutions evolve over time in response to the alliance security dilemma. 
Measuring levels of institutionalization at alliance formation does not capture this 
evolution. Additionally, if consultation mechanisms are not exclusively or primarily aimed 
at lowering transaction costs in war, as this literature posits, but are used in part as intra-
alliance tools for ameliorating peacetime abandonment fears, these results make more 
sense.  As we have seen, consultation need not induce mutual adjustment or bind partners 
to any particular course of action for it to make an abstract security guarantee more 
tangible.  
The NATO and US-Japan cases also highlighted another assurance factor that is not 
addressed by the theory presented here. The former US Ambassador to NATO and senior 
Japanese officials both noted the importance of consultation mechanisms to client states’ 
legitimacy vis-à-vis their own publics. Harland Cleveland underscored the need for NATO 
allies to seem as though they had access to the place where “destiny decisions” were made; 
Japanese MOFA and MOD officials noted that they still faced challenges in communicating 
that assurance to a public that remains largely anti-nuclear. This study has focused on the 
formation and management of security guarantees from an interstate perspective, but 
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there may be important domestic elements at play.  
If a state, and especially a sovereign democracy, contracts its security to a 
superpower patron, its leaders must not only convince themselves that they will not be 
abandoned at a time of extreme danger, but they must convince their publics of the same. If 
the unilateral and ambiguous nature of security guarantees makes it difficult to assure 
clients, their constituencies will be all the more difficult to reach. Not only can a nuclear 
patron not make public the strategy and policy details that it might be able to share with 
client state leaders, but it is doubtful that a general populace would understand those 
details if it did. Client state leaders may therefore face pressure from both above and below 
to ensure that their vague but existential security commitments will be fulfilled.  
Consultation may give them the information they need to make that case. Related to this is 
the fact that in both cases, client states seem to have believed that nuclear consultations 
conferred some prestige. Moving from a relationship of complete informational ignorance 
to one in which they had a seat at the table to observe unilateral policy and strategy seems 
to have contributed to client states’ beliefs that they held a more equal role in the alliance, 
even if the relationship remained as asymmetric as it had been. The theory explored in this 
project does not account for domestic political or ideational factors per se, but these 
findings highlight the fact that the informational ambiguity and unilateral nature of security 
guarantees matter beyond the realm of defense strictly defined.   
 
Conclusions 
Despite the fact that they have ample incentive to keep their guarantees ambiguous 
and unilateral, we have seen that nuclear patrons may respond to client abandonment fears 
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with the use of consultation mechanisms, in an effort to give allies a clearer picture of 
existing policy and strategy.  Patrons’ form deterrence consultation mechanisms in a 
deliberate effort to respond to clients’ fears of abandonment. And as evidence from all 
three cases suggest, patrons have traditionally formed nuclear consultations to respond to 
nuclear abandonment fears, conventional mechanisms for conventional abandonment 
fears, and none whatsoever when the alliance in question is not a security guarantee. 
Deterrence consultation does not, however, appear to have been intended to change the 
level of cooperation among the allies in an effort to facilitate burden sharing or economies 
of scale, or a more binding guarantee. Patrons set up these mechanisms with little intention 
of making security guarantees any less unilateral.  
The fact that security guarantee partners are able to locate a modus vivendi outcome 
in peacetime, however, does not make it more likely that the patron will be forthcoming in 
war, especially if intervention comes at great cost to itself. Unlike other forms of military 
cooperation, which may bind allies’ wartime fates and change their values for fighting, 
information provision does not change the patron’s willingness to intervene on an allies’ 
behalf. One of the most surprising things about nuclear consultation as an assurance 
mechanism, then, is that it does not meaningfully mitigate the persistent dilemmas that 
characterize these guarantees. It simply focuses and makes them more apparent to their 
recipients.   
The fact that deterrence consultations do not meaningfully alter the unilateral and 
ambiguous nature of security guarantees casts some further light on the underlying 
dynamics of security guarantees. As these case studies demonstrated, simply by virtue of 
having received more information about the unilateral policies and their patrons were 
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already undertaking, client states appear to have been assured by nuclear consultation 
mechanisms. In neither case did the United States increase its commitment to its allies, but 
those allies gained some amount of additional insight into how the United States was 
thinking about that commitment. There remained a significant chance—indeed, probably 
an equal chance to the one that had existed prior to consultation—that patron would fail to 
aid client in wartime. But client anxieties were assuaged because they possessed an 
improved understanding of how their patron might approach the decision of whether or 
not to use nuclear weapons when and if it arose.  
Most defensive alliance arrangements involve a risk of abandonment—there is some 
chance that one ally will fail to aid the other if the casus foederis is invoked. The client may 
have some sense of the probability that it will not receive aid, or it may face abandonment 
uncertainty and also be unsure of the probability that support will be forthcoming. As we 
have seen, however, security guarantees entail several layers of deep uncertainty. Clients 
generally have little a priori knowledge of their patrons’ capabilities, and the conditions 
under which they might be able to use those capabilities in wartime. They also face 
uncertainty over whether the security guarantee is accomplishing its peacetime goal of 
deterring an attack by the adversary in the first place. Deterrence consultation of course 
cannot reveal to the client whether or not its adversary is being deterred. But without 
binding the patron to any particular action or raising the probability of its intervention, it 
dissipates some of the uncertainty surrounding the capabilities that patron might consider 
using on behalf of its client, and the circumstances under which it might see fit to intervene.  
In an alliance with existential stakes but few true guarantees of anything, this reduction in 
uncertainty provides some assurance, even if substantial ambiguity still remains.   
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This examination of deterrence consultation mechanisms permits at least one 
optimistic conclusion. Despite the many reasons that client states have to lament the 
credibility of their security guarantees, they also have incentives to trust them. As we saw 
in both the NATO and the Japan cases, nuclear consultations helped each alliance surmount 
a particularly tumultuous period, and allies welcomed their proximity to patron policy and 
strategy once these institutions were in place.  For all the reasons that a client may doubt 
the ability of an abstract nuclear umbrella to deter and defend on its behalf, security 
independence is costly and comes with its own uncertainties. Security guarantees are 
designed to be long lasting and flexible, and they can accommodate an iterative assurance 
process if patron and client are so invested. As a Japanese official stated, “seeing is 
believing,” and client states would not be clients if they did not want to believe. Without 
paying the costs that we traditionally associate with maintaining credible commitments 
then, it may be possible for patrons and clients to manage abandonment fears in these 







“As de Gaulle has often said, nuclear weapons make alliances obsolete. At the strategic level 
he was right. That is another reason for calling NATO a treaty of guarantee rather than an 
old-fashioned alliance.”780 
-Kenneth N. Waltz 
 
Further Security Guarantee Research 
This dissertation has demonstrated that security guarantees are fundamentally 
different from other “old-fashioned” alliances in the way that they form and the manner 
that they are maintained. Ambiguous treaty content and the unilateral provision of aid 
means that balancing, entrapment, and abandonment all manifest differently in these 
relationships. While I have found strong support for my initial hypotheses, this study is 
necessarily a preliminary exploration of so-called umbrella pacts. I hope that it has served 
to define this sub-class of alliance, identify some important underlying dynamics, and 
convince the reader that Absolute Alliances are, indeed, markedly distinct from other 
defense pacts. But much work remains.  
Future studies of nuclear security guarantees should treat in far more detail the 
alliance dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment. I have identified one unique 
manifestation of each of these in this study, but they exist in many other forms, and the way 
that clients and patrons manage them is central to understanding why these pacts have 
persisted for so long.   I have argued and found support for the notion that these alliances 
may cause patrons to intervene in client crises due to fears of entrapment in wider wars. 
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But the unilateral and ambiguous nature of security guarantees means that clients may also 
have entrapment fears of their own. In particular, clients may worry that nuclear weapons, 
the instruments of catastrophic destruction that support their alliance, may be used on 
their behalf in ways that are inimical to their interests. Indeed, to their continued existence. 
During the Cold War, both Germany and Japan feared that their populations would face 
annihilation at the hands of their own nuclear patron. This same concern has become 
prominent in Seoul in recent years, as South Korea must for the first time entertain the 
possibility of a nuclear attack across the DMZ. Security guarantee clients may also fear 
conventional entrapment in their patron’s wars, as some in Japan have begun to do since 
the United States has debuted its Air Sea Battle concept for engaging China. How precisely 
security guarantees’ vast information deficits and one-sided nature stoke client fears of 
patron entrapment and how these fears are managed is certainly a worthwhile subject of 
further study, and one that must rely heavily on evidence from client states themselves.  
 There may also be instances in which the unilateral provision of information is 
totally insufficient to stem a client state’s fear of abandonment. At the time that Robert 
McNamara was establishing the Nuclear Planning Group, for example, Charles de Gaulle 
was also preparing to exit NATO’s military structure, having already acquired an 
independent deterrent for France. When client states choose to arm themselves in ways 
that contravene patron wishes this is a form of double-abandonment. Client states’ own 
fears that they will not be protected in times of need result in their defection from a 
patron’s guarantee. While nuclear proliferation by security guarantee clients is quite 
uncommon—a surprising fact, given the vexing information problems explored here—
many more client states have seriously considered and abandoned independent nuclear 
299 
weapons programs, or pursued particular conventional capabilities over their patrons’ 
objections.781 Good work is presently being done on client states’ inclinations towards 
nuclear proliferation, but the conventional dimension of this dual abandonment dilemma 
has not been closely studied.782   
Beyond these additional entrapment and abandonment dimensions, future work 
should also investigate how major changes in the international system shape and redound 
within security guarantee alliances. Russia’s decision to completely dismantle the Warsaw 
Pact, and later found the Collective Security Treaty Organization is one important line of 
inquiry, which may be difficult to undertake due to a lack of available sources. The US 
decision to repurpose and expand NATO is a parallel security guarantee study that would 
suffer from far fewer evidentiary afflictions. Another research agenda is an investigation of 
how security guarantees may interact with the rise of a new major power. This line of 
inquiry will be discussed later in this chapter.  Beyond these avenues for future research, 
however, this dissertation also speaks broadly to the continued relevance of the study of 
security guarantees and has some important implications for policy practitioners.  
 
Absolute Alliances in History and Policy 
Nuclear umbrella alliances are often discussed as relics and vestiges of the Cold War. 
While there can be no doubt that the superpower standoff was their genesis, this project 
opened with the observation that this category of defensive alliance is much broader than 
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NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It includes alliances that were extended by the USSR and the 
United States in Asia, and Great Britain also extended its own guarantees. It also includes 
post-Cold War cases, with the United States adding Eastern European members to NATO 
and Russia extending its umbrella to the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moreover, 
as this project has demonstrated, there are significant similarities between these pacts 
across time and space—parallels that can be best understood with an eye to security 
guarantees’ vague content and the fact that they provide unidirectional support. The 
abandonment anxieties that plague the Japanese in the early 21st century are not so 
different than those that seized NATO in the 1960s, and similar tools for addressing those 
appear to be effective.  
The end of the Cold War brought with it the widespread belief that extended 
deterrence and the security guarantees through which it is imparted would cease to be 
relevant tools of foreign policy.  Recent trends and events, from China’s rise, to North 
Korea’s nuclearization and Iran’s quest for the bomb, to Russia’s invasion of its former 
Warsaw Pact ally, Ukraine, however, reveal that this is not so. This study generates some 
insights on the future of nuclear security guarantees in practice as well as in theory.  
 
The Enemy of my Friend in the 21st Century 
 Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that security guarantees are likely to form where a 
prospective patron and client have exclusively-shared adversaries. That is, the client does 
not have adversaries that the patron does not also share. This is because the ambiguous 
and unilateral nature of umbrella alliances mean that a patron cannot tailor its signaling to 
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a given client adversary, and risks making new enemies and being dragged into war if it 
extends a guarantee to an ally who has unshared foes.  
 Principal US policymakers, including President Barack Obama and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, have stated that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the United States may 
extend its “security umbrella” over the Gulf.783 The United States, however, has not 
extended a new security guarantee since 1954, and there is reason to believe that this 
would be difficult to achieve domestically.  Beyond this, we have good reason to doubt 
whether a US umbrella would be possible in the Gulf, even if the US Senate supported such 
a move.   
If Iran does go nuclear, the United States will be concerned primarily with 
reassuring the Arab monarchies that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council, in addition to 
Israel. The GCC states, however, all have adversaries that the United States does not share.  
The Gulf monarchies have persistent territorial and political rivalries amongst themselves, 
and many also count longstanding US partners, including Turkey and Israel, among their 
foes. This makes it highly unlikely that US policymakers would actually decide to extend 
formal treaty guarantees to these states. 784  Chapters 2 and 3 suggest two alternative 
courses of action.  
 First, US policymakers may find it prudent to keep alliance relations with Gulf States 
informal, as in the case of Israel. In this type of relationship, the United States may provide 
Gulf States with second-order deterrent tools in the form of augmented arms sales, defense 
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training, and relatively informal military advising. The United States may maintain a 
political affiliation with the GCC as an organization, but give military aid and consult on a 
bilateral basis, for the purposes of avoiding intra-Gulf lines of enmity. Washington must be 
aware, however that the failure to extent to these prospective partners formal guarantees 
means that it will have less control over Gulf monarchies’ armament decisions as a result, 
as Chapter 4 underscored. This is particularly worrisome in the case of Saudi Arabia. If Iran 
goes nuclear, experts debate whether Saudi Arabia may develop its own arsenal, or attempt 
to purchase a small stockpile from Pakistan—the Islamabad deterrent.785 Some have also 
argued that and Iranian bomb may cause Pakistan to become a nuclear patron for the first 
time, extending a formal guarantee to the Saudis.786 Given serious concerns about 
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control, this is a terrifying prospect. 
 A second option for the United States is to extend new, formal treaty promises to 
GCC states, but to stop short of extending broad, one-sided security guarantees. Indeed, as 
the Franco-Russian case instructs, prospective allies can press forward with formal pacts 
despite unshared adversaries if they make those alliances specific and contingent. It has 
extended relatively few non-guarantee defense pacts, but this does not prevent Washington 
from reconsidering its treaty design under changed circumstances. Given that the United 
States faces resource constraints that it did not in the early Cold War, and because its 
leaders are fundamentally uncertain how deeply and permanently invested they want to be 
in the Middle East, policymakers should explore the possibility of extending more specific 
defense pacts. These could make US aid to Gulf states conditional on a crisis or conflict with 
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Iran—the most –likely, shared adversary—without requiring Washington to make broader, 
more polarizing commitments. It is possible, however, that Iran would find ways to 
undermine these contingent commitments, such as through the use of proxy groups like 
Hezbollah. To maximize the deterrence power of an Iran-directed defense commitment, 
Washington may want to consider including proxy groups as adversaries in any new 
agreements. It should, however, return with great caution to a more traditional defense 
pact structure, and insure that none of its agreements involve secret clauses, and that its 
promises in crises are consistent with those objects over which it is actually willing to fight.  
 The exclusive rivalry alliance formation condition also generates insights on US 
alliances in Asia. When it extended security guarantees in the Pacific in the early Cold War, 
the United States relied primarily on a “hub-and-spokes” system of bilateral alliances. This 
made good sense: many of its prospective allies had at least one enemy that Washington 
did not share—Japan.  With the Second World War barely a memory, there was little hope 
of cooperation between Tokyo and other Pacific powers, and the US-Japan alliance was 
originally the second phase of US occupation.  With China rising and the legacy of World 
War II in the distance, however, the patterns of enmity that governed early-Cold War 
alliance formation no longer prevail. This does not mean that that bilateral alliances will be 
folded into a multilateral structure—historical contingency and organizational stickiness 
will likely prevent this—but it does mean that US security guarantees in East Asia may 
come to resemble webs as opposed to spokes.   
 As US allies in the Pacific grow increasingly alarmed by China’s rise, we should 
expect deepening defense cooperation between US security guarantee partners. This will 
include the rise of trilateral relationships such as the United States, Japan, and Australia 
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and the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. Without requiring new formal treaty 
commitments, we can expect to see regular, sustained cooperation among US client states 
that now share a potential adversary. We may also expect to see the formation of more 
intra-regional security relationships and institutions, as US clients who are used to being 
on the unilateral end of a broad security guarantee see fit to make deterrence more 
tangible by doing more for themselves.  
The original conditions that shaped US alliance structures in the Pacific are not 
wholly transformed, however: To Washington’s consternation, the longstanding rivalry 
between Japan and South Korea remains intense and impedes cooperation on North Korea 
and China between these two close US allies.  While many US allies are supportive of 
Tokyo’s decision to reinterpret Article 9, the “peace” clause of its constitution, and to begin 
some foreign military sales, Seoul remains highly concerned that these are signs of 
resurgent militarism. This example aside, however, the United States is likely to find that its 
friends in Asia increasingly share adversaries, with few or no unshared adversaries among 
them.  
 
Immediate Entrapment Ahead? 
 As Chapter 4 demonstrated, the unilateral and ambiguous nature of security 
guarantees may mean that patrons feel a pull to intervene in relatively peripheral client 
state crises, lest that weaker ally be defeated, dragging the patron into a wider and more 
serious war. This lower-level crisis entrapment may be the price that patrons’ pay for the 
higher-order deterrence that may dissuade challengers from attacking clients in the first 
place, but this tradeoff is near impossible to measure empirically. As we have seen, if 
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patrons become overly anxious about crisis entrapment, they can take steps to reduce the 
unilateral or ambiguous nature of their guarantee. But before discussing these, it is worth 
considering the alliances in which the United States is likely to face crisis entrapment.  
 The most obvious present-day analogues to the Taiwan Straits Crises lie in the East 
and South China Seas. In these regions, two US umbrella clients lay claim to islands whose 
sovereignty is disputed. In the South China Sea, the gravest concern is the Philippines’ 
claims in the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and Vietnam. In the East China Sea, the serious concern is Japan’s claim to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are also claimed by China and Taiwan. As in the US-ROC 
pact, the status of these islands in the alliance is highly ambiguous and raises serious 
questions about when the United States might intervene in a war over them on Japan or the 
Philippines’ behalf, if it would at all.  
  The ambiguity surrounding disputed islands varies substantially between the US-
Philippines and US-Japan alliances. The United States has officially adopted a position of 
neutrality towards the sovereignty claims of all Pacific claimant states. In 2012, during a 
standoff over the Scarborough Shoals, it declined to declare that its security guarantee to 
the Philippines in any way applied to the area, and forced its ally to negotiate with China.  
This resulted in Manila being ousted from the area after Beijing failed to uphold its side of 
the deal. Washington has made clear that it intends to defend the Philippines home islands 
if they are attacked, but has not suggested any broader alliance commitment than that.  
 The situation in the East China Sea is quite different. The disputed Senkakus are part 
of the Ryukyu Islands, which include Okinawa and were administered by the United States 
for nearly three decades after the Second World War. While the United States’ neutrality on 
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sovereignty disputes applies to these islands, it also takes the position that the US-Japan 
security guarantee applies to them by virtue of the fact that Japan administers them. 
According to Washington, Tokyo has done so since it reverted control of the Ryukyus in 
1972, and the security guarantee stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the 
territories under the Administration of Japan.” 787  The fact that Article 5 of the treaty 
applies to the islands, however, says nothing about the actions that the United States would 
actually take if Japan became embroiled in conflict there. As we know, the treaty does not 
compel Washington to take any specific action under any particular circumstance. With 
almost no vested national interest in these uninhabited atolls, a strong compunction to 
avoid war with China, and the closest US military installation some 200 miles away, 
Washington may well hesitate to join a Senkaku skirmish.  
 Could the United States or its allies take actions to mitigate the risk of crisis 
entrapment over disputed territory in the Pacific? In the East China Sea, Washington has 
already taken some steps to reduce ambiguity over its position. In 2012, Secretary Clinton 
reaffirmed that the US-Japan alliance applied to the Senkakus by virtue of Japanese 
administration, and added a warning that the United States would oppose efforts to change 
by force Japanese administration of the islands. This was intended to signal to both Japan 
and China that Beijing could not undermine the US security guarantee through salami-
tactics or a fait accompli seizure that rendered Japanese administration inapplicable. 
Whether and how the United States would fight for these islands remains uncertain, and 
this is an alliance focal point as the Washington and Japan revise their bilateral defense 
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guidelines in late 2014. Of course, if the United States makes more apparent the conditions 
of its intervention, it may increases general deterrence while raising the price of its own 
non-fulfillment of the pact if Beijing should mount a challenge.  
 Where the unilateral nature of the US-Japan alliance is concerned, Tokyo is already 
taking steps to provide for its own defense at lower levels of escalation, which may reduce 
the United States’ impetus for immediate crisis intervention. Japan is in the process of 
reinterpreting Article 9 of its constitution, which will allow it to give security assistance for 
the first time, rather than solely being a recipient of US defensive aid. It is also seriously 
contemplating the development of long-range missile capabilities, which have long been 
prohibited as offensive weaponry. If Tokyo moves forward with these initiatives, this 
increases the chance that it could take sole or primary responsibility for a Senkaku 
campaign. But as always, independent patron capabilities also raise the risk that the United 
States could become entrapped by virtue of that independent action.  
 Ambiguity in the US-Philippines relationship presents itself quite differently. Where 
the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal are concerned, the United States has reaffirmed its 
defense commitment to the Philippines, but has declined the Philippines’ request to state 
publicly that the mutual defense treaty covers the disputed territory.788 Even if the United 
States does not acknowledge Philippine administration, however, it still retains the right to 
intervene in the dispute because the US-Philippines treaty includes a provision for aid in 
                                                           




the case of an attack on either party’s “armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the 
Pacific.”789  
Unlike in the Japanese case, where Washington has incrementally reduced the 
ambiguity of its treaty commitment to the Senkakus, it has done little to specify any South 
China Sea interests on behalf of the Philippines. Instead, it has pressed for mediation by the 
Association for South East Asian Nations, and supported the Philippines’ decision to bring 
international arbitration against China.790  If Washington sought to reduce this South China 
Sea ambiguity without increasing its commitments, it could, of course circumscribe the 
Philippines’ claims from the treaty. This may, however, lead Beijing to feel emboldened, 
and that these reefs and islets are its for the taking.  It seems reasonable to assume that the 
US-Philippines treaty guarantee will retain its present form. If the Philippines does become 
victim of a Chinese attack in the Spratlys, however, Washington may nonetheless see fit to 
intervene.  At present, then, it may be mitigating its own risk of crisis entrapment by 
increasing the risk of crisis instability later.  
If the United States did intervene in a South China Sea conflict, one likely reason 
would be the fact that the Philippines is so weak. With a feeble Coast Guard and Navy, 
Washington’s failure to back Manila in armed conflict against Beijing would almost 
certainly lead to the former’s defeat. In the last few years, Washington has increased Coast 
Guard aid to Manila, and recently signed an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement, which gives 
it rotational base access, but these actions only underscore the Philippines’ scant capacity 
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for self-defense.791 Because of US alliance ambiguity and the Philippines’ maritime 
weakness, patron crisis entrapment seems to be the most serious risk in the South China 
Sea.  
In both Japan and the Philippines, the United States may see fit to reduce the 
ambiguity of its commitments with its allies, even if it does not do so publicly. If 
Washington specifies to its clients, for example, that it will only provide military aid over an 
island dispute if Japan or the Philippines is the victim of a completely unprovoked attack at 
these sites, this reduces the chance that either ally assumes it will have US backing in all 
territorial contingencies. Of course, it is very difficult to know how to define an 
“unprovoked” attack, and as the Taiwan Straits Crises demonstrate, to know if one has 
occurred, especially if it takes place at sea.   
 
The Future of Allied Assurance 
 As Chapter 5 demonstrated, alliances consultation mechanisms may be useful tools 
for engaging client state abandonment fears, despite the fact that they do not necessarily 
strengthen security guarantees. Although deterrence dialogues have recently been 
instituted in South Korea and Japan, these are likely to become ever-more important as 
China continues to rise, especially in Tokyo.  Because it has had little exposure to nuclear or 
conventional deterrence strategy until very recently, Japan will naturally have new alliance 
anxieties that are not yet addressed by the Extended Deterrence Dialogues as China’s 
military reach expands. Deepening existing consultations and adding new elements to 
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address the client’s perceived threats, such as conventional exercises that address Beijing’s 
growing Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities and tactics would help to engage those 
concerns.  
Additionally, the United States has no standing deterrence consultations with the 
Philippines, despite the fact that this is one of its oldest umbrella guarantees. Assuming that 
China continues to press its claims in the South China Sea , the United States may see fit to 
establish formal consultations with Manila to engage the abandonment anxieties that it is 
likely to feel as competition near its coastline increases. 
 In Europe, US policymakers are already facing a resurgence of abandonment anxiety 
among NATO allies, but this time the angst will be found primarily among the alliance’s 
newest members. Russia’s invasion of Crimea has stoked fears in Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia that they will be the next victims of lower-level aggression and coercion. This is, of 
course, unlikely, as Moscow is well aware that any military action against a NATO ally 
would provoke a far different international response that the one it faced over Ukraine. But 
this logic is unlikely to calm jittery Baltic States. This is a particularly difficult conundrum, 
because some of the tools that nuclear patrons have often used to manifest their otherwise-
vague treaty commitments to specific allies, such as forward-deployed troops or nuclear 
weapons, are unavailable to the United States in this case.  
NATO has pledged through a 1997 act not to permanently station troops or NSNWs 
on the soil of the alliance’s newest members.792 The most overt security guarantee signals 
that a patron can send to its adversaries and allies cannot be used in this case, at least not 
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on a permanent basis. This means that candid, regular consultation will be especially 
important to reassure anxious clients.  Additionally, because many of the most 
apprehensive European states were only admitted to NATO in 2004, they have had minimal 
exposure to US nuclear strategy and policy. The NPG meets only once a year and these 
states do not participate in the more regular work of the HLG, so they have very limited 
deterrence-relevant information compared to their Western European counterparts. This 
suggests that “special” deterrence consultations—crash courses in NATO defense and 
deterrence policies and strategies —may be helpful in addressing these newer clients’ 
fears. Special contingency planning and exercises with these allies may also be advisable.   
 This NATO assurance challenge is likely to be accompanied by another intra-alliance 
problem: NATO states near Russia’s borders are experiencing significant abandonment 
anxiety, while Western European countries have been hesitant to react to Russia’s Ukraine 
transgressions. How will the alliance undertake the signaling necessary to assuage newer 
members without the full backing of the original allies? One can imagine, for example, that 
Eastern European states would like to see the alliance abandon its “Adaptive Planning” 
process and resume explicit preparations for nuclear contingencies that involve Russia. 
Whether or not this will appeal to “Old Europe,” however, is another question entirely. Put 
differently, NATO expansion came at a time when the allies considered resurgent Russia a 
potential, but mostly theoretical foe. The threat from Moscow has since become manifest to 
many former Soviet states, but Western European countries do not judge it to be nearly so 
pressing. How a multilateral security guarantee signals its commitment when members do 
not agree on the extent of the threat from the shared adversary is no small problem. In all 
likelihood, it is also one that is likely to fall to the United States as unidirectional guarantor. 
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 Far from being a Cold War alliance concern, security guarantee formation and 
entrapment and abandonment continue to present themselves in unique ways by virtue of 
the unilateral and ambiguous nature of these pacts. These dilemmas may reveal themselves 
in novel contexts, but many of the patterns are familiar and the tradeoffs are no less vexing.  
 
Extended Deterrence in Transition 
 This study suggests another research agenda that is relevant to both IR theorists 
and policymakers. As I have demonstrated, security guarantees are unique to the nuclear 
age, and until very recently, extended deterrence was thought of as a defunct Cold War 
concern. Scholars have not considered the fact that we have never experienced a major 
power transition when the dominant state in the international system has a longstanding 
network of security guarantees in place.793  
When modern extended deterrence was conceived in the late 1940s, the Cold War 
was already under way. The international system was clearly bipolar in its structure, and 
the superpowers’ alliances were instruments for consolidating their spheres of influence. 
NATO was founded after the Soviets had fortified their reach in Eastern Europe in the 
immediate postwar years. Its military structure was largely a response to the first Soviet 
nuclear test in 1949 and North Korea’s 1950 invasion of the South. The Warsaw Pact was, 
similarly, a reaction to West Germany’s rearmament and accession to NATO. Security 
guarantees were, at the outset, a symptom, rather than a cause, of major power rivalry, 
although they certainly became a catalyst for conflict as the Cold War dragged on. 
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Today, the vast majority of the United States’ Cold War extended deterrence 
commitments remain in place and have been adapted to new security challenges, including 
China’s rise. Never before has a new major power risen in a region that is rife with 
another’s extended deterrence guarantees. Power transition theorists have argued that 
alliances may help to stabilize the status quo during a time of structural change, but 
scholars and strategists have not analyzed this proposition in any detail. 794 
Power transitions are particularly fragile moments for the international system. We 
should expect that the existence of umbrella guarantees may have some effect on the 
likelihood of conflict during a tenuous period. At times of stasis as well as transition, all 
states exhibit some degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the distribution of benefits 
in the international system.795 The most powerful states have typically had the most 
influence in creating the existing order, and they therefore benefit disproportionally from 
that system. In times of stability, the distribution of power is well matched with the 
distribution of benefits. Those states that are satisfied with the status quo have little 
incentive to alter the status quo while those states that are dissatisfied have little ability to 
do so.  
Power transitions, however, upend this condition by skewing the distribution of 
power and the distribution of benefits. When weak states acquire power relative to their 
stronger peers, power is typically transferred from more satisfied to less satisfied states. 
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Moreover, an increase in a state’s capabilities may motivate that state to desire a change in 
the prevailing order.796  
Extended deterrence complicates this dynamic condition precisely because it is a 
tool of status quo preservation. As we know, the United States and Soviet Union brought 
allies under their umbrellas to prevent changes to the political and territorial status quo 
and to exercise some influence over their client states’ security policies. These alliances 
were intended to lock in each superpower’s sphere of influence.  
Decades on, the United States still maintains most of its Cold War guarantees, but 
has repurposed them to meet contemporary defense challenges.  This has been possible in 
large part because the treaties themselves are so vague, and specify almost nothing about 
their targets. But while Washington views its robust alliance presence in the Pacific as a 
fundamental part of the political status quo, Beijing increasingly argues that its continued 
presence there is revisionist—the vestige of a bygone conflict that should have been 
dismantled along with the Berlin Wall. 797  Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for the 
creation of an Asian alliance that excludes the United States and suggested that US 
guarantees create a moral hazard problem among its clients.798 Alliances, which Glenn 
Snyder has called “quasi-structural,” may be more than a quasi-problem as Chinese power 
continues to grow and the structure of the international system itself shifts.  
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How precisely may US security guarantees affect the propensity for conflict during a 
power transition? This study suggests that they may reduce the risk of some types of 
conflict, while increasing the risk of others. If power transitions are generally associated 
with some changes to the political and territorial status quo, extended deterrence may 
forestall these. Although the treaty guarantees themselves contain almost no information, 
the fact that US alliances with South Korea and Japan have been in place for 60 years means 
that close political relationships have followed these treaty guarantees. If Beijing had any 
interest in attacking Tokyo or Seoul, which it probably does not, it could not do so and 
expect Washington to stand aside. Where guarantees have been maintained over long 
periods of time, red lines are drawn and vital interests manifested.   
Washington’s intent to defend its client states is not always so apparent, however.  
Its alliance with the Philippines was hollowed out after Manila ejected it from Clark Air 
Force Base and Subic Bay in 1992, and is only just being restored in response to China’s 
rise. Taiwan is no longer a full security guarantee client, but holds a contingent defense 
commitment from the United States in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act. 799 And as 
noted above, several US treaty allies have territorial claims whose status within the 
broader alliance is uncertain. Where US actions over time have not clarified its clients or 
parts of their territory to be vital interests, its guarantee treaties continue to provide little 
evidence of how precisely it may respond in specific contingencies, if at all. It is in these 
ambiguous areas that extended deterrence may raise the risk of conflict in a power 
transition.  
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Fuzzy commitments may present appealing targets for opportunism if a rising 
power is dissatisfied with the political and territorial order in any way. Where US alliance 
commitments are poorly defined, China may calculate that it can challenge those 
incrementally, in an effort to reveal the United States’ limited interests and erode 
confidence in its guarantees. How the United States is likely to react to such challenges, 
even where its interests are minimal, however, is another question.   
In general, when a dominant state is faced with a rising challenger, it has at least 
four possible avenues of recourse: retrenchment, burden-sharing with allies, 
accommodation, or preventive war.800  The United States is already encouraging greater 
burden sharing within its alliances, but a formal system of extended deterrence makes it 
much harder for it to contemplate even limited alliance retrenchment. If it forswears or 
fails to make good on any one commitment, policymakers are likely to worry that allies and 
adversaries alike will make broader inferences about the remainder of its umbrella. 
Because its treaty commitments are vague and long-lasting, the United States is unlikely to 
be able to dismantle any of these selectively, or to allow them to lapse over time. Moreover, 
the fact that the United States has ambiguous commitments to specific allies or territories 
does not mean that it will not act to defend them if China uses coercion or force in those 
areas. But in cases like these, where US interests are less than clear, security guarantee 
commitments may invite crisis instability or conflict between the two superpowers where 
it might otherwise have been avoided. This phenomenon may be thought of as a Clarity-
Ambiguity Paradox of security guarantees.  
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 This paradox leads us once again to the dilemma of whether the United States 
should clarify or circumscribe its guarantees in the face of entrapment risks. If it explicitly 
states a willingness to fight for the Senkaku Islands or Scarborough Shoal, it must be 
prepared to do so. Alternatively, if it communicates to its allies and allows China to infer 
that it will not defend certain territories or states, it can expect to be challenged there. The 
existence of an alliance treaty, however, makes it harder for it to back away from a less-
than-vital commitment, making it more likely that the United States will stand firm despite 
the fact that its vested political interests do not require it.  
 One key difference between the Cold War conflict and the emerging US-China 
dynamic, however, is that Washington and Beijing are not sworn adversaries; US allies in 
East Asia do not at present need to choose between their economic and social ties to China 
and their close security and political ties to the United States. Both Washington and Beijing 
also have strong incentives to convince one another that they seek to avoid war. In addition 
to the long-employed influence strategies of extended deterrence and assurance that are 
associated with security guarantees, then, the 21st century has already seen an emphasis on 
a third strategy: adversary reassurance, whereby one power seeks to convince a potential 
foe that no harm will come to it if it acts with restraint.  
The desire to send benign signals to China may well inform some of the security 
guarantee dynamics studied here. The United States may, for example, be less likely to 
intervene militarily in an ally’s crisis for fear of provoking China, and less inclined to rely 
on overt signaling on behalf of its allies. This, in turn, may make assurance through 
consultation all the more important as umbrella allies worry whether Washington’s efforts 
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to defuse US-China tensions are indicators that its patron will not support it militarily 
against Beijing.  
Even with this profound change—the rise of a new major power that is not 
necessarily a sworn adversary—it seems highly unlikely that US security guarantees will be 
transformed or dismantled. In many ways, both the United States and its East Asian client 
states are relying more heavily on these relationships now than they ever have. Instead, as 
in the case of NATO, these security guarantees’ vagueness will likely allow them to adapt to 
patron and clients’ needs as power shifts and the international context changes. The 
longest-lasting alliances in international politics are likely to persist, precisely because they 
promise so much and specify so little. What Thomas Schelling remarked of deterrence 
commitments in general is doubly true of these Absolute Alliances: “we can wait—
preferably forever; that’s our purpose.”801 
 
  
                                                           
801 Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 72.  
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